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INTRODUCTION
The Rifkin case, which this article presents in abridged form,
shows just how awkward a major bank, a prosecutor's office, and
one of the biggest bank thieves in history can appear when computer crime brings them face-to-face with unfamiliar problems. It is
a case rich with unusual facts, but not uniquely so. These unexpected facts are part of what makes studying computer crime so rewarding. One does not know what the investigator, the business
person, the judge, or the criminal will do next. When it comes to
computer crime, they are all amateurs much of the time, and thus
they seem more like you or me. They are, as we often are, caught
up in an ethos not entirely their own.
What follows consists of a selection of those documents from
United States v. Rifkin (CR #78-1050-WMB, United States District
Court, Central District of California) which are most illustrative of
the factual and legal aspects of the case that make it of interest to
students of computer crime. Preceding the documents is a rather
detailed summary of the case, in effect a prose cross-reference to
the documentary highlights. The footnote references refer first to
the document, and then to the page within that document. The following table lists the documents.
1. Motion to Suppress Evidence Seized as a Result of the Defendant's Arrest
2. Government's Response to Defendant's Motions to Suppress
Evidence
3. Defendant's Reply to Government's Response
4. Government's Memorandum Re Admissibility of Depositions
Taken in Switzerland
5. Declaration of Robin Brown Re Depositions to be Taken in Switzerland
6. Declaration Re Procedures to be Followed in Swiss Depositions
7. Government's Declaration of Robin Brown Re Expected Testimony of Witnesses in Switzerland
8. Reporter's Transcript, February 6,1979
9. Reporter's Transcript, February 22, 1979

I. THE CRIME
"Diamonds," Gary Goodgame said. Diamonds would be the best
solution to Stanley Mark Rifkin's problem.
It was the middle of the summer in 1978, and Rifkin sought attorney Goodgame's legal advice. Claiming to represent a "Fortune
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500" corporation, Rifkin told Goodgame that his principal wanted an
"untraceable commodity" so that it could deal with another corporation. There were "political reasons" for his concern, Rifkin explained. Rifkin knew nothing about diamonds, and would need
assistance in purchasing the diamonds. Goodgame suggested that
Lon Stein, a diamond broker, could do the job.'
Rifkin's job at that time involved the creation of a "back-up"
system for the "wire room" of the Security Pacific National Bank in
Los Angeles. 2 The "wire room" is the hub of a communications system which handles some two to four billion dollars of fund transfers
every day for the bank. The "back-up" system would allow the bank
to continue to make fund transfers if its primary system became inoperable. To accomplish this task, Rifkin had to learn how the system currently in operation worked, and to be sure that all of the key
elements were carried over into the system that he was helping to
design. There were no specifications available to explain how the
money transfer system worked, so Rifkin interviewed a number of
bank employees who worked in the wire room to find out. This research provided Rifkin with an excellent opportunity to educate
3
himself as well.
As his education continued, Rifkin's interest in diamonds continued to grow. He met with Lon Stein for the first time in June of
1978, and asked if Stein could buy ten million dollars worth of
diamonds for him. "Impossible," Stein replied. 4 He said that the
a single transaction,
quantity was too large, it could not be done in
5
or even a small number of large transactions.
Rifkin persisted. He and Stein spoke many times between June
and October 25, discussing different methods of payment, and different ways in which the diamonds might be purchased. 6 Finally,
agreement was reached. Stein would go to Geneva to see if he could
arrange the transaction with Russalmaz, a Russian government
7
agency that sold diamonds.
Shortly before October 25, 1978, Rifkin left his work at National
Semi-Conductor "for personal reasons. '8 On October 25, he went to
the Security Pacific wire room. Rosemary Hanses met him at the
door and asked him what he was doing there. He replied "that I was
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Document 2, at 543.
Document 9, at 665.
Id.
Id. at 668.
Id. at 669.
Id. at 670-74.
Id. at 674.
Document 2, at 546.
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doing a study."9 Indeed he was. Rifkin timed the operators and took
counts of transactions to see if the wire transfer system was working any better than it had been previously functioning. 10 Apparently
it was not. Rifkin decided to continue with his plan to rob the bank.
In order to transfer money through the wire system, it was necessary for an authorized employee to use a code symbol. Looking at
a slip of paper on the wall inside the wire room, Rifkin was able to
copy the code. Then he left." Then Rifkin went to a pay phone located nearby and called the wire transfer room. 12 He said he was
Mike Hansen, of the International Department of Security Pacific
National Bank, and requested that $10.2 million be transferred to an
account in the Irving Trust Company in New York. From there the
amount was to be transferred for credit through the Wozchod
13
Handels Bank in Zurich, Switzerland.
It was at this point that the pieces of Rifkin's plan began to
come together. Ruzzalmaz, the Russian diamond trading agency,
maintained an account in the Wozchod Handels Bank.14 Its director,
Alex Malinin, received a telegram,' 5 ostensibly from a Mr. Nelson, to
the effect that one Lon Stein was a representative of the Security
Pacific National Bank, and that he had funds for the purchase of
diamonds from Russalmaz. Mr. Nelson, the head of the wire room at
Security Pacific National Bank, had not sent the telegram; Stanley
Mark Rifkin had, two Weeks before he caused the funds to be transferred.' 6
Stein flew to Geneva on the 25th of October, and soon went to
work. Between noon on October 26th, and the evening of October
27th, he examined the purchased $8.145 million worth of Russian
17
diamonds.
After effecting the funds transfer, Rifkin went home and
"thought a lot about taking the next step." He decided to proceed.
The next morning he boarded a plane for Switzerland. 18 On arrival
he called Russalmaz. The money had not yet been credited to their
account. Finally, the Zurich bank got telegraphic confirmation that
the money had been transferred to its New York account with Irving
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Document
Id. at 679.
Id. at 680.
Id. at 681.
Document
Document
Id. at 619.
Document
Document
Document

9, at 678.

2, at 512.
7, at 615.
9, at 696-98.
2, at 544.
9, at 684.
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Trust Company. They called Russalmaz in Geneva, told them the
19
money was there, and the transaction was virtually complete.
The next day, Rifkin picked up a baggage ticket for a piece of
luggage from the managing director of Russalmaz. He boarded a
plane for Luxembourg assured that the diamonds would accompany
Spalter, who sat next to him, "I
him. 20 En route, Rifkin told Jacques
'21
am a very wealthy man now."
But it was not until he got to his hotel in Luxembourg that
Rifkin finally got to see the diamonds. Only then was he sure that
the scheme had really worked. His reaction: "I was aghast." "I
didn't have the slightest idea what to do." He decided that the only
logical thing to do was to go back to the United States. 22 Rifkin then
took the diamonds and reduced their bulk, taking several of them
out of small packages and putting them into a smaller number of
them in a transparent
larger packages. He put the whole bunch of
23
container made to store folded dress shirts.
By October 29th, Rifkin was back in Los Angeles. He called attorney Goodgame, and told him that he desperately need to speak
with him, saying that he had not taken Goodgame's24 advice not to abscond with the diamonds he planned to purchase.
On the 30th, Rifkin met Goodgame in L'Ermitage Hotel in Beverly Hills. He filled an ashtray to overflowing with diamonds and
gave Goodgame three of the stones. He told Goodgame that he had
made an unauthorized wire transfer from Security Pacific National
Bank, and added that he had acquired a new identity and was going
to "places unknown." He also gave Goodgame documents to dissolve the company through which he had purported to purchase the
diamonds. 25 The next day, Goodgame, in the company of his attorney, appeared at the Los Angeles office of the FBI and told an agent
of his contacts with Rifkin.
By November 1st, Rifkin was in Rochester, New York, sitting in
a hearing concerning rate increases for the Rochester telephone
company. He was there to see Paul O'Brien, whom he had last seen
during the summer of 1976. Rifkin explained that he had received
payments in the form of cash and diamonds as a result of a West
German land deal, and he wanted to convert the diamonds to cash.
For this purpose Rifkin wanted O'Brien to set up a New York City19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 685-86.
Id. at 689.
Document 7, at 620.
Document 9, at 690-91.
Id. at 691-92.
Document 2, at 543-44.
Id.
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based diamond brokerage. While O'Brien was thinking the proposition over, Rifkin told him that he could not be contacted since
"Stanley Rifkin" was not in Rochester. Rifkin explained that he had
done something several months ago that he had always wanted to
do-he had disappeared. 26 The discussions continued, with Rifkin
giving O'Brien $6,000 to initiate their relationship. O'Brien agreed to
approach his superiors at the telephone company to arrange a leave
of absence to handle Rifkin's business affairs. He was to discuss the
leave on Friday afternoon, and Rifkin was to call him Saturday
morning. The president of the phone company had agreed to
O'Brien's leave of absence, and O'Brien was watching television Friday night, November 3rd, when he saw a news item concerning a
multi-million dollar bank theft in Los Angeles. The story identified
the thief as Stanley Rifkin and identified the victim as Security Pacific National Bank. Immediately O'Brien attempted to reach the
appropriate parties in Los Angeles and, unable to do so, called the
Buffalo, New York office of the FBI.
II.

How

RIFKIN WAS CAUGHT

Rifkin's admissions to attorney Gary Goodgame gave the FBI a
substantial lead in attempting to catch him. After receiving Goodgame's information, federal agents spoke with officials at Security
Pacific National Bank and confirmed that the unauthorized wire
transfer had taken place.27 Then Lon Stein was interviewed, and he
confirmed that he had gone to Switzerland and purchased diamonds
at Rifkin's request. The bank ordinarily tape recorded all telephone
orders to transfer money, and it had recorded Rifkin's transfer as
well. Stein listened to the recording and identified the voice of the
person purporting to be Mike Hanson as that of Stanley Mark
Rifkin. Goodgame had surrendered the diamonds Rifkin gave him,
and Stein was able to identify them as similar to the ones that he
28
had purchased.
In an effort to find Rifkin, FBI agents checked his last known address, an apartment in Sepulveda, California, and gathered background on Rifkin from driver's and vehicle license information. The
next day, three people identified as employees of Rifkin's company
were interviewed. They said that Rifkin had a room in a motel in La
Jolla, California. Rifkin's mother was interviewed and she gave further identifying information about her son. 29 Based on the informa26.
27.
28.
29.

Document 3, at 598.
Document 2, at 512.
Id. at 512-13.
Id. at 545-46.
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tion already received, the United States Attorney's Office in Los
Angeles issued an arrest warrant for Rifkin, and a complaint charg30
ing him with interstate transportation of stolen property.
The investigation continued as the FBI tried to locate Rifkin.
They spoke with Mary Bruskotter, whom they characterized as his
girlfriend. They checked the National Crime Information Center,
and interviewed "known relatives, former associates, former employers, and those to whom Rifkin was connected via notes, memoranda, and unfounded information."'3 1 None of these avenues turned
up anything.
At that point, O'Brien called the FBI and told them of his contact with Rifkin. He was asked if the FBI could record calls between
himself and Rifkin, and he consented.32 Rifkin called O'Brien in the
afternoon of November 5th. Rifkin knew he was in trouble, and
O'Brien advised him to turn himself in. "One against the FBI is real
bad odds," Rifkin admitted, but he rejected O'Brien's offer of help if
he turned himself in. He asked O'Brien to send back the $6,000 in a
"plain brown wrapper"3 3 to a post office box in the name of Daniel
34
Wolfson. Wolfson lived in Carlsbad, California, near San Diego.
Postal authorities provided the FBI with the address that Wolfson used when he obtained the Post Office box that Rifkin was using. 35 They reported a change of residence filed by Wolfson as well.
The California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System
showed an address on Jefferson Street in Carlsbad for Wolfson, and
Carlsbad police records contained a complaint that Wolfson had
filed which indicated a similar address. FBI agents were dispatched
to all of these addresses, given Rifkin's license plate number and
told to look for his grey 1972 Datsun 240Z. 36 Unable to find the car,
37
the agents decided to try to arrest Rifkin at Wolfson's apartment.
Late in the evening of November 5th, Daniel Wolfson responded
to knocking on his door. It was Norman Wight and Robin Brown.
The two identified themselves as FBI agents and asked to come in.
Wolfson said that he would talk, but only at his doorway. Shown a
picture of Rifkin, Wolfson said that he wanted to talk to his attorney
to determine his rights. Brown asked him if he had anything to hide
and Wolfson replied that he did not trust the government since
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

18 U.S.C. § 2314
Document 2, at
Document 3, at
Id. at 584-97.
Document 2, at
Id. at 554.
Id. at 554-56.
Id. at 548.

(1976).
546.
601.
547.
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Watergate. Brown said that he wanted to come in and talk about
Rifkin, since Rifkin was a wanted federal fugitive. Wolfson said no,
holding his arms on each side of the door frame. Brown told him
that his failure to cooperate might result in his being guilty of harboring a federal fugitive.
Brown asked Wolfson how long it had been since he had seen
Rifkin, and Wolfson said that he wanted to talk to his attorney.
Brown asked if Rifkin was inside the house and Wolfson said "I
don't know." Finally, the agent informed Wolfson that they were going to enter the house, using force if necessary. Wolfson moved
38
aside and let them enter.
While the search was proceeding, Rifkin appeared in the doorway of a vacant bedroom and said "here I am." The agents identified themselves and placed him under arrest. Rifkin was escorted to
39
a bedroom and allowed to finish dressing before leaving for jail.
Rifkin was searched, remarking that he had practiced being
searched with Wolfson the previous day. Advised of his rights,
Rifkin made an attempt to sign the form before the agents finished
reading it to him. Before the question began, Rifkin said "I guess
you want the diamonds." He went and pointed to a black and brown
canvas suitcase and removed a plastic shirt case from it. Inside
were some thirty packets containing the diamonds. 4°
III.

MAKING THE CASE

Once Rifkin was arrested and the diamonds were recovered, the
bulk of the necessary investigation was complete. Rifkin's indictment charged him not only with interstate transportation of stolen
property but also two counts of43wire fraud,4 1 entering a bank to com42
mit a felony, and smuggling.
Much of the evidence that would be required to convict Rifkin
was not readily available. Witnesses in Switzerland were necessary
if the complete picture of Rifkin's crime was to be presented to the
court. The documents filed by the United States Attorney's office in
support of a motion for depositions to be taken in Switzerland illustrate both the problems of proof that the government faced and the
procedural problems arising from the fact that the witnesses were
located in another country. (It seems likely that computer crime
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 556-58.
Id. at 550.
Id. at 551.
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976).
Id. § 2113a.
Id. § 545.
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cases will involve such international aspects far more frequently
than other cases, since computer use often goes beyond national
boundaries.) In conjunction with the FBI special agent serving as
legal attache through the United States embassy in Berne, the government developed the following list of witnesses to be questioned
in Switzerland:
* A Bank official from the Wozchod Handels Bank in Zurichto lay a business records foundation for documents necessary to
show that the money Rifkin stole was received by that bank from
the Irving Trust Company;
a Werner Oppliger, a courier who brought the diamonds from
the Russian trading company to the Swiss Airlines office in Geneva;
* Three other couriers who helped Oppliger transport the
diamonds and who might be necessary to establish the chain of custody;
0 Swiss air personnel who received the diamonds and could
testify that Rifkin picked the diamonds up;
* Alex Mahnin, the employee of Russalmaz who handled the
transaction. He showed diamonds to Lon Stein and received notification that the funds to pay for them had been wire transferred into
Russalmaz' account. He also received the wire sent by Rifkin under
the name of Nelson from Los Angeles;
• Jacques Spalter, Renee Broon, Robin Page-other witnesses
44
who had less crucial information about the case.
The procedure for deposing witnesses in Switzerland by an
English-speaking attorney is drastically different from American
practice. Under Swiss law, no agent of a foreign government may
conduct a criminal investigation in Switzerland. Thus, the FBI could
not interview the witnesses nor could agents of the United States
Attorney's office. Instead, only the Swiss authorities could conduct
interviews, and this they did by deposition.
Before testifying at a deposition, each witness is reminded in
great detail of Swiss perjury laws. Each question in the deposition
is asked of a Swiss magistrate in English. He or she then poses that
question in French or German to the witness. The two of them then
discuss the question and discuss the answer. Only then is the answer summarized by the magistrate and dictated to the court reporter in English. At the completion of the witness' testimony the
entire testimony is reread to the witness and thereafter the witness
signs a summary transcript. A treaty between the United States and
Switzerland governs these procedures. It requires that American arrangements be made through the United States Attorney General's
44. Document 7, at 615-21.
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The issue of admissibility of the depositions became moot
before the validity of the government's contentions could be tested,
as it was soon decided that the Rifkin case would not go to trial.
IV.

RiFKiN's DEFENSE

As in many non-computer crime cases, much of the defense effort was focused on search and seizure issues. None of these issues
directly focused on computer technology, but they illustrate the difficulties in drafting a warrant and making an arrest when there is
limited time.
A major part of the defense was a motion to suppress evidence
seized as a result of Rifkin's arrest at Wolfson's apartment on the
5th. The arrest warrant was defective, the defense urged, since it
failed to establish probable cause for Rifkin's arrest. The defense
also argued the use of information from O'Brien constituted a violation of Rifkin's attorney-client relationship, and that the entry of
Wolfson's apartment violated the requirements of United States v.
Prescott.46
In the comments of Judge Matt Byrne granting a substantial
part of the defense motion, the need for specificity in support of the
arrest warrant was very clear. Byrne found the affidavit in support
of the arrest warrant "totally void of any source information whatsoever." He went on to note that "it is impossible to tell where Mr.
Brown [the FBI agent affidant] obtained the information that is set
forth in subparagraphs (a) through (f), including such obvious
shortcomings as not stating the name of the diamond broker, not
stating the name of the individual who met with Mr. Rifkin in Los
Angeles who Mr. Rifkin allegedly exhibited the diamonds to, not
stating where the information was obtained from the bank, not stating whether the recording ever had been listened to, not stating any
information whatsoever about where they heard what occurred in
diamonds were picked
Switzerland, not stating how they knew '4the
7
information.
any
of
void
totally
up-just
Building on this observation, the court went on to rule that
there was no exigent circumstance justifying the arrest of Rifkin inside Wolfson's home absent a valid warrant. The prosecution argued that Rifkin had a propensity to suicide, that he might hold
45. Document 6, at 611-13.
46. 581 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1978). Since the court invalidated the arrest warrant,
and rejected the attorney-client argument, these contentions are of relatively little interest.
47. Document 8, at 626.
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Wolfson hostage, that he might escape, and that he might flush the
diamonds down the toilet, trying to establish "exigent circumstances" which might justify failure to obtain a valid warrant. Byrne
concluded "the only exigent circumstance is created when the
agents go to the door and ask if Rifkin is there."'48
Moving from that point the court further concluded that the
statements made by Rifkin at the time of his arrest, and the evidence taken pursuant to a search at the time of his arrest were
tainted by the illegal arrest, and thus had to be suppressed. Similarly, the court ruled that the items seized pursuant to a search warrant served the next day were also illegally tainted by the prior
49
illegalities, and suppressed-them as well.
Though startling enough to give rise to headlines like "Key Evidence Ruled Invalid in 10.2 million Bank Theft, 50° the court's ruling
left the prosecution with a tape of Rifkin making the phone call
which resulted in the transfer of the $10.2 million. This evidence,
along with the testimony of attorneys Goodgame and O'Brien, Lon
Stein, and the Swiss witnesses would have been enough to convict
Rifkin. However, before the case proceeded to trial, Rifkin once
again found himself in trouble, and probably rendered any possibility of trial close to nil.
V.

RIFKIN'S SECOND EFFORT

On February 9, 1979, Patricia Ferguson met with Joseph
Sheehan. She told him that she represented a principal who wanted
to move funds, and who needed access to a bank. "You must have
larceny in your heart", she told Sheehan, going on to explain the
principal was "Stanley Rifkin-Security Pacific-Electronic Fund
Transfers." Shortly thereafter, Rifkin met with Sheehan and told
him that he wanted to make a wire transfer between $1,000,000 and
$50,000,000 from the Union Bank in Los Angeles to the Bank of
America in San Francisco. Once the money was there, Rifkin would
arrange for the purchase of "bearer" bonds, and flee to Mexico City.
This time, Rifkin said, he would do it right (referring, it appears, to
his earlier theft).
Unlike Goodgame and O'Brien, Sheehan did not turn Rifkin in
to the FBI. He did not have to; he was an FBI agent working in an
undercover capacity. Based on these facts the government prepared
a second complaint against Rifkin, this one charging him with con48. Id. at 629-31.
49. Id. at 631-37.
50. Los Angeles Times, Feb. 7, 1979, at 1.
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spiracy to cause false entries to be made in a bank, 51 transportation
53
2
of stolen property interstate, and failure to appear.
Within two weeks, Rifkin plead guilty to two of the charges
against him in the $10.2 million theft and the government dropped
the other charge and agreed not to prosecute him on the attempted
theft charge.
VI.

RIFKIN'S PLEA

Doubtlessly aware of the publicity that the case had received,
and aware of the numerous requirements for an uncoerced and
knowing plea of guilty, Judge Byrne laboriously told Rifkin his
rights, and the consequences of his guilty plea.5 4 Then with equal
detail, the court led Rifkin through a recitation of those acts that he
committed which constituted the crime of wire fraud.55 Finally, the
court found that there was a basis in fact for Rifkin's plea of guilty
and summarized those acts that Mr. Rifkin had performed which
56
constituted violations of those two statutes.
On March 26, 1979, Rifkin was sentenced. His attorney argued
that he was "a unique individual" and urged a unique and imaginative sentence for Rifkin. "What is so unique about the offense?"
asked Judge Byrne, going on to observe that Rifkin had numerous
opportunities to abandon his plan, and that there were many stops
along the way that required rethinking and remotivating his decision to commit the crime. Defense attorney Robert Talcott argued
that Rifkin did not commit his crime freely and voluntarily, but was
motivated by an unconscious desire for self-annihilation. Everything Riflkin did, his attorney argued, was done to be caught and
punished.
Though attorney Talcott stressed the possibility of a unique sentence for Rifkin, the court seemed concerned mainly with deterrence. Judge Byrne dismissed the defense suggestion that Rifkin
assist financial institutions to study their wire transfer systems and
prevent crimes such as his own. "If he can't deter himself, how is he
going to deter others?" the Court responded.
The prosecution argued for a maximum sentence-ten years.
Attorney Katherine Stolz urged that society needed to be protected
from Rifkin, and that Rifkin was a con artist, a manipulator, and a
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

18 U.S.C. § 1005
Id. § 2314.
Id. § 3150.
Document 9, at
18 U.S.C. § 1343
Document 9, at

(1976).

648-60.
(1976).
708-10.
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habitual liar. She scorned the idea that Rifkin could be of value to
financial institutions concerned about computer crime. "I doubt that
the Security Pacific Bank would want him on their premises for any
reason," she noted.
Rifkin spoke at last. "I feel there are two me's", he said. "One
rational and one not." The irrational Rifkin would rise up from time
to time, he explained, and his conscience would not always raise to
meet it. When that happened, he would take a step forward toward
committing the crime.
The court found Mr. Rifkin's explanation less persuasive.
Whatever his motivation, the court observed, he had many chances
to get out. He didn't take any of them. He continued to evade the
law. After being given the opportunity to be at liberty on bail, he
again attempted to involve himself in the same criminal activity.
The court saw this as a total disregard for the law, with Rifkin showing no remorse. Finally, in handing down the sentence, the judge
said that he hoped his sentence would serve as a warning that a
crime such as Rifkin's is serious, not just because of the money involved, but also because of Rifkin's continuing pursuit of criminal
activity. Rifkin was sentenced to eight years in federal prison.
At the time of this writing, the Rifkin case is far from resolved.
On May 15, 1980, a hearing for modification of Rifkin's sentence was
held, and the motion denied. A civil complaint, filed in the Los Angeles Superior Court by Security Pacific National Bank charges
Rifkin with fraud, 'conversion of personal property, and a number of
other counts. It seeks the return of all monies and properties taken
from the bank or purchased with money taken from the bank, plus
punitive and exemplary damages, including "all profits, interest, proceeds, revenue, royalties, or other advantages gained from any publication, sale, serialization, republication rights in any form, movie,
television, or video rights, speeches, seminars or any other distribution for profit of any material based on or dealing with plaintiff's
[Security Pacific] secret codes or procedures or the events or circumstances dealing with Rifkin's obtaining access to or using said
secret codes or procedures."
VII.

THE CRIMINAL--WHO IS STANLEY MARK RiFKiN

Given the wealth of information about the Rifkin case, it is both
tempting and bewildering to try to draw conclusions about the nature of computer criminals. What made Rifkin do it? The obvious
explanation, that $10.2 million is enough to motivate most people,
flies in the face of a couple of facts. First, it seems clear that Rifkin
was not well equipped to accomplish his criminal goal. Not only did
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he fail to anticipate the problems involved in bringing the diamonds
back to America, 5 7 but his failure to find people to work with once
he returned further suggests an amateurishness.
Another explanation that would seem to fit some of the facts of
this case is the "mountain climber" analogy, that Rifkin committed
his crime because the challenge was there. The statement to agent
Sheehan, that this time he wanted to "do it right," make this explanation plausible. Many people who deal with computing have noted
the existence of a game-playing mentality which takes delight in rising to the challenge prescribed by a computer system.
At the same time, one is struck with the indecision which
seemed to follow Rifkin from beginning to end. Although his statements at the time of his plea are obviously self-serving, if believed
they suggest someone who never totally committed himself to his
endeavor.5 8 When he says "I never thought I'd get them, ' 59 the
statement takes on an aura of plausibility as an explanation for his
failure to develop a logical plan to deal with the jewels should his
plan succeed.
Rifkin certainly had an abundance of experience with electronic
fund transfer systems. A memorandum written in 1976 while he
worked for Payment Systems, Inc. outlined several frauds involving
automated teller machines. 60 This expertise was necessary to enable him to ask questions about how the Security Pacific system
worked.
Whether Rifkin fits the stereotype of a computer criminal is not
clear. His lack of ability to carry out his crime successful may reflect the "loner" image that he had in the eyes of many who spoke
about him. That his psychology was less than stable is suggested by
comments from his mother, his girlfriend, and others who knew
61
him.
It is this suicidal side which his attorney seemed to refer to
when he said that Rifkin did everything he could to get himself arrested short of hiring a skywriter and writing a confession in the
sky. His offer to teach a course in computer fraud for the FBI after
his arrest, his rapid admission that he had committed the crime, and
his questions about the Security Pacific personnel with whom he interacted while he committed the crime, all suggest that he was out
of contact with the reality of which most criminals are aware.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 687.
Id. at 679.
Id. at 687.
NCCCD Document No. 7216.
Document 2, at 570.
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Whether this was because they represented parts of the puzzle that
did not challenge him, because he was suicidal, or because he was a
kind of idiot-savant is impossible to say.
It may also be that Rifkin, like many people, was victimized by
the media's perception of crime in general, and computer crime in
particular. Filling an ashtray with diamonds, talking about a new
identity and going to places unknown, is the kind of derring-do that
may give a TV criminal a quick shot of macho enthusism, but it also
is the type of thing that both on television and in real life seldom
does the criminal much good.
Finally, it is impossible to look at the Rifkin case without keeping in mind the publicity value of a $10.2 million crime. Wolfson, the
man at whose house Rifkin was arrested, was talking with media
people about Rifkin's ability to commit a computer crime about a
62
year before Rifkin's theft from the Security Pacific Bank.
With other computer criminals like Jerry Schneider and Bertram Seidlitz attempting to go from computer criminal to computer
consultant as a result of the publicity that they received, it is possible that Rifkin too felt that even in failure he could be a commercial
success. In short, the documents offer many clues-not only to
Rifkin's character, but to how society can prevent, investigate, and
prosecute computer crime.

62. Document 2, at 564.
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7
S

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
I]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

12

Plaintiff,

13

v.

14

STANLEY MARK RIFKIN,

15

16
17

Defendant.

NO. CR 78-1050(A)-WMB

)

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
SEIZED AS A RESULT OF THE

)

DEFENDANT'S ARREST

)

_

The defendant hereby moves to this Court for an order

13

suppressing all evidence seized as the result, directly or

19

indirectly, of the arrest of the defendant on November 6, 1978.

20

As the grounds for this motion the defendant asserts that his

21

arrest was unlawful on three distinct grounds:

22

pursuant to a warrant not founded on probable cause; 2) It

23

was the result of a deliberate and surreptitious intrusion

24

by the Government into an attorney-client relationship of the

25

defendant's and was a violation of his Sixth Amendment right

26

to the assistance of counsel and his Fifth Amendment due

27

process right; and 3) It was the product of unlawful entry.

28

1) It was made

This motion is based on the attached Memorandum of

DOCUMENT 1

RIFKIN
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1

Points and Authorities and Affidavit of Probable Cause

2

of Special Agent Robin Brown, as well as any evidence that

3

may be presented at the hearing on this matter.

4

.5

Jespectfu'lly submitted.

6
ROBERT M. TALCOTT
MICHAEL J. LIGHTFOOT
CARLA M. WOEMRLE

s
9
10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Dated:

December 14, 1978.
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I

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

2

Since It is the defendant's contention that his arrest

3

was unlawful' for three different reasons, each reason:will-be

4

treated separately.

5

A.

6

NOT BASED ON .PROBABLE CAUSE.

THE DEFENDANT'S ARREST WAS MADE PURSUANT TO A WARRANT

1.

7
I
9

Statement of Facts

Sh6rtly after midnight during the early morning hours
of November 6,

1978,

Stanley Mark Rifkin, was

the defendant,

California by agents of. the FBI in

10

arrested in Carlsbad,

II

home of an individual by the name of Daniel Wolfson.

12

the

Within minutes of his arrest. Rifkin was advised of

13

his constitutional rights and questioned at considerable length

14

by the arresting FBI

15

The FBI agents seized from Rifkln, and from the location where

16

he was arrested,

17

diamonds and cash.

is

agents at the location of the arrest.

various items of evidence including numerous

The defendant contends that his arrest was based on an
1978,

which warrant was

19

arrest warrant issued on November 2.

20

obtained after an affidavit of probable cause was submitted

21

to U.S. Magistrate by Special Agent Robin Brown.

25

fendant's contention that the affidavit submitted by Agent

21

Brown is

24

ta~lish probable cause to believe that the defendant committed

2

a crime.

26

constitutionally deficient in

that it

It

is

de-

does not es-

The affiant, Robin Brown, began the affidavit (attached)

27

by stating that he had conducted an investigation into the

28

transportation of stolen goods in

interstate commerce.

He

1980]
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I

then went on to describe in six paragraphs information he

2

had acquired.

3

sources of his information, either by name or other description.

At no time does Brown indicate the source or

4

2.

5

The Constitution Requires the Identification of the

6

a)

7

Source(s) of Information.

I
9

Pertinent Law

It has

become axiomatic that an affidavit in support of

a warrant which does not indicate

the source

of information

The United States

10

renders the warrant unconstitutional.

11

Supreme Court held

12

480, 486-487 (1958) that an affidavit in support of a warrant

13

is constititionally deficient when it:

in Giordenello

v. United States. 357 U.S.

14

"contains no affirmative allegation

Is

the affiant spoke with personal

16

of the matters contained therein;

17

not indicate any sources

is

belief;

and it

of the

that

knowledge
it does

complainant's

does not set forth any other

19

sufficient basis upon which a finding of

20

probable -cause could be made.

21

these deficiencies could not be cured by

22

the Commissioner's reliance upon a pre-

23

sumption that the complaint was made on

24

the personal knowledge of the complaining

25

officer."

26

We think

Later Supreme Court cases have.reiterated the conprinciple that it

is the magistrate, not the affiant-

27

stitutional

28

police officer, vested with the responsibility of determining

[Vol. I
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I

the credibility and reliability of toe sources of information.

2

Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v.

3

Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).

4

Thornton, 545 F.2d 957, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1971)

3

however, that the affiant himself is satisfied that the In-

6

formation and its source are credible.

I

is for the magistrate

I

the officer seeking it, to determine whether there Is probable

9

cause to issue it."); United States v. Schartner, 426 F.2d

See also United States v.
("It is not enough.

As we have said, it

from whom the warrant is sought, and not

10

470, 473 (3rd Cir. 1970); and Di Bella v. United States.

11

284 F.2d 897, 899 (2nd Cir. 1960)[(vacated on other grounds.

12

369 U.S. 121 (1962).)].

13

In Saville v. O'Brien, 420 F.2d 347, 349 (1st Cir. 1969)

14

(cert. den. 398 U.S. 938) the search affidavit stated that

Is

the informant had told the officer that the defendant had

16

given him (the informant) counterfeit money.

17

jectured that the officer may have been given this informa-

is

tion by someone who had heard the informant talking at a

19

neighborhood bar.

20

when or to whom the statement had been made," the affidavit

21

was insufficient on its face, and the Court was forced .to

22

conclude the informant's source "totally unreliable because

23

it was totally unknown."

24

The Court con-

As the "affidavit simply did not reveal

Saville v. O'Brien, supra, at p. 350.

Similarly, because the affidavit here totally failed

25

to identify the source or sources where Brown got his in-

26

formation, the magistrate was unable to test the sufficiency

27

of that information.

28

invalid.

The consequential arrest was therefore

REFKIN
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The Facts Could Not Support a Conclusion That the Diamonds

I

b)

2

Were Stolen.

3

The Court will note that the affidavit and comp3aint

4

identify the alleged crime committed by the defendant as the

5

"transportation of stolen diamonds in foreign commerce" In

6

violation of 18 U.S.C. 12314.

7

of this particular argument that the magistrate in this case

S

had constitutionally sufficient information before him on

9

November Z, 1978 on which to base findings that:

We will assume for the sake

1) the de-

10

fendant caused a fraudulent transfer of money from Los

11

Angeles to Geneva; 2) the funds were used to purchase diamonds

12

and 3) the defendant caused the diamonds to be transported

13

in foreign commerce.

14

may have been obtained by fraud, the diamonds were not and

is

were therefore not "stolen" goods.

16

known to the magistrate would not have constituted probable

17

cause of the crime of transportation of stolen diamonds in

is

foreign commerce and therefore the arrest of the defendant

19

on November 6. 197C, not based on probable cause-that a crime

20

had been committed, was invalid.

21

While the money which arrived in Geneva

The information then

The United States Attorney's Office has addressed

22

itself to the question of the "stolen" nature of the diamonds

23

in a memorandum filed on December 4. 1978.

24

cites a number of cases, all involving prosecutions under 16

25

U.S.C. 12314 for the transportation of one kind of "monetary

26

obligation" converted from an earlier stolen "monetary

27

obligation" of a different form.

28

been noted by the Courts

That memorandum

That change in form has

as just that - a change in form
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I

rather than a change In kind, therby not affecting the stolen

2

nature of the underlying obligation. (United States v. Levy,

3

579 F.2d 1332 (2nd Cir. 1978).

4

money to checks and United States v. Pomponto. 558 F.2d 1172

5

(4th Cir. 1977), involved a change in form from a counterfeit

6

stock certificate to a promissory note to a cashier's check.)

7

involved a change in form from

In this case we do not have a change in form (for

I

example, a change of a stolen bank draft to Swiss francs).

9

but a change in kind from a monetary obligation to diamonds,
In United States v. Walker,

10

items of personal property.

1i

176 F.2d 564 (2nd Cir.

12

tinction of a mere change in form:

13

), the court set up this dis-

'We may concede that there are goods,

14

procured by means of the property of

15

the victim, whose transportation is not

16

within

17

be seriously. argued that, if the accused

13

defrauded his victim of bills of a large

19

denomination and changed them into smaller

20

bills, or vice versa, he would escape;

21

and we recognize no distinction between

22

such a case and the exchange of money

23

from ordinary bank cheques into Travelers

24

cheques."

25

the :tatute.

Even so, it cannot

176 F.2d 566

United States v. Poole, 557 F.2d 531 (Sth Cir. 1977)

26

and United States v. Cac , 401 F.2d 664 (2nd Cir. 1968).

27

vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Giordano v. United

28

States, 394 U. S. 310 (1969).

cert. denied in part sub nom..
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1

Cino v. United States. 394 U.S. 917 (l99), cert. denied in

2

part sub nom., Sorgi

3

cited by the' government, both cited Walker for this specific

4

holding.

v. United States, 394 U.S. 931

493

(1969).

3

We are not dealing here with a change in form from

6

larger bills to smaller bills or from bank checks to traveler's

7

checks.

I

money to diamonds.

9

to in Walker.

Rather we are dealing with a change in kind from
This is exactly the distinction referred

The diamonds, "while procured by means of

10

the property of the victim", were not themselves taken by

:I

fraud.

12

purchased with money from a bank robbery is itself stolen.

13

Such a result was obviously not inteoded by Congress.

A holding to the contrary would mean, that a car

14

As a consequence, the warrant which formed the basis

15

for the defendant's arrest, based on activity not a federal

16

crime, was invalid.

17

B.

kV'
0

THE DEFENDANT'S ARREST WAS THE RESULT OF AN INTRUSION

INTO AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AND THE DEFENDANT'S
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND
FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.

ki.
;.2

1. Statement of Facts
The Government has charged the defendant by Indictment with five crimes, all alleged to have been committed

24

in October. 1978.

25

smuggling and foreign transportation of diamonds, are both

26

alleged to have occurred on October 29, 1978.

27
28

The last (chronologically) two, the

On November 1, 2 and 3, 1978 (the week before his
arrest) the defendant travelled to Rochester to meet with
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1

an attorney, one Paul W. O'Brien.

According to the FBI re-

2

port of an interview of O'Brien on November 4. 1978. Ri.fktn

3

"wanted O'Brien to handle the legal work to set up a New

4

York based diamond brokerage".

5

in Rochester on .a number of occasions over the first three

6

days in November.

The two met privately

On Friday evening, November 3, 1978, O'Brien. without

7
I

Rifkin's consent, called the FBI and disclosed to them the

9

contents of the conversations he had had with Rifkin.

It

the day before, November 2, that the FBI had obtained

10

was

ii

a warrant formally accusing Rifkin of a federal crime.
O'Brien consented to the installation of a record-

12

Thereafter, on November

13

ing device on his home telephone.

14

4 and 5, the FBI tape recorded and monitored two telephone

is

conversations between O'Brien and Rifkin and one between

16

Rifkin and O'Brien's wife.

17

have been provided to defense counsel.

!8

from these tapes that:

19

in what was presumed by Rif-kn to be an attorjney-client

0

Copies of transcripts and tapes
It is apparent

_1) O'Brien and Rifkin were talking

relationship; 2) Rifkin was led to believe by O'Brien that

21

the conversations were not -being recorded; and 3) the .two

22

discussed circumstances relatingto the pending federal

23

criminal charges.

24
25
26
27
28

2.
a)

Pertinent Law

Sixth Amendment Intrusion.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution

provides:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the

19801
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1

accused shall enjoy the right.. .to

2

have the assistance of Counsel for his

3

defense."

4
5

With respect to that "right to counsel", the Second
Circuit has stated:

6

"...the

7

right is.. .privacy of communication with

$

counsel."

9

F.2d 1213, 1224 (2nd Cir. 1973) cert.

10
I!

495

essence Of the Sixth Amendment

United States v. Rosner, 485

denied 417 U.S. 950.
We contend that the surreptitious invasion of the

12

private councils of attorney and client by the Federal Bureau

13

of Investigation in this case show, at the very least, a

14

callous disregard and disdain for the essential purpose,

15

safeguards and protections of the Sixth Amendment.

16

conduct demands the exclusion of all evidence obtained.

17

directly or indirectly. as a result of the intrusion, either

18

on constitutional grounds or on the basis of this court's

19

supervisory powers.

That

20

At the outset, we would emphasize that this motion Is

21

not) based on an assertion of the traditional attorney-client

22

privilege and therefore involvesnone of the problems of an

23

evidentiary nature that many times accompany assertion of

24

that privilege.

25

whether or not conversations between Rifkin and O'Brien

26

amounted to,

27

In a similar situation, the Sixth Circuit recently noted

28

that even though the lawyer may have engaged in illegal ac-

Our claim is therefore not concerned with

or looked toward, the commission of a. crime.

-10-
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I

tivities with his clients he did have discussions with the

2

defendant "for the purpose of defending him on smuggling

3

charges.."

4

Those activities were held to fall within the ambit of the

5

attorney-client privilege for purposes of Sixth Amendment

6

coverage.

7

case, drafted long after the FBI interviews with O'Brien

I

and review of the taped conversations in question, alleges

9

that the last criminal activity engaged in by Rifkin occurred

United States v. Valencia, infra, 541 F.2d at 621.

In any eventthe five count indictment-in this

strongly suggesting no criminal activity

to

on October 29, 1978.

i1

between O'Brien and Rifkin on November 1 through 3.

12

While we submit this argument on behalf of a named

13

defendant, "it bears emphasis that.. .the crucial interests

14

at stake belong to the whole community."

15

256 F.Supp. 683, 684 (S.D.N.Y., 1966).

16

said in an unusually perceptive ananlysis of this problem

17

in In Re Terkeltoub, at p. 685:

In Re Terkeltoub,
As Judge Frankel

is

"The ultimate interest to be protected

19

is the privacy and confidential4ty of

20

the lawyer's work in preparing the case.

21

It is the violation of that interest

22

that is hbld offensive to the Constitution

23

In the case of eavesdropping and spying."

24

One of the first cases in this area dismissing an

25

indictment on grounds of a Sixth Amendment invasion was de-

26

cided twenty-five years ago.

27

205. F.2d 879 (D.C.

28

the defendant had been charged federally with obstruction

In Caldwell v. United States.

Cir. 1953) cert. denied 349 U.S. 930,

-11-
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1

of justice and bribery.

2

prosecution to find out who was behind CaldwelI's offenses.

3

After being solicited to work for the defense, he was ad-

4

vised by the Government not to undertake such employment or

5

to take money.

6

offered large sums of money by the defense If he would ne-

7

gotlate the theft of the United States Attorney's files

$

in the pending case.

9

extend his activities into the defense camp with a view to-

One Bradley had been hired by the

Bradley later reported that he had been

The prosecution then caused Bradley to

10

ward collecting evidence of the planned crime.

11

was never effected.

12

pending charges.

13

Court said:

The theft

The defendant was convicted on the

Focusing on Caldwell's conviction, the

14

"On these basic facts, so stated, we

15

think our decision Jn the Coplon v. U.S.

16

case [ll F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1952)] is

17

controlling.

is

'The prosecution is not entitled to have

19

a representa-tiye present to hear the con-

20

versations of accused and counsel'.

21

specifically, we held that interception

22

of supposedly private telephone con-

23

sultations between accused and counsel,

24

before and during trial denies the accused

25

his constitutional right to effective

26

assistance of counsel,

27

and Sixth Amendments."

28

"We do not mean to deny the right-indeed

We there held flatly that

-12-
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I

the duty-of prosecuting officials to

2

seek to uncover, prosecute and punish

3

resort by accused persons and their coon-

4

sel to theft of files or other lawful

5

means of defense.

6

prosecutor-In this case was faced with.;a

7

real dilemma, once the possibility of a

S

theft of the files had been reported by

9

Bradley.

We recognize that the

We do not question that he then

10

acted with what must have seemed high

I1

motives, and certainly with active dill-

12

gence.

13

law enforcement cannot justify spying upon

14

aod intrusion Into the relationship between

Is

a person accused of crime and his counsel.

16

The Constitution's prohibitions against un-

17

reasonable searches, and its guarantees of

is

due process of law and effective repre-

19

sentation of counsel

20

substance if the Government can with impunity

21

place a secret agent in a lawyer's office

22

to inspect the confidential papers of

23

the defedant and his advisers, to listen

24

to their conversations, and to participate

25

in their councils of defense.

26

that sort on the part of our Government

27

is

28

occur a conviction tainted by it cannot

But .high motives and zeal for

,

lose 4nost of their

no doubt extremely rare.

Conduct of

But if it does

[Vol. II

1

stand."

(citations ommitted) 205 F.2d

at 881.

2
3
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The cited Coplon and Caldwell cases are the germinal

4

cases on the issue'of the propriety of governmental-Intrusion.

5

The principles established in these cases are now firmly

6

imbedded in federal Constitutional law. having been so rec-

7

cognized in Hoffa v. United States; 385 U.S. Z93. 306 (19E6).

$

See also United States v. Choate. 527 F.2d 748. 751

9

1975); United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d.1213, 1227 '2ndCir.

(9th Cir.

10

1973); United States v. Brown. 484 F.2d 418, 424 (5th Cir.

11

1973); South Dakota v. Long .465

12

F.2d .65. 72 (8th Cir. 1972).

The most recent case on point is United States :v.
There the defendants

13

Valencia, 541 F.2d 618 (6th Cir. 1976).

14

were charged with conspiracy and possession and distribution

15

of cocaine.

16

to Bogota, Columbia and purchased cocaine from Valencia.

17

One Klein then obtained cocaine from Company and Company was

is

arrested.

19

lease and then arranged for Company to sell cocaine to one

20

hayes in oroer to obtain money to pay Antonelli's fee.

21

Antonell.i also sold cocaine to two.,otner defendants, Brooks

22

and Cunningham.

23

Antonelli's secretary, had been present during her employer's

24

Illegal dealings and had phoned a DEA agent and told him of

25

Klein's and Company's arrest and that Antonelli had made

26

arrangements for Company to sell cocaine to pay his fee.

27

In mid-trial, on hearing this evidence, the trial

28

court dismissed the indictment with respect to Antonelli

Defendant

Company had travelled from Detroit

An attorney, Antonelli, effected Company's re-

At trial it was brought.out that Susan Reichard.

-14-
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I

(the lawyer), Brooks, Mayes and Cunningham, finding as to

2

the latter three that their cases must be dismissed as the

3

fruit of the poisonous tree--the attorney-client Intrusion--

4

since the government would not have had a case against any

$

of them had it not been in the spying business.

6

as the conduct of the lawyer Antonelli was con.cerned, the

7

trial court was outraged,

$

tempt."

9

to permit "the law in its

finding him to be "beneath

majesty.;.to be equally slimy."

541 F.2d at 621.

i]

and Company,.were later convicted and appealled.

Three other defendants, Including Valencia

Judge (now Solicitor General)

mcCree, writing for the

03

Sixth Circuit,

14

in dismissing the charges against Mayes,

15

and Antonelli:

found that the trial court had acted properly
Brooks,

Cunningham

16

"We agree with the district court that it

17

was improper for the government to have in-

1

truded into an attorney-client relationship

19

by paying an attorney's Secretary for 1n-

20

formation about his clients.

If any convic-

21

tions were affected by the-taint of this

22

highly irregular, and we trust, unusual

23

arrangement, we would not hesitate to set

24

aside the convictions."

25

con-

The court nonetheless dismissed the charges refusing

10

12

Insofar

541 F.2d at 623.

As a final matter in Valencia, two defendants, in-

26

cluding Valencia. had not retained Antonelli as their attorney.

27

The court nonetheless reversed their convictions "under our

28

supervisory authority over the conduct of federal prosecutions."
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1

541 F.2d at 622.

2

Supp. 113. 133-135 (N. D. Ohio. 1977) and United States v.

3

Jernigan, 582 F.2d 1211.

4

See also United States v. Payner, 434F.

1213-1214 (9th Cir. 1978).

It Is therefore the contention of the defendant that

5

the deliberate and surreptitious Invasion by the FBI into

6

the confidential communications between himself and his

7

lawyer, during which the pending criminal

I

the defendant were discussed amounts to a-violation of his

9

Sixth Amendment and Fifth Amendment due process rights.

charges against

10

Since It is clear from the grand jury testimony of Agent

11

Brown (pp. 28-29) that Rifkin's arrest resulted from in-

12

formation obtained during the FBI's monitoring of Rifkin's

13

conversation with OBrien. his arrest and its fruits are

14

tainted by the constitutional violation.

I5

b)

Sixth Amendment violation- under Massiah v. United StatesIn the case of

16

assiah -v. United States, 377 U.S.-

the Supreme Court held that the defendant's

17

201 (1964)

is

Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when, follow-

19

ing.-his indictment and-release on bail, incriminating

20

statements were deliberately elicited from him by a govern-

21

ment informant.

22

indictment at the time his statements were made, it has been

23

recognized that, for purposes of the right to counsel, the

24

formal

25

to commence at the time an arrest warrant is issued.

26

Robinson v. Zelker. 468 F.2d 159 (2nd.Cir. 1972), cert.

27

denied 411 U.S. 939; United States v. Miller. 432 F.Supp.

28

382, 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Burton v. Cuyler, 439 F. Supp.

Although the defendant in Massiah was under

nitiatJton of criminal proceedings may be considered
See

1
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1173. 1181 (E.D. Pa. 1977).

But see, United States v.
The defendant contends

2

Duvall, 537 F.2d 15 (2nd Cir. 1976).

3

that, in the instant case, the-conduct of the FBI agents:In re-

4

cording the conversations between the defendant ann Paul

$

O'Brien constituted a .Sixth Amendment violation under the

6

principles established in Massiah
of the tape recorded conversations. when

0Transcripts

oead in the light of facts which are now known regarding
9

Mr. O'Brien's cooperation with the FBI. indicate that, although he was ostensibly talking with the defendant on an

ii

attorney-client basis, Mr- O'Brien was actually being used

12

by the agents as an informant for the-purpose of eliciting

13

information from the defendant..

14

the violation of the defendants right to -counsel. is all the

is

more egregious because the informant who was questioning

16

him purported to be acting as his attorney.

17

made by Mr. Rifkin during those conversations are therefore

1

constitutionally tainted, as is the arrest which directly

19

resulted from the information obtained by agents.An -this

20

unlawful manner...
C.

Under these circumstances

.;

The statements

...

.

THEDEFENDANT'S ARREST WAS THE PRODUCT OF-.AN UN.LAWFUL VITRYL
2. Statement of Facts

23

As stated earlier in this memorandum, the defendant was

24

arrested at the apartment of Daniel Wolfson during the early

25

morning hours of November 6. 1978.

26

sation between the defendant and his attorney. Paul O'Brien,

27

the agents had obtained information that the defendant wished

28

some money to be sent to Mr. Wolfson at a post office box in

-17,

From the telephone conver-
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1
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Carlsbad, California.
Although they had a warrant for the defendant's arrest.

2

)
4

,Phe agents did not have a search warrant authorizing their
entry into Mr. Volfson's apartment.

Pther than the Information

45

that money would be sent to a post office box.in Wolfson's name,

'6

the agents do not appear to have had any information that the

7
8.
-9

defendant was present at Wolfson's apartment.

The circumstances

f the entry into the apartment were described by Special Agent
Robin Brown in his sworn testimony before the Grand Jury:
Mr. Wolfson refused to let us enter the

10
11

apartment.

12

the subject's identity, showed him a picture,

13

told him all about the harboring statutes,

14

asked him very nicely, and finally just

15

swept him aside as we entered the apart-

16

ment and searched it.

17

We advised him of our identity,

2. Pertinent Law
It is clearly-established law that a warrantless entry

Is
19

into and search of a private premises is per se .unreasonable

20

under the Fourth Amendment, subject to only a few specific and

21

carefully-delineated exceptions. G.M. Leasing Corp., et al. v.

22

United States, 429 U.S. 338 (197F): Coolidge v. New Hampshire,

23

403 U.S. 443 (1971).

24

these exceptions, all evidence obtained thereby is inadmissible

25

at trial.

26

the burden of the government to demonstrate that the warrant-

27

less entry in this case falls within such an exception. United

28

States

Unless a warrantless search meets one of

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 382 (1914).

v. Canada, 527 F.2d 1374. 1380 (9th Cir.1975).

It is
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In the instant case, the entry into the premises where

2

the defendant was arrested was effected without a search warrant

3

for those premises.

4

regarding the circumstances of the entry clearly shows that it

3

was not consensual.

Furthermore, the statement of Agent Brown

It is the defendant's contention that the

entry was in fact unlawful.because It-was not authorizedkby.-.
7

warrant and because the agents'id not have probable cause ty

9

believe that the defendant was on the premises.

9
10

CONCLUSION

11

For all of the above stated reasons, the defendant

12

submits that all evidence seized as a result of. his arrest

13

on November 6. 1978 must be suppressed.

14
Is

Respectfully submitted.

16
17

ROBER
-ALCO TJ9
ROBERT M. TALCOTT
MICHAEL J. LIGHTFOOT
CARLA M. WOEHRLE
Attorneys for Defendant

DATED: December 14. 1978
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20
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3
4

The FBI first received information regarding the crime charged

5

in this case on Wednesday, November 1, 1978.

6

Goodgame, the attorney for the defendant's corporation, Rifkin, Inc.,

7

reported to the FBI information regarding a theft by Rifkin.

8

said that Rifkin had represented to him that Rifkin represented a

9

company that wanted to make a large purchase of diamonds.

At that time, Gary

Goodgame

Goodgame

Arrangements had

10

introduced Rifkin to a diamond broker, Lon Stein.

11

been for Stein to purchase 10 million dollars worth of diamonds from

12

the Soviets in Switzerland.

13

earlier, on Monday, October 30, 1978 at a hotel in Beverly Hills,

14

California.

15

told Goodgame he had taken them and that only Security Pacific Bank

16

would bear the loss.

17

to places unknown.

18

Rifkin had met with Goodgame two days

At that time, Rifkin showed Goodgame the diamonds and

He said he was changing his identity and going
He gave Goodgame three of the diamonds.

The FBI spoke to officials at Security Pacific Bank and con-

19

firmed that an unauthorized wire transfer had occurred the prior week.

20

On Wednesday, October 25, 1978, a person representing himself'to be

21

Mike Hansen had requested a 10.2 million dollar wire transfer to the

22

Irving Trust Company in New York for credit through the Wozchod

23

Handelsbank in Zurich, Switzerland.

24

ent account.

25

Fo,
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This was charged to a non-exist-

An interview with the diamond broker, Lon Stein, confirmed that

26

he had purchased diamonds in Switzerland for a company represented by

27

Rifkin at Rifkin's request.

28

a tape recording of the telephone call as being that of Rifkin.

B
06DA83

124-76 DoJ

He identified the voice of Mike Hansen on

-3-
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1

also identified the diamonds given to Goodgame as similar to the ones

2

he had purchased.
On November 2, 1978, the FBI obtained a complaint and a warran

3
4

for Rifkin's arrest charging an interstate transportation of stolen

5

property.
Thereafter, the FBI obtained an additional corroborative evi-

6
7

dence including Rifkin's statement to his girlfriend, Mary Bruskotter,

8

that he had committed the crime.

9

proved fruitless.

Extensive effort to locate Rifkin

Finally, four days after receiving the information

10

from Goodgame, on Sunday, November 5, 1978, the FBI received informa-

11

tion from Paul O'Brien that Rifkin had been in New York meeting

12

O'Brien and that Rifkin had gone to California.

13

that O'Brien mail him some money at a post office box registered to

14

a Dan Wolfson.
The FBI located Wolfson's apartment.

15

Rifkin had requested

At midnight that night

After receiving an evasive answer from

16

they went to the apartment.

17

Wolfson and after being refused entrance, the FBI entered and arrested

18

Rifkin inside his friend's apartment.

19

and offered to turn over th diamonds which were located in his

20

luggage.

21

said that, in order to pay his attorney, he wanted to keep some cash

22

he had obtained by selling some of the diamonds.

23

he could not do this and that the money would also have to be turned

24

over.

25
26
27

The defense is not contesting this consent search.

Rifkin

The FBI said that

The defendant is contesting the seizure of this money.
Rifkin fully confessed to the crime.

the voluntariness of the confession.

He is not contesting
Rather, the defendant contends

that the confession should be suppressed because it was the result
of an illegal arrest.

O". 9.183
124.76 Doj

Rifkin signed a Miranda waiver

-4-
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On November 7, 1978, Wolfson was arrested.

I

A search warrant was
Pursuant

2

obtained for Rifkin's suitcase inside Wolfson's apartment.

3

to that search, documents were located, including Rifkin's handwritten

4

note, hotel bills, and Rifkin's passport.
II

5

THE DEFENDANT WAS LAWFULLY ARRESTED PURSUANT TO A

6

COMPLAINT BASED ON SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE

7
8
9

A.

The Affidavit in Support of the arrest warrant describes in
Sufficient Detail the Facts Establishing Probable Cause and

10

the Sources of the Information.

11

As the defendant states in his motion, an affidavit in support of

12

an arrest warrant must supply enough facts so that a magistrate can

13

independently determine whether probable cause exists to arrest the

14

suspect.

15

(1958).

16

invalidate the arrest warrant on the ground that the affidavit does

17

not disclose the sources of the affiant's information.

18

following discussion demonstrates, the affidavit supplies enough facts

19

so that the magistrate not only could determine the weight to be given

20

to those facts, but also could reasonably infer the sources of the

21

information.

See Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486-87
Relying on language from Giordenello, the defendant seeks to

But as the

22

The affidavit in question here, which is attached to this Memo-

23

randum as Exhibit One, was signed by Special Agent Robin C. Brown of

24

the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

25

ducted an "investigation into the transportation of stolen goods in

26

interstate commerce," Agent Brown then described, in six separate

27

paragraphs, the facts supporting a finding of probable cause that the

28

defendant had committed the crime.

Fo,. OB -183
124-76 Doi
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After stating that he had con-
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have been somewhat more specific with respect to the sources for
2

certain items of information.

Nevertheless, the affidavit supplied

more than enough information from which the magistrate could reasonabl
3
4

s
6

infer the sources of that information.
For example, paragraph (b) of the affidavit states that on
October 25, 1978, the defendant Rifkin, representing himself to be
Mike Hansen, an employee of Security Pacific Bank, telephoned the

7

8

wire transfer room of the bank in order to effect the transfer of
$10.2 million to an account in Zurich, Switzerland.

The affidavit

9

Agent

10

next states that this telephone "conversation was recorded."

11

Brown's statement that the conversation was recorded clearly implies

12
13

call
that he had obtained the information regarding the telephone
from officials at the bank itself.

14

had "estabAgent Brown further states in paragraph (b) that he
lished that the purported account from which these funds were trans-

16

ferred [did] not "in fact exist."

17

information
this statement, again, is that Agent Brown obtained this

18

from the bank.

20

establish that
Other specific facts detailed in the affidavit
broker whose
Agent Brown had obtained information from the diamond

21

23
24

The only reasonable inference from

(c), Agent Brown
services had been retained by Rifkin. In paragraph
states that on October 27, 1978, the diamond broker purchased
which had
$8,000,145 worth of diamonds in Switzerland with the funds
affidavit
been fraudulently obtained from Security Pacific Bank. The
also states that the diamonds were assembled by the Russians and the

27

broker and were delivered to a pick-up location in Geneva, Switzerlanc
In paragraph (f) of the affidavit, Agent Brown stated that the

28

diamond broker had "positively identified" the voice of Mike Hansen

26

-6r-7
Doi
124-76080.183
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on the tape recorded conversation to the bank as the voice of the
2
3
4

defendant Stanley Rifkin.

This statement in the affidavit as to the

broker's positive identification indicates that the broker had been
interviewed and that he had provided all the information in the
preceding paragraph regarding his own activities in Switzerland.
p

6
7

The affidavit to the complaint further states that on October 31,
1978, the defendant Rifkin met with an individual in Los Angeles and
told that individual that he had obtained the above-described diamonds

8
9

Rifkin showed this individual the diamonds and indeed gave him three

0

diamonds.

1

the affidavit, its reliability is supported by the very next sentence,

12

which states:

13

similar to the diamonds purchased in Switzerland."

14

contains first-hand information provided by the broker himself.

15

Although the source of this information is not stated in

"These stones have been identified by the broker as
This sentence

Later in paragraph (e) of the affidavit, Agent Brown quotes

16

Rifkin as stating that Security Pacific Bank would bear the loss of

17

$10.2 million.

18

not identified, the information is corroborated by the previously

19

recited information from the bank itself that an unauthorized wire

20

transfer in the identical amount had been made from the bank.

Although again the source of the quote from Rifkin is

21

The strength of the present affidavit is most evident when it is

22

compared with the affidavit that was struck down by the Supreme Court

23

in Giordenello.

There, the affidavit did no more than state that:

24

"On or about January 26, 1956, at Houston,

25

Texas, in the Southern District of Texas,

26

Veto Girodenello did receive, conceal, etc.,

27

narcotic drugs, to-wit:

28

with knowledge of unlawful importation; in

Po, 080-183
124-76 Doi

heroin hydrochloride
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violation of Section 174, Title 21, United

2

States Code."

3
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357 U.S. at 481

By contrast, the affidavit here describes, in six paragraphs,

4

the details of the results of Agent Brown's investigation.

5

details make very clear that Agent Brown obtained much of his infor-

6

mation from bank officials, from the tape recording of the telephone

7

conversation from "Mike Hansen" to the Security Pacific Bank, and from

8

the diamond broker.

9

professional informants, their reliability should not be questioned.

10

United States v. Banks, 539 F.2d 14,

11

429 U.S. 1024 (1976).

12

offense cannot be proven by a few identifiable facts, the Magistrate

13

can justifiably place more reliance upon the conclusions of the

14

investigative agent.

15

(9th Cir. 1977).

Those

Since the broker and the bank officials are not

17 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

Moreover, in a case such as this, where the

See United States v. Towill, 548 F.2d 1363, 1368

The only constitutional requirement is that an affidavit in

16
17

support of an arrest state enough information to enable the Magistrate

18

to make the "judgment that the charges are not capricious and are

19

sufficiently supported to justify bringing into play the further steps

20

of the criminal process."

21

25 (1965).

22

affidavit should supply enough facts to indicate some of the sources

23

of the affiant's information.

24

Both of these requirements were met here.

25

to the specificity of the affidavit should be rejected.

26

/

27

/

28
Fo.. 080.183
124-76 DoJ

Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 224-

To assist in meeting this constitutional requirement, the

Giordenelko v. United States, supra.
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The Conversion of the Fraudulently Obtained Money into

2

Diamonds was an Integral Part of the illegal Scheme and

3

Thus the Transportation of Those Diamonds in Foreign

4

Commerce Violated 18 U.S.C. S2314

5

Where property obtained by fraud is converted into a different

6

form and the new form is transported in commerce, courts have uniforml

7

held that the change in form of the property does not bar prosecution

a

under 18 U.S.C. 52314.

9

1978); United States v. Pomponio, 558 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1977).

10

the instant case, the defendant fraudulently effected the transfer of

11

$10.2 million from the Security Pacific Bank in Los Angeles to an

12

account in Zurich, Switzerland.

13

diamonds, which were then transported in foreign commerce to the

14

defendant Rifkin.

15

not remove the defendant's subsequent transportation of the diamonds

16

from the scope of 52314.

17

United States v. Levy, 579 F.2d 1332

(2d Cir.
In

This money was used to purchase

The mere conversion of the money into diamonds did

The defendant contends, however, that the instant case involves

18

not a change in form, as in United States v. Levy, supra, and

19

United States v. Pomoonio, supra, but a change in kind from money to

20

diamonds.

21

shows the frivolity of this distinction.

A quick examination of the defendant's scheme in this case

22

As the Government's earlier memorandum discussed, the conversion

23

of the fraudulently obtained money into diamonds was an integral part

24

of the defendant Rifkin's illegal scheme.

25

The Government's evidence at trial will show that Rifkin told

26

people that the diamonds were going to be used instead of money becaus

27

diamonds could not be traced.

28

diamonds here was no different than the conversion of cash into checks

o,. 0eo--83
12.-76 DOi
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1

in Levy and the conversion of a fraudulent stock certificate into a

2

promissory note and then into a certified check in Pomponio.

3

case, one medium of exchange, virtually equivalent to cash, was

4

substituted for another medium of exchange.

5

In each

It is important to note that in this case the money was not
Instead, the conversion

6

converted into diamonds as an afterthought.

7

was part of the original plan.

8

defendant's argument should be rejected, and the arrest warrant

9

should be upheld.

10

C.

Under these circumstances, the

The Defendant has not Presented any Evidence that an

11

Attorney-Client Relationship Existed Between Himself

12

and O'Brien

13

The defendant claims that the Government intruded into his

14

attorney-client relationship with a Mr. Paul O'Brien by taping

15

telephone conversations between himself and Mr. O'Brien with O'Brien's

16

consent.

He also complains that O'Brien supplied the information as
However, Rifkin does not attach a

17

to his whereabouts to the police.

18

supporting declaration in which he claims any attorney-client relation

19

ship between himself and Mr. O'Brien.

20

devoid of any declaration by Rifkin under oath that O'Brien was in

21

fact his attorney.

22

The defendant's motion is

Therefore, no facts have been alleged by the defendant to

23

establish a claim of attorney-client privilege.

24

ant's attorney states that the tapes themselves establish that there

25

existed an attorney-client relationship between O'Brien and Rifkin,

26

the attorney's conclusion to this effect is not evidence.

27

no supporting facts to this claim of attorney-client privilege, it

28

should be disregarded.

0;01- 080-183
12476 DoJ
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III

1

THE ARRESTING OFFICERS HAD PROBABLE CAUSE

2
3

TO ARREST THE DEFENDANT, EVEN APART

4

FROM THE COMPLAINT AND ARREST WARRANT

5

Courts have consistently held that even though an arrest is made

7

pursuant to a warrant that is subsequently found to be invalid, that
arrest is lawful as long as there was probable cause to arrest the

8

suspect.

9

United States v. Hall, 348 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1965).

6

Dearinger v. United States, 378 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1967);
In the instant

10

case, there was an abundance of probable cause to arrest the defendant

11

Rifkin.

12

As the detailed declaration of Agent Brown indicates, the agents

13

had, prior to the arrest, obtained detailed information from Gary

14

Goodgame that Rifkin had committed a crime.

15

professional informant, but merely a citizen supplying information to

16

law enforcement officers.

17

by Mr. Goodgame is unquestionable.

18

information was Rifkin himself.

19

money, Rifkin had asked Goodgame to recommend a diamond broker to

20

purchase diamonds that would be used in a $10 million international

21

transaction.

22

Goodgame met on October 30, however, Rifkin not only told Goodgame

23

that he had illegally transferred money from Security Pacific Bank,

24

but also showed him many of the diamonds he had purchased with that

25

money.

26

to "places unknown."

27
28
F080.183
124 .76 DoJ

Mr. Goodgame was not a

The reliability of the information provided
The source of Mr. Goodgame's

Prior to the wire transfer of the

Goodgame had recommended Lon Stein.

When Rifkin and

Rifkin added that he had acquired a new identity and was going

As the attached declaration notes, the information supplied by
Goodgame was corroborated, prior to Rifkin's arrest, by many sources,
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1

including the diamond broker, Lon Stein, and Rifkin's girlfriend,

2

Mary Bruskotter.

3

directly from Rifkin.

4

activities in Switzerland regarding the purchase of the diamonds.

5

Security Pacific Bank itself confirmed to the agents that an unauthor-

6

ized wire transfer of $10.2 million to a Swiss bank had in fact

7

occurred.

a

from "Mike Hansen" to the wire transfer room ordering the illegal

9

transfer and immediately identified the voice of Mike Hansen as the

10
11

Both Stein and Bruskotter obtained their information
Stein also recounted to the FBI agents his own
The

Stein listened to a tape recording of the telephone call

voice of the defendant Rifkin.
All this information demonstrates that, at the time of Rifkin's

12

arrest, the FBI agents had more than enough probable cause to believe

13

that he had committed the crimes.

14

the arrest warrant and complaint inadequate, the arrest itself was

15

lawful.

16
17
18
19
20

Therefore, even if the Court finds

IV
THE DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS TO O'BRIEN WERE MADE
PRIOR TO HIS ARREST AND INDICTMENT AND THUS DO NOT
FALL WITHIN THE PROHIBITION OF MASSIAH v. UNITED STATES
The defendant contends that under Massiah v. United States, 377

21

U.S. 201 (1964), his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the

22

FBI agents recorded his telephone conversations with Paul O'Brien on

23

November 3 and 4, 1978.

24

rights announced in Massiah apply only after the defendant has been

25

arrested or indicted.

26

(2d Cir. 1976) (Friendly, J.).

27

been arrested or indicted at the time the FBI agents recorded his

Contrary to the defendant's assertion, the

United States v. Duvall, 537 F.2d 15, 19-22
In the instant case, Rifkin had not

28
-12Fwm 080-183
124.76 Doi
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I

conversations with O'Brien.

2

were not violated.
The cases cited by the defendant simply do not support his

3

Accordingly, Rifkins rights under Massiah

argument that his rights under Massiah were triggered at the time the
5

arrest warrant was issued.

6
7

468 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 939 (1973),
United States v. Miller, 432 F.Supp. 382 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 573

8

F.2d 1297 (2d Cir. 1978), and Burton v. Cuyler, 439 F.Supp. 1173

9

(E.D.Pa. 1977), the defendants had already been arrested.

In United States ex rel Robinson v. Zelker

The Court

10

in Cuyler actually stated that it "need not decide whether the
issuance of a warrant for arrest is sufficient in itself as a matter

12

of federal law to trigger (the defendant's] right to counsel."

13

439 F.Supp. at 1181.

14

Admittedly, there is language in United States ex. rel Robinson

15

v. Zelker, supra, suggesting that criminal proceedings commence with

16

the filing of an arrest warrant.

17

the Second Circuit expressly limited Zelker to arrest warrants issued

18

in New York state, where a former section of the New York Code of

19

Criminal Procedure provided that a prosecution commenced with the

20

filing of an information and the issuance of an arrest warrant, 537

21

F.2d at 21-22.

22

issuance of an arrest warrant does not trigger the right to counsel.

23

Id. at 22.

24

time of his telephone conversations with O'Brien, his rights under

25

Massiah were not violated by the recording of those conversations.

26

/

But in United States v. Duvall, supr

Duvall goes on to hold that in federal cases the

Because Rifkin had not been arrested or indicted at the

27'
28'
-131on- 08D0183
124.76 DOJ
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V

2

NONE OF THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

3

WERE VIOLATED WHEN THE AGENTS ENTERED A FRIEND'S

4

APARTMENT WITHOUT CONSENT TO ARREST THE DEFENDANT

5

A.

The Ninth Circuit's Decision in United States v. Prescott

6

does not Apply to Rifkin's Claim.

7

The defendant claims that because the agents, without consent,

8

entered an apartment belonging to Rifkin's friend in order to execute

9

an arrest warrant for Rifkin, this entry made the arrest unlawful and

10

all resulting evidence, including the defendant's confession, should

11

be suppressed.

12

obtained a search warrant for the premises before entering the

13

premises to execute the arrest warrant for Rifkin.

14

The defendant argues that the agents should have

Although not cited by the defendant in his moving papers, the

15

government has an obligation to bring to the Court's attention a very

16

recent Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343

17

(9th Cir. 1978).

18

ant's home without either an arrest warrant or a search warrant

19

looking for a third party whom they had reason to believe had com-

20

mitted a crime and was hiding in the apartment.

21

seized in the apartment pursuant to the arrest of the third party was

22

introduced against the defendant in a prosecution for being an

23

accessory after the fact.

24

In Prescott, the police forcibly entered the defend-

Physical evidence

The Court held that the evidence seized as a result of the

25

warrantless search of the defendant's home for the third party should

26

be suppressed unless the government could show exigent circumstances.

27

The Court remanded for a hearing on whether exigent circumstances

28

existed to justify the forcible entry onto the premises.

2.7 OO-183
12a-76
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The portion of the opinion which appears on the surface to depart

2

radically from prior law is the indication that to enter a dwelling

3

lawfully, the police must have either a search warrant naming the

4

suspect as the thing to be seized or an arrest warrant setting forth

5

the probable cause to arrest the suspect, the probable cause to belie

6

that the suspect is on the particular premises, and a description of

7

the premises.

8
9

Prescott should be limited to the particular facts of that case.
If the holding in Prescott is construed to be simply that evidence

10

seized during a warrantless search of a person's home, when there is

11

no reason to believe that the person himself has committed a crime,

12

may not be used against the person, then Prescott is a rather unre-

13

markable case.

14

requirement that provisions for the search of the premises in question

15

be included in an arrest warrant is construed to afford protection to

16

a fugitive on the run at each stop along the way, this would be a

17

radical departure from the prevailing law and would have a devastatinc

is

impact on law enforcement.

19

F
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However, if this requirement of a search warrant or a

The cases cited in Prescott for the proposition that a warrant iE

20

necessary to enter a dwelling to carry out an arrest do not support

21

the additional proposition that if an arrest warrant does not contain

22

a description of the premises to be searched and the reason to believ(

23

the suspect is on the premises, then the arrest itself would be

24

completely invalid.

25

F.2d 385 (D.C. 1970),

26

justified the nonconsensual warrantless entry into a man's own home

27

to arrest him for robbery.

28

in dicta the possibility of including provisions for a search of

010-13

124.76 Doi

In the first case, Dorman v. United States, 435
the Court held that exigent circumstances

Although in that case the Court discussed

-15-
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1

premises in an arrest warrant, the Court indicated in a footnote that

2

this extra provision was not required for an entry to execute a
lawful arrest warrant:

3
4"..

. While

there is no strict logic in the

5

matter it seems to be accepted, at least by impli-

6
7

cation, that the obtaining of an arrest warrant is
material in supporting a search of premises as not

8

'unreasonable' even though the magistrate has not

9

passed upon the need for invasion of privacy of

10
11

the premises.

a judgment by a magistrate would obviously be

12

helpful."

[(Emphasis added) 435 F.2d 396, footnote 25].

In United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1978), also cited

13
14

If that issue should arise, however,

by the Court in Prescott, the defendant Reed was arrested in her home
without an arrest warrant or a search warrant.

Evidence which was

16

seized in her home pursuant to the arrest was introduced at trial.

17

In reversing Reed's conviction, the Court stated:

18

"We hold that warrantless felony arrests by

19

federal agents effected in the suspect's home,
in the absence of exigent circumstances, even

21

when based upon statutory authority and probable

22

cause, are unconstitutional."

23

572 F.2d at 418].

24

There is no discussion in Reed regarding the type of warrant

25

which would have been required to make the defendant's arrest a lawful

26

one.

27

other than a traditional arrest warrant supported by probable cause

2e

to believe that the defendant had committed a crime.

Fo-m 000-183
,n
1 2.R.79
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There is no indication that the Court was referring to anything
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The third case cited by Prescott, Government of Virgin Islands
is more complicated.

In that

2

v. Cereau, 502 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1974),

3

case, the agents went to 527 Hospital Street because they had received

4

a tip that five persons for whom they had arrest warrants were there.

5

Three of the persons came out of the building when requested to do so

6

by the police.

7

in the Cereau case.

8

for the other two suspects for whom they had arrest warrants.

9

later turned out that these two did not in fact exist and were simply

These three persons were arrested and were defendants
The police then entered the premises looking
It

The police seized evidence inside the premises

10

fictional characters.

11

which was introduced against the three people who had surrendered

12

outside.

13

The Government tried to justify the search of the premises and

14

subsequent introduction of the evidence against the three individuals

15

by the fact that they entered the premises to find the other two

16

individuals for whom they had arrest warrants.

17

this argument , stating:

The Court rejected

18

"This Court has made clear, however, that arrest

19

warrants are not substitutes for search warrants."

20

[502 F.2d at 928].

21

However, the Court continued:

22

"Although police have warrants for the arrest of

23

suspects, they may enter premises, at least of

24

third persons, to search for those suspects only

25

in exigent circumstances where the police officers

26

also have probable cause to believe that the suspects

2may

be within."

[(Emphasis added) Id.].

28
¢124.76
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It seems clear that the Court added the language regarding the

2

search of the premises of a third party for suspects to limit the

3

holding to situations where the evidence found on the premises is used

4

against the third party.

5

three persons had refused to come out of the building, the police coul

6

not enter the premises to effect their arrest and use evidence seized

7

against them.

8

other two people had in fact been real and had been found inside, the

9

seized evidence could not be used against them.

10

The Cereau case does not say that if the

The Court in that case also does not say that if the

Both the holdings in Cereau and Prescott can be construed to be

11

limited to situations in which evidence is sought to be used against a

12

third party where the evidence was seized in the third party's home

13

while the police were searching for other individuals.

14

The police should not be required to obtain both an arrest warran

15

for a suspect and also, in order lawfully to execute that arrest warra:t

16

inside a dwelling, a search warrant or a new arrest warrant with searci

17

provisions every time they develop a new lead regarding the suspect's

18

whereabouts.

19

would be significant.

20

The impact of such a requirement on law enforcement

In the instant case, the agents had an arrest warrant for the
A magistrate had already determined

21

defendant, Stanley Mark Rifkin.

22

that there was probable cause to believe that the defendant had

23

committed a crime.

24

the premises where he was found.

25

only a few days in each place before moving on.

26

unreasonable, unwarranted, and unprecedented for the Court to find

27

his arrest made pursuant to a lawful arrest warrant is invalid and to

Rifkin was not the owner or permanent occupant of

28
-18OBO-183
124.76 OOJ
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I

suppress his ensuing confession and offer to surrender evidence simply

2

because he was arrested inside, rather than outside, his friend's

3

apartment.

4

B.

The Defendant has not Asserted a Sufficient Expectation

5

of Privacy in His Friend's Aoartment.

6

A person can claim Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonab e

7

governmental intrusion only if that person asserts sufficient facts to

8

establish that he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place

9

that is invaded.

10

Dec. 5, 1978).

Rakas v. Illinois, 24 Cr.L. 3009, No. 77-5781 (U.S.
See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347

(1967).

11 Neither in his counsel's motion to this Court nor in his own declara12

tion has the defendant Rifkin asserted any facts that would show such

13

a legitimate expectation of privacy.

14

There is no evidence that Rifkin was anything other than a tempo-

15

rary guest in his friend's apartment.

16

reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his own person while

17

staying with his friend.

18

with his friend Wolfson, Wolfson could allow access to the apartment

19

to anyone he chose.

20

friend Wolfson would not go through Rifkin's suitcases or his personal

21

belongings, he could not reasonably expect total privacy with respect

22

to his physical presence in the apartment.

23

The defendant could not have a

While Rifkin was staying on the premises

While Rifkin could reasonably expect that his

Indeed, it is quite clear that Rifkir did not expect privacy on

24

the premises and actually anticipated being arrested soon.

25

defendant was arrested inside the apartment, the agents had him lean

26

against the wall while they made a search for weapons.

27

the defendant spontaneously told the agents that he and his friend had

28

even practiced being searched the day before.

F-of 0BD.183
124.76 .1
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remark that both the defendant and his friend were aware that Rifkin

3

his imminent
was being sought by federal agents and were expecting
arrest. As the arrest warrant for Rifkin had been given nationwide

4

publicity, this case is quite different from the usual situation where

2

the person being sought has not been informed of an outstanding warran

7

for him.
for his arrest and of the fact that the police are looking
Rifkin certainly cannot claim that he had no expectation that the agents

9

him.
would enter the apartment to arrest
The situation here differs markedly from the facts in Jones v.

6

10

held that
United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), where the Supreme Court
by
the
the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights had been violated

12

police officers' entry into a dwelling leased by someone else.

13

unlike Rifkin, the defendant in Jones had been given total freedom to

14

use his friend's apartment.

But,

He had been given a key to the apartment

1s

and had used that key to enter the apartment on the day of the search.
in the
In fact, the defendant in Jones was the only person present
had
apartment at the time of the search. The lessee of the apartment
been away for several days. None of these facts emphasized by the

19

Court in Jones are present in the instant case.

20

C.

15
16
17

Even if Rifkin had an Expectation of Privacy in Wolfson's

21

Apartment, Exigent Circumstances Justified an Immediate

22

Entry into the Apartment.

23

The Ninth Circuit has consistently upheld warrantless arrests

24

inside dwellings where exigent circumstances justified immediate actio

25

by the Government agents.

26

1349 (9th Cir. 1978).

27

fied by two factors--the likelihood that the defendant would flee

E-g,

United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d

In the instant case, immediate action was justi

28
-20AD-, 0BO-183
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1 absent immediate arrest and the likelihood that the defendant would
2

destroy evidence.
Not until about 7:00 p.m. on Sunday, November 5, 1978, did Agent

3
4

Brown learn that earlier that day Rifkin had telephoned Paul O'Brien

5

in Rochester, New York, and had asked him to send $6,000 to Post Offic4

6

Box #1564 in the name of Daniel Wolfson in Carlsbad, California.

7

Brown immediately traveled to Carlsbad.

a

of the investigation in Carlsbad, Agent Brown decided to arrest Rifkin

9

at Wolfson's apartment.

10

11:45 p.m.

Ageni

After awaiting the results

The agents arrived there at approximately

Ten minutes later, they entered the apartment.

These facts illustrate the time pressures under which the Govern-

11

The agents knew that Rifkin had been in

12

ment agents were operating.

13

Switzerland in late October and that he had then traveled to Los

14

Angeles, where he had met with Goodgame on October 30 and with

15

Bruskotter on October 31.

16

New York, on November 1, 2 and 3.

17

he received the information on November 5, that Rifkin was not staying

18

in any one place for a long period of time.

19

undoubtedly was aware of the media publicity that was being given to

20

his theft.

21

from persons who wanted to steal the diamonds from him.

They also knew that Rifkin was in Rochester
It was obvious to Agent Brown, when

Rifkin was a fugitive who

He could have been fleeing not only from the FBI but also

Under these circumstances, the FBI agents cannot be faulted for

22
23

not waiting on November 5 to obtain a warrant to enter Wolfson's

24

premises.

25

warrant in the middle of the night, obtaining that warrant would have

26

/

Although the agents conceivably could have obtained such a

27
28
2.7 0183
124-76
Doi
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1

caused a great deal of delay.

2

have fled once more, possibly avoiding capture indefinitely.

During that delay, the defendant could
The

likelihood of flight by Rifkin clearly justified the immediate action
3
by the agencs.
5
6
7
8
9

Moreover, once the agents arrived at Wolfson's apartment and were
denied entry, it became much more likely that Rifkin would attempt to
destroy or otherwise dispose of evidence, to escape, or to confront
the agents violently.

As the Ninth Circuit stated in United States v.

Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1978):

10

"A suspect who realizes that he is in danger of

11

immediate apprehension is clearly more likely

12

to destroy evidence, to attempt to escape, or to

13
14

engage in armed resistance than is a suspect who
is taken unaware. By acting promptly, however,

15

the police can substantially mitigate the

16

possibility of such occurrences."

17

All of these occurrences were sufficiently likely to justify the
1gents' immediate entry into Wolfson's apartment.

19
20

selves could have been flushed down the toilet.
ave been burned or otherwise destroyed.

The diamonds them-

Other evidence could

Moreover, since Rifkin had

21

een frequently moving from place to place, it was very likely that,
2hen aware of the immediate presence of Government officers, he would

23

attempt to escape through another exit of the apartment.

24

heer value of the diamonds in
2iolence a likely possibility.

26
27

A suspect's knowledge that he is at risk of immediate apprehension
:learly qualifies as an exigent circumstance justifying immediate actio

Finally, the

Rifkin's possession made his resort to

Jnited States v. Flickinger, supra; United States v. McLaughlin, 525
-221 4m080.183
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F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Curran, 498 F.2d 30,
2
3

35-36 (9th Cir. 1974) ;
(9th Cir. 1973).

United States v. Bustamente-Gamez,

488 F.2d 4

Moreover, the Government agents are not required to

4

surround the residence and wait for the proper warrant.

5

Circuit again stated in Flickinger:

As the Ninth

"The alternative to immediate action may be that
the police would take escalated precautionary

6
7

measures while awaiting the warrant in order to

8

guarantee that the suspect did not escape and to
insure their own safety.

10

off the residence.

This may include cordoning

Such measures, while appropriate

12

in some cases, may carry their own acceptable

13

danters, i.e., a heightened risk of weapons play

14

and danger to third parties . . .

"

15

Accord United States v. Johnson, 561 F.2d 832, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1977)

16

(en banc).

17

The agents had ample reason to believe that Rifkin was in Wolfson s

18

apartment because of the negative results of the rest of their investi

19

gation and the positive information that he was either with Wolfson or

20

in close contact with him.

21

defendant had left his original residence in Sepulveda to take a new

22

job in the San Diego area.

23

at work in San Diego or at the nearby motel which he had checked into.

24

His mother, relatives, friends, and his girlfriend did not know his
whereabouts.

26
27

The agents had already determined that the

He had not been seen for the past few days

In the space of several days he had checked into and out

of a hotel in New York and in Beverly Hills.
The agents then received information that Paul O'Brien was to
mail a package to Rifkin at a post office box registered to a friend,
-23-
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Before going to Wolfson's

1

Daniel Wolfson in Carlsbad, California.

2

most recent address, the agents first went to Wolfson's place of

3

business and then to Wolfson's previous addresses; they even drove

4

around the area checking the parking lots of local motels for Rifkin's

5

car.

When all of this checked out negative, they were reasonably
When

6

certain that Rifkin was in his friend's, Wolfson's, apartment.

7

the agents went to Wolfson's apartment, they told Wolfson that they

a

had a warrant for Rifkin's arrest, showed Rifkin's picture to the
friend and asked him whether Rifkin was in the apartment.

Wolfson

10

replied dumbly, "I don't know."

11

reason to believe that Rifkin was on the premises.

12

who else is at home with them!

13

whether Rifkin was on the premises was the answer of a person with a

14

guilty conscience who was trying to be evasive.

15

the likelihood was very high that the defendant was in fact on the

16

premises.

This response added to the agents'
Most people know

Wolfson's answer that he did not know

At that point in time

Under all these circumstances, the FBI agents in this case acted

17

IS

wisely and properly in entering Wolfson's apartment without waiting tc

19

obtain a warrant that authorized them to enter that apartment to arreE

20

Rifkin.

21

arrest inside the apartment was lawful.

22

D.

Because exigent circumstances justified this entry, Rifkin's

Even if the Agent's Entry Without Consent onto the

23

Apartment Premises was Unlawful, the Defendant's

24

Confession and Offer to Surrender Evidence Were not

25

Related to Whether He was Arrested on the Premises

26

or in a Public Place and Should Therefore not be

27

Suppressed.

28
-24go-m 060-183
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AS is indicated supra, the defendant could lawfully have been

3

arrested, with or without an arrest warrant, in a public place, as
there was ample probable cause to believe he had committed a crime.

4

The defendant was so eager to confess that he wanted to sign the

5

Miranda form before it had even been read to him.

6

offered to surrender the diamonds before being asked anything by the

2

agent.
7

Moreover, he

It is quite clear from these facts that the confession and

B

consent to seize evidence would have occurred regardless of the

9

defendant's physical location at the time of his arrest.

10

Even if there were something improper about the agents' entry
without consent into the friend's apartment to make the arrest, there

12

must be some connection between the entry and the evidence sought to b

13
14

suppressed. Cf. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 598 (1973); United
States v. Duncan, 570 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1978).
Here there is none.

15

This is not a situation where items were seized which were in plain

16

view which could not have been seized if an arrest had been made on

17

the street.

The defendant's confession and voluntary surrender of the

diamonds was totally independent of the fact that he happened to be
19
20

inside a dwelling.
VI

21

EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFIED THE AGENTS'

22

SEIZURE OF THE MONEY AT THE TIME OF THE DEFENDANT'S

23

ARREST EVEN WITHOUT THE DEFENDANT'S CONSENT

Government agents can seize evidence of a crime without first

24
25

obtaining either a search warrant or the defendant's consent where:

26

(1) they have probable cause to believe such evidence exists, and

27

(2) exigent circumstances justify such immediate action.

28

following discussion demonstrates, both of these conditions were
-25-
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1

satisfied here, and thus the FBI agents acted lawfully in seizing the

2

$12,000 in cash.
Immediately following his arrest, Rifkin himself told the agents

3
4

that he had about $12,000 which he had obtained by selling some of the

5

diamonds.

6

probable cause to believe that the $12,000--fruits of the crime--was
located in the apartment.

7
8
9
10

12

Nor is there any doubt that exigent circumstances justified the
agents' immediate seizure of the money.

In his own declaration, the

defendant Rifkin states that he "was concerned that when [he] was take
from the premises the diamonds might disappear in [his] absence."
Defendant's Motion, at p. 19. Just as the diamonds might have disap-

13

peared if they had been left at the apartment, so might the money have

14

disappeared.
The declaration of Agent Brown makes clear that Wolfson had not

15
16

cooperated with the FBI agents when they had first appeared at Wolfsons

17

door.

18

extremely close friends.

19

possibility that, if they left the $12,000 in the apartment, Wolfson
would destroy, hide, or even abscond with the evidence.

20

The agents had other information that Wolfson and Rifkin were
The agents were certainly aware of the

22

In addition, the agents wEre fully cognizant of the extensive
media coverage that had been given to Rifkin's crime. With such

23

extensive publicity and with such a large amount of money involved in

24

the theft, the agents realized that other persons might have been

25

trying to locate Rifkin in order to steal the proceeds of the crime.

21

26

12-.876

Thus, there is no doubt in this case that the agents had

All these factors increased the likelihood that the $12,000 would
Because of this

7

disappear if the agents did not seize it immediately.

28

likelihood of disappearance, the agents properly seized the $12,000 at
the time of the defendant's arrest.
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I

VII

2

THE SEARCH OF THE DEFENDANT'S SUITCASES

3

PURSUANT TO A SERCH WARRANT WAS LAWFUL

4

A.

The Affidavit in Support of the Search Warrant Establishes

5

More Than Enough Probable Cause to Justify the issuance

6

of the Warrant.

7

The Government readily agrees with the defendant that an affidavi

8

in support of a search warrant must supply enough facts to justify a

9

finding of probable cause that evidence of a crime will be found in
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967);

10

the premises to be searched.

11

Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); United States v. EsDarza,

12

546 F.2d 841, 843 (9th Cir. 1976).

13

by the defendant's contention that the affidavit here failed to meet

14

that requirement.

15

probable cause.

16

However, the Government is astound d

This affidavit clearly establishes the required

The defendant argues first that the affidavit fails to allege

17

sufficiently that the defendant Rifkin had committed the crime of

18

interstate transportation of stolen property.

19

completely frivolous.

20

the defendant was arrested "on a complaint filed in federal court in

21

the Central District of California charging him with the violation of

22

Title 18, United States Code Section 2314--Interstate Transportation

23

of Stolen property, arising out of the theft of $10,200,000 from the

24

Security Pacific Bank in Los Angeles, California."

25

further states that other agents had informed the affiant that the

26

crime involved the transfer of money to Switzerland, the conversion

27

of the money there into diamonds, and the transportation of the dia-

28

monds back to the United States.

The affidavit states that on November 6, 1978,

-27124-76 Do0
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The statement in the affidavit that Rifkin had been arrested

3

pursuant to a complaint filed in the Central District of California
indicates that a judicial officer in Los Angeles had already determine4

4

that probable cause existed to believe: (1) that a crime had been

2

committed, and (2) that Rifkin had committed the crime.

The Fourth

6

Amendment requires only that one judicial officer be presented with
enough specific facts to justify a finding of probable cause. With

8

respect to the defendant's commission of the crime, that requirement

9

was met here when the judicial officer in Los Angeles issued the

11

arrest warrant. The magistrate in San Diego was certainly entitled
to rely upon the independent judgment of the judicial officer in Los

12

Angeles.

13

The defendant's next contention is equally meritless.

The

14

defendant claims that the affidavit does not support a finding of

15

probable cause to believe that evidence of the crime would be found in

16

the defendant's suitcases inside the apartment.

17

argument, the defendant cites United States v. Bailey, 458 F.2d 408

18

(9th Cir. 1972),

19

house or an automobile does not create probable cause to search that

20

house or automobile.

21

In support of this

which held that the mere presence of a defendant in a

Bailey simply does not apply to this case.

The affidavit here

22

does much more than merely assert that Rifkin was present inside the

23

apartment.

24

"removed a suitcase from a closet located in the southeast bedroom of

25

the apartment, brought it into the living room, and removed from it

26

the diamonds and $12,000 in cash."

27

as he was leaving the apartment, Rifkin told Wolfson to put his bags

28

back into the closet.

The affidavit states that at the time of his arrest Rifkin

The sources of this information--Agent Norm
-28-
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I

Wight, Agent Charles McLaran, and Wolfson himself--are clearly indi-

2

cated in the affidavit.

3

cause to believe that since Rifkin had removed some evidence of the

4

crime from his suitcase, other evidence might similarly be found

5

inside the suitcase.

6

All this information establishes probable

In addition, the affidavit states that after Wolfson had been
arrested for harboring a fugitive, he stated that he still had Rifkin'

8

suitcase in his apartment and asked whether the FBI still intended to

9

search his apartment.

10

case added to the probable cause to believe that evidence of the crime

11

could be found in that suitcase.

12

The affidavit relates a conversation between Wolfson and Steven

13

Palma, a media person in Los Angeles, in which Wolfson offered to act

14

as a go-between in a news story about Rifkin and the theft.

15

affidavit also states that in that conversation, Wolfson asked Palma

16

to remove from Rifkin's suitcase some paperwork containing information

17

relating to the crime.

18

Palma that he had not yet removed any items from the suitcases.

19
20

The

The affidavit also states that Wolfson told

The defendant argues, however, that the hearsay attributed to
!Wolfson is not corroborated by any other facts stated in the affidavit

21

But Wolfson's statements to Palma are supported both by Rifkin's own

22

acts in retrieving the diamonds and the money from the suitcase and by

23

Wolfson's statements to Special Agent Zopp expressing concern about

24

suitcases.

25

(1969),

Moreover, both Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410

and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964),

involved informatio

Wolfson is not a professional

26

provided by professional informants.

27

informant.

28

("there has been a growing recognition that the language in Aguilar

Pon, esc~3
12a.76

Wolfson's concern for the welfare of that suit-

oJ

See United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377, 380 (2d Cir. 197 ),

-29-
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1

and Spinelli was addressed to the particular problem of professional

2

informers") .

He is a friend of Rifkin whose statements were based on

his personal observations.
4

Finally, the defendant argues that Wolfson is not credible since
he was tempted to exaggerate his access to important evidence in order

6

to interest the media.

7

speculative.

This assertion by the defendant is totally

An affidavit in support of a search warrant should be interpreted
in a common-sense manner.

United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102,

When the affidavit in question here is examined in

10

108-09 (1965).

11

this manner, it becomes very apparent that this affidavit establishes

12

more than enough probable cause to justify the issuance of the search

13

warrant.

14

B.

The Government Does Not Intend to Use Any Evidence Obtained

15

in the Search of Wolfson's Apartment that Was Not Found

16

in Rifkin's Suitcase.

17

The search warrant issued in this case authorized a search of

18

Wolfson's apartment for "suitcases belonging to Stanley Mark Rifkin

19

that contain documents and physical evidence and/or other documents oz

20

physical evidence that may have been removed from said suitcases."

21

(Emphasis added).

22

of this warrant did not sufficiently particularize the items to be

23

seized and thus permitted a general search in violation of the Fourth

24

Amendment.

25

The defendant contends that the underlined portion

The Government does not concede that this portion of the search
In Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S.

26

warrant was impermissibly broad.

27

463, 479 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld a search warrant that

28

authorized the seizure of numerous documents "together with other

Form 080.183
12.-76 .07

-30-

540

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. II

1

fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this [time]

2

unknown."

3

no broader than the language upheld by the Court in Andreson.

4

theless, the Court need not concern itself with this language in the

5

warrant, since the Government does not plan to use any evidence

6

obtained in that search that was not found in Rifkin's suitcase.

7

The questioned language in the warrant in this case appears
Never-

Even if the underlined language were too broad, that defect in

8

the warrant would not invalidate either the other language in the

9

warrant or the items seized pursuant to that other language.

As the

10

Ninth Circuit recently stated in United States v. Daniels, 549 F.2d

11

665, 668 (9th Cir. 1977):

12

"The exclusionary rule does not require the

13

suppression of otherwise legal seizures merely

14

because they were part of the same search in

15

which an illegal seizure occurred."

16

Accord, United States v. Artieri, 491 F.2d 440, 445-46

17

denied, 419 U.S. 878

18

(2d Cir.),

cert

(1974).

The defendant does not question that portion of the search warran
the agents

to seize "suitcases belonging to Stanley Mark

19

allowing

20

Rifkin that contain documents and physical evidence."

21

is beyond any challenge, for it specifies the exact items to be seized

22

As the previous discussion demonstrated, there was abundant probable

23

cause to seize those suitcases.

24

cases are properly admissible.

Any items found ins-de those suit-

25

VIII

26

NO MATERIAL MISSTATEMENTS WERE

27
28
For
-080-183
12.6.76 1>OJ

That portion

MADE IN THE AFFIDAVIT TO THE SEARCH WARRANT
As the attached declarations of Agents McLean and McLaran indicat
-31-
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there were no material misstatements in the affidavit to the search
2
3
4

warrant.

The only error in the facts of the affidavit, attached as

Exhibit Two, was that the affidavit stated that Palma said an article
on computer fraud appeared in the San Diego newspapers whereas, in
fact, Palma had told the agent that it was a television program on

7

error was
computer fraud, not a newspaper article as reported. This
not brought to the attention of the agent who signed the affidavit to

8

the warrant.

9

States Attorney.

10

time to retype the affidavit for such a minor point.

11

Assistant's conduct is not excusable, it is understandable in view of

12

the time pressures involved.

13
14

to
Wolfson was making inquiries about selling evidence of the crime
whether
the news media, and Wolfson had asked, after he was arrested,

15

the agents intended to search his apartment.

17

bail or had someone else go to his apartment to remove the evidence.
The only factual error in the affidavit to the warrant related

6

It was brought to the attention of the Assistant United
However, he indicated that there was not sufficient
While the

The Government had information that

Wolfson could have made

19

to a
only to a point of background information and was not material
validity
finding of probable cause. Therefore, it does not affect the

20

of the warrant.

18

21

On a more serious level, Palma contends that he never told the
that there was evidence of the crime in Rifkin's suitcases in

22

agent

23

Wolfson's apartment.

24

recounts in detail his conversation with McLaran.

25

Agent McLaran refutes this.

Agent McLaran

It is apparent from Palma's declaration that his denials of

26

McLaran's statements are literal denials of the exact wording rather

27

than of the substance of the representations. Palma says that Wolfson
did not cal' him at 4:00 p.m. on November 7, 1978. However, he admits
-32-
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Palma denies telling the agent

I

that he called Wolfson at that time.

2
3

that Wolfson asked him to remove paperwork from Rifkin's suitcases
relating to the theft. However, he does say that his conversation witl

4

Wolfson consisted of a series of "what if" statements to him by
Wolfson.

Palma characterizes these as "hypotheticals."

Palma does

6
7

not state what was said in these "what if" statements.
Agent McLaran says that Palma recounted Wolfson's statements as

8

saying what if information relating to the theft were in Stan's bags
in Wolfson's apartment; what if Palma would remove them from Wolfson's

10
11

apartment--then Wolfson would not be involved. These are clearly not
"hypotheticals", but suggestions that that is what Wolfson wants Palma

12

to do.

13

summarized as follows:

14

that was in Rifkin's suitcases that contained more information

15

relating to the theft."

16

was the plain meaning of Wolfson's so called "what if" statements.

In the affidavit to the search warrant, this conversation was
"Wolfson asked if Palma would remove paperwork

Any reasonable person would conclude that tha

As the affidavit recounted the plain meaning of the conversation,

17
18

there were no material misstatements in the evidence to believe that

19

the bags in Rifkin's suitcases contained evidence of the crime.
The defendant's claim that the agents already knew that there

20
21

was no evidence in the suitcases and fabricated Palma's statements to

22

obtain the opportunity to make a general search of the apartment is

23

wildly speculative and highly irresponsible.

24

he made only a cursory search of the bags and did not read any of the

25

documents or paperwork in the suitcases.

27

evidence should be denied.

8-330D183

24-761 0

Agent Wight states that

For the reasons stated above, the defendant's motions to suppress

26
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DECLARATION OF ROBIN C. BROWN

2

I, ROBIN C. BROWN, hereby declare as follows:

3

1.

I am employed as a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of

4

Investigation, now stationed in Los Angeles at 11000 Wilshire

5

Boulevard.

6
7

2.

On October 31, 1978, at about 1:00 p.m.,

I was assigned to

investigate an allegation of a major wire fraud.

8

3. On October 31, 1978, at about 2:00 p.m., Gary Goodgame, an

9

attorney, appeared at the Los Angeles Office of the FBI in the comDuring the next approximate

10

pany of his attorney, H. Walter Croskey.

11

two-hour period, Goodgame explained that he had known Stanley Mark

12

Rifkin about three or four years.

13

legal work for Rifkin in respect to Stan Rifkin, Inc.

14

said that in mid-summer 1978, Rifkin had approached him indicating

15

that he represented a "Fortune 500" corporation, and that this corpo-

16

ration desired to deal with another international corporation by

17

using an untraceable commodity for political reasons.

18

suggested and Rifkin indicated that he would present that to the

19

company for their approval.

20

Rifkin indicated that the company had approved the concept of using

21

diamonds as the commodity and asked Goodgame whether he could suggest

22

an individual knowledgeable in the diamond market that could be of

23

assistance.

24

broker.

25

that this transaction was for the amount of ten million dollars.

26

4.

He said that he had done some
He

Diamonds were

At a subsequent meeting with Goodgame,

Goodgame suggested the name of Lon Stein, a diamond

Rifkin mentioned to Goodgame and Stein in subsequent meeting

Goodgame also told me during that interview that on October

27

29, a Sunday, as Goodgame returned from a week's vacation, he re-

28

ceived a phone call from Rifkin who indicated that he desperately

124-76 DcJ
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1

needed to speak with Goodgame.

2

that Rifkin did not take his advice.

3

comment was in reference to a previous conversation where Rifkin had

4

indicated that he might abscond with the diamonds to be purchased in

5

this transaction.

6

should not do that.

7

at the L'Ermitage Hotel in Beverly Hills.

8

Rifkin filled an ashtray to overflowing with diamonds to show to

9

Goodgame.

He indicated to Goodgame at that time
Goodgame indicated that this

At that time, Goodgame had advised him that he
A meeting was set up for October 30, a Monday,
During that meeting,

Rifkin gave him three of those stones.

Rifkin further

10

explained that he had made an unauthorized wire transfer of funds

11

from Security Pacific National Bank.

12

including the diamond broker and the diamond supplier, had been paid

13

and that Security Pacific National Bank would stand the loss.

14

added that he had acquired a new identity and was going to "places

15

unknown."

16

At that time, he gave Goodgame documents for the dissolution of Stan

17

Rifkin, Inc.

18

5.

He added that all individuals,

Rifkin

He further indicated that Goodgame would not see him again.

Late Wednesday night, November 1, 1978, I interviewed Lon

19

Stein, the diamond broker, at his home.

20

Rifkin a number of times regarding Rifkin representing a large corpo-

21

ration, and their desire to buy ten million dollars worth of diamonds

22

Rifkin provided only the size and quality of the diamonds to be

23

purchased and would provide no further detail.

24

made to examine diamonds in Geneva, Switzerland offered by the Soviet

25

government.

26

provided by Rifkin.

27

October 27, Stein examined and purchased 8.145 million dollars worth

28

of diamonds.

,n 080-1 83
12a-76 DoJ

He said that he had met with

Arrangements were

On October 25, 1978, Stein flew to Geneva using a ticket
From noon, October 26, to the evening of

The diamonds were then picked up by couriers and taken
"

_35

1

to the duty-free port at the airport.

2

monds were then picked up by someone between that time and the evenin.

3

of October 28.

4

6.

Stein was told that the dia-

On November 2, 1978, I met with employees and officers of

5

the Security Pacific National Bank,

6

them of the alleged 10.2 million dollar theft from their bank.

7

checking the records of the bank, they informed me that their records

8

showed that an unauthorized wire transfer had been sent on October

9

26,

10

Switzerland, to the account of Russalmaz, a branch of the Soviet

11

government.

12

for this transaction did not exist.

13

that the wire was ordered by telephone and that call was found to

14

have been recorded on their logging recorder.

15

Mike Hansen, using the secret codes and supposedly employed by the

16

International Branch at the World Trade Center, had caused the wire

17

transfer to be sent.

18

Soviets confirmed to him that the 10.2 million dollars was on deposit

19

in Zurich by mid-day October 27, 1978.

20

interview of some employees of the wire transfer room that Rifkin had

21

been there on two or three occasions in October in the guise of a

22

consultant for the Federal Reserve Bank.

23

employees and the observation of their work, he was able to learn the

24

secret codes, procedures, and techniques and later use those to make

25

the wire transfer order.

26

the telephone call was played.

27

that the caller was Rifkin.

C0-183

-76 Doi

Los Angeles, California, to infor
After

1978, through Irving Trust Company in New York to a bank in Zuricl

The bank confirmed that the offsetting customer account
Records of the bank indicated

A person using the name

I had previously been told by Stein that the

The bank also determined by

By his interviewing of

Stein was present with me when the tape of
He said quickly and without hesitation

28/
,
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7.

I interviewed Mary Bruskotter, a girlfriend of Rifkin, on

2

November 4, 1978.

3

Rifkin on October 29, a Sunday, and he had requested her to come to

4

the L'Ermitage Hotel in Beverly Hills.

5

at about 5:00 a.m. on October 31.

6

he was a fugitive and that he had committed a crime, but did not go

7

into any detail.

8

and would not be seeing her again.

9

gifts purchased in Europe.

10

her that he was checking out at about 8:00 that morning.

11

days earlier, I confirmed that Rifkin had checked out about 8:00 a.m.

12

on October 31, 1978.

13

that he had used the alias of David Garnett.

14

8.

She indicated that she had been telephoned by

Bruskotter was at the hotel

Rifkin at that time told her that

He told her that he would be leaving the country
At that time, he gave her some

She said that Rifkin had indicated to
Several

I discovered through the records of the hotel

During the night of October 31, 1978, I went to Rifkin's

15

last known address, 15015 Parthenia, Apartment 18, Sepulveda,

16

California, and found that no one was at the apartment and that no

17

vehicle was in his assigned parking place.

18

evening was spent gathering descriptive information and background

19

information on Rifkin from driver's license and vehicle information,

20

identification records from Washington, D.C. etc.

21

9.

The remainder of the

On November 1, 1978, I contacted three individuals at the

22

apartment on Parthenia Street.

23

ees of Stan Rifkin, Inc.

24

corporation and had accepted employment in the San Diego area with

25

National Semi-Conductor.

26

the La Jolla, California area.

27

Diego to conduct investigations in that area.

28

mother on November 1, 1978.

Mom OBD-183

12.76 DO]

They identified themselves as employ-

They told me that Rifkin had left the

They said Rifkin had a room in a motel in
Leads were immediately sent to San
I spoke to Rifkin's

She indicated that Rifkin was driving a
-4-37-
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1

gray Datsun sports vehicle, bearing California license 701EYQ.

2

Rifkin's mother and the employees of Stan Rifkin, Inc. told me that

3

a missing person's report had been filed by relatives and by National

4

Semi-Conductor inasmuch as Rifkin had not been seen since October 25,

5

1978, when he left work in San Diego for personal reasons.

6

that extensive searching had been done by local law enforcement agen-

7

cies for Rifkin in the Southern California area.

8

to no avail with no references to other possible locations of Rifkin.

9

10.

Both

They said

All of these were

On November 2, 1978, an arrest warrant for Stanley Mark

10

Rifkin was obtained by my filing an affidavit for a complaint before

11

a United States Magistrate in Los Angeles, California.

12

11.

At this time, Rifkin's name was entered into the National

13

Crime Information Center computer system in Washington, D.C., to-

14

gether with his physical description and the description of his auto-

15

mobile.

16

teletypes were sent to other law enforcement agencies to include the

17

United States Customs Service and the United States Immigration and

18

Naturalization Service.

19

Department to confirm his passport information, and to other govern-

20

ment agencies known to have employed Rifkin.

21

out to a number of divisions of the FBI to interview known relatives,

22

former associates, former employers and those to whom Rifkin was

23

connected via notes, memoranda and unfounded information.

24

this information was immediately handled by receiving agents and was

25

found to be negative as to Rifkin's location.

26

12.

This information is disseminated na:ionwide.

In addition,

Calls were made to the United States State

Leads were further sent

All of

During the evening of November 3, 1978, while conducting a

27

surveillance in Anaheim, California, at a possible location of Rifkin

2S

I was advised via telephone that Rifkin had been located in the

DB.183
Fo.m
128.76 DOi
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After returning to the Los Angeles office,

I

Rochester, New York area.

2

I relayed information to Rochester to aid in their search for Rifkin.

3

I was informed by FBI

4

had contacted them and said that he, O'Brien, had met Rifkin in the

5

Rochester area on November

6

Rifkin had cancelled a meeting scheduled for November 4, 1978.

7

13.

agents in Rochester, New York that Paul O'Brien

1, 2, and 3, 1978.

O'Brien also said that

Special Agent Dennis Carney of the Rochester, New York

8

Resident Agency was told by O'Brien that Rifkin had called O'Brien

9

at about 7:00 p.m. on November 5 (New York time),

and asked him to

10

send the $6,000 that he had previously given O'Brien to a post office

11

box number 1564, in the name of Daniel Wolfson in Carlsbad, California

12

92008.

13

He requested that this money be sent immediately in a plain brown

14

wrapper with no return address.

15

14.

Rifkin said that he was meeting Wolfson, an attorney, soon.

At about 7:00 p.m. on November 5 (California time),

i

16

telephonically contacted the resident agency in Rochester to deter-

17

mine the status of the investigation.

18

call with a number of agents that included, I believe, Special Agents

19

Richard Foley and Hugh Higgins, the information regarding the post

20

office box in Carlsbad and about Wolfson was relayed to me.

21

indicated that they believed they were about an hour behind Rifkin on

22

Friday and Saturday, and that after that it had appeared Rifkin had

23

left the Rochester area.

24

15.

At this time, in a conference

They

At that time, I telephonically contacted the San Diego

25

Division and requested the name

and residence telephone of the agent

26

who handles the Carlsbad area.

I was provided with the residence

27

telephone of Special Agent Norm Wight, the Senior Resident Agent of

28

the Vista Resident Agency of the San Diego Division.

F,- 08D.183

12-8-76DoJ
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1

Wight and explained to him the basic facts of the case, and in de-

2

tail explained to him the facts that included Rifkin being located

3

in Rochester, and his request to have cash mailed to him in care of

4

a post office box in Carlsbad.

5

agent and I would leave immediately to Carlsbad with photographs and

6

additional background information on Rifkin.
16.

7

He was advised further that another

I arrived at the Carlsbad Police Department and met approxi-

8

mately five other San Diego agents at about 9:00 p.m., November 5,

9

1978.

10

17.

At approximately 11:45 p.m. on Sunday, November 5, 1978,

11

Special Agent Norman I. Wight and myself, upon learning of the nega-

12

tive results in the fugitive investigation that was being conducted

13

in the Carlsbad, California area that night, decided to attempt

14

apprehension of Stanley Mark Rifkin at the residence of Daniel

15

Wolfson.

16

complex so that if anyone attempted to flee from the rear of the

17

apartment, such attempt would be thwarted.

18

18.

Agents were directed to go to the rear of the apartment

Wight and I knocked on the door and rang the doorbell to

19

the apartment.

About thirty (30) seconds later, a man who identified

20

himself as Daniel Wolfson answered the door.

21

19.

22

credentials.

23

At that time, Wolfson placed his arms on the door frame to bar entry.

24

He said that he did not want to talk with us in his apartment because

25

he did not trust the government since Watergate.

26

sire to contact his attorney because of that distrust.

27
28
14.76 00-3

12.76Doi

We introduced ourselves to Wolfson and showed him our FBI
We then asked Wolfson to talk with us in his apartment.

He indicated a de-

20. I then explained to Wolfson, who continued to physically
bar entry, the purpose of our visit.

-7-40-

I explained to him that we had

1

a warrant for the arrest of Stanely Mark Rifkin.

2

the warrant as I showed Wolfson a four inch by six inch black and

3

white photograph of Rifkin.

4

was in his apartment at that time.

5

he did not know.

6

consequences of harboring a fugitive.

7

Rifkin was in his apartment, and he responded by saying that he did

8

not know.

9

that Rifkin was in his apartment at that time.

I further explained

He was then asked whether or not Rifkin
He hesitated and then said that

Wight then explained to him in great detail the
Wolfson was again asked whethe

We then explained to Wolfson that we had reason to believe
This discussion con-

10

tinued for about ten minutes, at which time entry was again requested

11

As we stepped forward, Wolfson stood aside and allowed us to enter

12

the apartment.

13

21. Wight walked past me in the entrance hall and went to the

14

kitchen and living room area.

I stopped and commenced the search in

15

the area of the hall closets.

As Wight was finishing the kitchen and

16

living room area, I went towards a bedroom nearest the living room

17

and remarked to Wolfson, who was near me at the time, how much grief

18

Rifkin had put his family through, how Rifkin's mother reacted to my

19

explaining to her the gravity of the situation, and how dangerous it

20

was for Rifkin to be "on the street" with the diamonds and cash.

21

said these things loud enough for Rifkin to hear them.

22

loudly as I approached the hallway to the bedrooms that Rifkin should

23

immediately come out of hiding.

24

Wight made a similar bid and received no response, we began a system-

25

atic search of the apartment.

26

22.

I

I then said

Receiving no response, and after

Wight left the apartment to request Special Agent Dalton

27

to guard the front door of the apartment so as to prevent Rifkin

28

from leaving during the search.

08013
12876 Doj
Pw.
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1

23.

I started searching the master bedroom and adjacent --a-t-

Wight joined me in that room and he made note of the fact that

2

room.

3

the patio door of that bedroom was locked from the inside.

4

went back into the hall and I checked the hall bathroom, and then we

5

went to the end of the hall to the bedroom that had been converted to

6

an office.

7

except one lamp that illuminated the room.

8

and the shades drawn in that room.

9

24.

We then

We walked past a bedroom that had no furniture in it
The closet door was close

As we finished our search of the office/bedroom and were in

10

the doorway leaving, Rifkin appeared in the doorway of the vacant

11

bedroom.

12

efforts and said that he was only being a friend.

13

ourselves and placed Rifkin under arrest.

14

underwear on and I noticed that he was barefoot.

15

to the master bedroom where he put on his underwear.

16

to the hall bathroom where he got a pair of black socks left on the

17

shower curtain rod to dry.

18

room where he put his socks and shoes on.

19

gear and clothing he should take with him to the jail.

20

him that they would not allow him access to most of the items he

21

requested for a while, and that it would be best to leave them for

22

someone to bring to him later.

23

25.

He said, "Here I am," and then he thanked Wolfson for his
We then identified

He said that he had no
Wight escorted him
I escorted him

He was then taken back to the master bedHe asked us what toilet
We advised

I then led Rifkin out of that bedroom and placed him

24

against the wall in the hall to search him for weapons and evidence.

25

At this point, Rifkin said that Wolfson and he had practiced being

26

searched the previous day.

27

was escorted to the living room adjacent to the area of the search.

28

Wight asked Wolfson to step outside and allow us some time with

orm 080183

12.76
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He was not handcuffed at this time.
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I

Rifkin alone.

2

26.

3

Rights form.

4

certain of Rifkin's constitutional rights to him.

5

to obtain and sign the form before I was finished.

6

him that I had to read the

7

understood all that I read to him.

8

gave it to him to read.

9

I read to him.

Wight at that time left for a moment to get an Advice of
He returned shortly and I started to formally read
He made an attempt
I explained to

form to him first to be assured that he
After I read the form aloud, I

He said that he understood those rights that

He further said that he was willing to discuss the

10

matter with us and waived those rights by signing that waiver on the

11

form that I provided him.
27.

12

Before any questioning started, Rifkin said,

"I guess you

We asked their location and he said that they

13

want the diamonds."

14

were in an item of luggage in the office/bedroom.

15

him to that room and he pointed to a black and brown canvas suitcase

16

in the closet.

17

watched him take a red plastic shirtcase from it.

18

couple of shirts and it seemed that there were about thirty (30) whit

19

paper packets that he said contained the diamonds.

20

confirmed that he had sold twenty-four (24) diamonds for cash.

21

asked him about that cash and he said that he had $12,000 of it in

22

his luggage, but that he wanted to give that to his attorney.

23

then told that that was evidence also and would have to be turned

24

over.

25

pointed out a blue and white plastic and nylon athletic bag.

26

opening it in the living room, a brown man's purse was given to Wight

27

to inspect.

28

from that purse.

Form 060-183
12.8-76 Do

1

We then escorted

It was carried into the living room where Wight
Rifkin removed a

Thereafter, he
I

He was

We then went back to where the first suitcase was and he

Wight counted one hundred twenty

Upon

(120) $100 dollar bills

At this time, Rifkin was seated comfortably on the
-10-
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I

the couch with Wight and I on either side,

He was

sitting on chairs.

then freely provided Wight and

2

not handcuffed at this time.

3

I with detailed facts relative to how he planned and carried out the

4

fraud against Security Pacific National Bank.

5

28.

Rifkin

At the termination of the interview, Dalton entered the

6

apartment as did the other agents that were waiting outside.

7

telephoned the San Diego office of the FBI and gave them notice of

8

our departure.

9

advised the Los Angeles office of the arrest and our departure to

10
11

As Dalton and other agents then watched Rifkin, I

San Diego.
29.

There was some discussion with Wolfson as to where Rifkin

12

would be taken.

13

bags back in the closet.

14

30.

As we were leaving,

Rifkin told Wolfson to put his

As Rifkin was taken through the

front door, he was hand-

15

cuffed by Wight.

16

Bureau automobile and then we drove to San Diego.

17

Rifkin continued to provide information freely regarding his

18

activities.

19

Dalton

Rifkin was placed in the back seat of Wight's
During the drive,

31. Since we were carrying the diamonds with us, it was

felt

20

advisable to stop at the FBI office first to secure the diamonds in

21

the vault.

22

information freely regarding the crime.

23

the street and booked into the Metropolitan Correctional Center.

24

32.

While at the FBI office, Rifkin continued to provide
He was then

taken across

During the time that agents were with Rifkin, he was

25

treated humanely and was allowed conveniences requested.

26

entire course of the interview, Rifkin never denied his involvement

27

in the defrauding of the bank or complained of his treatment by

28

arresting or transporting agents.

F- 080.183
12.876Doi
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I
2
3

I declare under the penalty of perjury that the

[Vol. II

foregoing is

true and correct.
DATED:

This

day of December, 1978.

4
5
g. BROW
-cial Agent, Federal Bureau of
Investigation

/BIN

6

S

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-12Fo12o
cBDo183
121.78 DOi

1980]

555

RIFKIN

1

DECLARATION OF NORMAN I. WIGHT

2

1.

I, Norman I. Wight, am a Special Agent with the

3

Federal Bureau of Investigation assigned to the San Diego Division.

4

I am in charge of the resident agency which serves North San Diego

5

County.

6

2.

On the evening of November 5, 1978, I received a

7

telephone call from Special Agent Robin C. Brown, Federal Bureau of

8

Investigation, Los Angeles, California, and he advised me he was

9

the case agent in the investigation of Stanley Mark Rifkin and the

10

embezzlement of 10.2 million dollars from the Security Pacific

11

National Bank, Los Angeles.

12

the arrest of Rifkin, and investigation has revealed that Rifkin

13

may be in Carlsbad, California, and that Rifkin may be in contact

14

with Daniel Wolfson, Carlsbad, telephone 729-4573.

15

Agent Brown had received information that Rifkin expected to receive

16

mail at Wolfson's Post Office Box, which is 1564, Carlsbad.

17

further advised that Rifkin owns a gray 1972 Datsun 240Z, California

18

license 701EYQ, which may be in Rifkin's possession.

19

3.

He said a warrant had been issued for

Further, Special

Brown

After the telephone call with Special Agent Brown was

20

concluded, I called United States Postal Inspector Jim Jonas, who

21

subsequently called me back and advised that Daniel Wolfson

22

obtained P. 0. Box 1564, Carlsbad, in February, 1977, at which time

23

his address was 18681 Applewood Circle, Huntington Beach.

24

point, but the date was not indicated, he moved his residence to

25

222 Pacific, Apartment A, Carlsbad.

26

4.

At some

On the evening of November 5, 1978, I also placed a

27

telephone call to the San Diego FBI Office and had a clerk make a

28

teletype inquiry from the California Law Enforcement Telecommunica-

Fm,, 080-183
124-76 Doi
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1

tions System, and as a result of this inquiry received information

2

that Daniel Marshal Wolfson has California driver's license K0434726

3

and as of May 23, 1977, listed his address as 2525 Jefferson Avenue,

4

Apartment H, Carlsbad.

5

5.

At my request, Special Agent Charles A. Mc Laran,

6

who is also assigned to the San Diego Division, reviewed the records

7

of the Carlsbad City Police Department and after doing so, he

8

furnished me a copy of Carlsbad Police Department Case No. 78-4501

9

which revealed that on October 31, 1978, Dan Marshal Wolfson,

10

2535 Jefferson St., Apartment 13, Carlsbad, telephone 729-4573,

11

filed a complaint with the Police Department that Eileen Mackin

12

threw a glass cup at his vehicle.

13

as sales manager for Showcase Publications, 2821 Oceanside Boule-

14

yard, Oceanside, California.

15

girlfriend, and her address was listed as 874 Home Avenue, Apart-

16

ment 18, Carlsbad.

17

6.

Wolfson listed his occupation

Eileen Mackin was listed as his

On the night of November 5, 1978, a meeting was held

18

in the Carlsbad City Police Department, attended by other FBI

19

agents, including Robin C. Brown, during which a photograph, de-

20

scription, and warrant information of Stanley Mark Rifkin were

21

disseminated.

22

association with Wolfson, possible addresses of Wolfson, and a

23

previous address of Rifkin, namely the Namara Inn in Del Mar,

24

California, were disseminated.

25

Rifkin's car, the Datsun described above, in the vicinity of

26

2535 Jefferson Street, Apartment 13, 874 Home Avenue, Apartment

27

18, 2525 Jefferson Street, Apartment H, Carlsbad, 222 Pacific,

Additionally, available information regarding his

I assigned Agents to look for

28
Fa0B0.183
124-76 DoJ

-47-
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1

Apartment A, Carlsbad, the La Costa Country Club, and other motels

2

in the area.

3

to determine if Rifkin may have returned there.

4

I went to 2821 Oceanside Boulevard, the business address listed

5

for Wolfson, and knocked on the door, but no one answered.

6

also checked a motel in Oceanside to try to find Rifkin's auto-

7

mobile.
7.

8
9

I also assigned an agent to go to the Namara Inn
Robin Brown and

We

At about 11:00 PM, November 5, 1978, the agents who

were assigned the above investigation reported to me, by radio, that
in locating Ri.fkin or his vehicle.

I advised

10

they had no success

11

all the

12

Carlsbad Police Department.

13

to go to the residence of Eileen Mackin, and simultaneously six

14

agents would go to the last known address of Daniel Wolfson,

15

2535 Jefferson Street, Apartment 13, in an effort to locate Rifkin.

16

investigating agents to meet

8.

in the parking lot of the

At that time two agents were assigned

At about 11:30 PM to 11:40 PM, November 5, 1978, four

17

agents were assigned to station themselves around the residence of

18

2535 Jefferson Street, Apartment 13, and Agent Robin C. Brown and

19

I rang the doorbell and knocked on the door of that apartment.

20

After about 30 to 60 seconds, a man opened the door and Special

21

Agent Brown asked the man if he was Dan Wolfson and he indicated

22

that he was.

23

displaying our credentials and verbally telling him we were Special

24

Agents, FBI, and would like to come into the house to talk to him.

25

Wolfson said that he would talk, but would do it here at the door-

26

way at which time he extended his arms and placed them on each side

27

of the door frame.

28

Rifkin to Wolfson and told him that agents wanted to talk to him

'o-, OBD-183

.24.76Doi

Agent Brown and I identified ourselves to him by

Brown exhibited a photograph of Stanley Mark

-48-
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1 but Wolfson said that he wanted to talk to his attorney so he could
2 iee what his rights are, and Brown asked him if he had something to
3 bide and Wolfson replied that he just did not trust the government
4 ,fter Watergate.

Brown advised Wolfson that Rifkin was a wanted

5 federal fugitive based on a complaint which was filed on November 2,
6 1978, in Los Angeles, after which a warrant was issued and there7 gore Rifkin is a federal fugitive.

Brown told Wolfson that he

8wanted to come in and talk about that, but again Wolfson said "no"
9and continued to hold his arms up.

I advised Wolfson that if

0Rifkin is in his house and he does not cooperate with the FBI
11 agents by allowing agents to enter, or if he tried to impede the
12 arrest, he could be guilty of the harboring statute for harboring
13 a federal fugitive.

I also told Wolfson that if he does cooperate

l4with agents at this time, he will not be charged with harboring a
15 federal fugitive.

Brown asked Wolfson how long it had been since

16 he had seen Rifkin and Wolfson did not answer but again said that
17 he wanted to talk to his attorney.

I asked Wolfson if Rifkin is

18inside his house now, and Wilfson said, "I don't know."

Brown then

19 told Wolfson that agents had reason to believe that Rifkin is
20 inside and therefore agents have the legal right to enter the
21residence to search for Rifkin, and if necessary agents would force
22

entry to do this.

Wolfson continued to block the doorway with his

23 arms extended on to the door frame and continued to deny agents
24

entry and several times he said he wanted to talk to his attorney

25 to see what his rights were.
26if Rifkin was there or not.

He said several times he did not know
This conversation continued for

27 4pproximately ten more minutes during which Wolfson was told several
28 1
imes that he would be in trouble for harboring a federal fugitive
-49-
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1

if he did not immediately allow agents to enter.

2

of this approximate ten-minute period, I departed for a short period

3

of time from the front door, went around the corner of the walkway,

4

and explained to Special Agent Dalton that I believed Rifkin was in

5

the residence and that Robin Brown and I would be going in directly.

6

At the end of this approximate ten-minute period, Brown told

7

Wolfson that agents were now coming into his apartment and Agent

8

Brown and I both moved forward into the door at which time Wolfson

9

stepped aside.

10

9.

Toward the end

Upon entry into the residence, both Brown and I

11

loudly announced that we were Special Agents, FBI, and for Rifkin

12

to come out and surrender.

13

except one, Rifkin exited that room and was arrested by Special

14

Agent Brown and myself.

15
16
17

After searching every room in the house

1 declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is
true and correct.
Executed on this 19th day of December, 1978.

19
1rman
I.
W
20

Special Agent, FBI

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Fw.

OBD-183

124-76 DOJ
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DECLARATION OF NORMAN I. WIGHT

2

1.

I, Norman I. Wight, am a Special Agent with T,'b

8

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), assigned to the San Dlegoo

4

Division.

6

2.

I participated in the arrest and interview of Stanle
In the early morning of November

6

Mark Rifkin in November, 1978.

7

6, 1978, he was in custody, being interviewed by me and Robin C.

5

Brown, Special Agent, FBI, at 2535 Jefferson Street, Carlsbad,

9

California.

At that time, Rifkin made available to me luggage,

i0

consisting of a garment bag and a duffle bag, which he said

11

were his property.

12

the time, looking for diamonds, weapons, or money.

is

read any documents or papers which were contained in those bags.

I did not

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing

14
15

I made a cursory search of these bags, at

is true and correct.
Executed on this 19th d

1?
28~
10

21
22

93
24
26

28.
29 1-51-

f De

ber,

78.

korman I. Wight
Special Agent, FBI
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1

DECLARATION OF NORMAN I. WIGHT

2

1.

I, Norman I. Wight, am a Special Agent with

tbe

8

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assigned to the San Diego

4

Division.

6
6

2.

On November 7, 1978, I participated in a search

of 2535 Jefferson Street, Apartment 13, Carlsbad, California.
Pursuant to a search warrant, two pieces of luggage were seized,

8

consisting of a garment bag and a duffle bag.

9

had a combination lock on it,

10

The garment bag

and rather than break the lock,

I called Stanley Mark Rifkin at the Metropolitan Correctional
Center (MCC), San Diego, California, on November 8, 1978, and

22
18
14
15
1
18
39

I advised him the FBI had seized his luggage based on a search
warrant from the apartment of Daniel Wolfson.

I told Stanley

Mark Rifkin I would like him to give me the combination to the

lock on the luggage so I would not have to break it.
give me the combination.

He did

I did not at any time tell him I would

have to obtain a search warrant to gain access to that bag.
I declare under penalty of
perjury that the foregoing

is true and correct.
Executed on this 19th da

22

of December, 1978.

Norman I.

ight

Special Agent, FBI

24

a

29

-52-
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DECLARATION OF DAVID G. MCLEAN

2

I, DAVID G. MCLEAN, declare as follows:

3

1.

I am a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

4

and am assigned to their San Diego Field Office, located at 880 Front

5

Street, San Diego, California.

6

2.

On November 7, 1978, I was assigned to participate in the

7

investigation of the theft of 10.2 million dollars from the Security

a

Pacific Bank in Los Angeles, California.

9

in this case on November 7, 1978 was that of affiant for an affidavit

My particular involvement

10

for a search warrant on the premises known as 2535 Jefferson Street,

11

Apartment 13, Carlsbad, California, in the name of Daniel Wolfson.

12

3.

On this day I was handed, in the office of AUSA Michael

13

Lipman, an affidavit prepared by AUSA Lipman.

I telephonically con-

14

tacted Norman Wight, Charles A. McLaren, and James L. Zopp, all Special

15

Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and assigned to the

16

San Diego Field Office,and read to them the affidavit to confirm its

17

contents.

18

4.

During this reading, only two questions were raised as to

19

the content of the affidavit:

(1)

Special Agent McClaren stated to

20

me that the call signal for the radio station that Steven Palma was a

21

reporter for was incorrect and should be KNX radio.

22

I had AUSA
Lipman's word processor make the necessary correction on the original

23

of the affidavit.

24

limited wording on the face of the warrant regarding the description

25

of the property for which there was reason to believe to exist on the

26

premises.

27

the same, and the wording "and/or other documents or physical evidence

28

that may have been removed from said suitcases" was added.

(2)

Special Agent Wight was concerned about the

Special Agent Wight later contacted AUSA Lipman regarding

orm 080-183
24-76 DO3
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discrepancies were brought to my attention.
5.

I affirmed to the affidavit before Harry R. McCue, United

3

States Magistrate, United States District Court for the Southern

4

District of California believing it to be true to the best of my

5

knowledge.

6
7
8

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true
and correct.
8Executed

on this

day of December, 1976.

9

10
11

E~
DAVID G. MCLEAN
Special Agent, FBI

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Po,,m 080.183

124.76 Doi

-2-54-

564

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

DECLARATION OF CHARLES A. McLARAN

1
2

I, CHARLES A. McLARAN, declare as follows:

3

1.

I am presently employed as a Special Agent of the Federal

4

Bureau of Investigation, assigned to the San Diego Division.

5

Special Agent of the San Diego Division, I am assigned to the Vista

6

Resident Agency of the FBI in Vista, California.

7

2.

As a

On Tuesday, November 7, 1978, I was assisting in the

a

investigation of the Stanley Mark Rifkin matter and in that regard

9

I interviewed Steven Phillip Palma who was at that time in Vista,

10
11

California.
3.

At the onset of the interview, Palma advised me that he

12

previously was a CBS correspondent for the San Diego area for the

13

radio station KNX at Los Angeles.

14

accident which occurred September 22, 1978, he was currently on

15

a leave of absence recuperating from that accident.

16

Vista, California at the time of the interview but was residing

17

in Chula Vista, California with his parents due to the automobile

18

accident.

19

sustained head injuries in that during the recuperation period he has

20

periods when he cannot recall things clearly and other periods when

21

his mind seems to go blank and still other periods when he is quite

22

lucid and coherent.

23

to be lucid in thought and clear in his thinking and speech.

24

so.

[Vol. II

4.

However, due to an automobile

He was in

Plama commented that in the automobile accident he

At the time of the interview Palma appeared

At the onset of the interview, Palma indicated that he

25

had known Daniel Wolfson for several years, having met Wolfson in

26

and around radio stations in North San Diego County.

27

Wolfson to have several business ventures, one of which was "Media

28

Endeavors" where he worked with radio stations and another business

08D-183

CAM:ja

124-76 DOJ
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1

was "Do It In The Dark" which was a business of photography for

2

hobbyists.

3

5.

Palma stated that approximately one year prior to November

4

1978, CBS, in their television show "Sixty Minutes," had a segment

5

featuring Terry Knoepp, who at that particular time was the United

6

States Attorney for the Southern District of California at San

7

Diego, California.

8

Terry Knoepp dealt with computer fraud.

9

as the programs' appearance on television, Palma had an occasion

The segment of the television program featuring
About the same time frame

During their meeting the subject of

10

to meet with Dan Wolfson.

11

the television program with Terry Knoepp and computer fraud and the

12

"Sixty Minutes" segment came up.

13

time that he had a friend whom he identified as Stan who could do

14

computer theft as it was stated in the program.

15

that this frienc of his had talked about computer fraud and had

16

mentioned that banks have computer codes which are changed each

17

day and if a person knows the codes, that person can transfer funds.

18

Palma stated that he did not dwell on this statement of Wolfson and

19

in fact had put it out of his mind.

20

6.

Wolfson indicated to Palma at that

Wolfson indicated

Palma indicated that on the day previous to the interview,

21

Monday, November 6, 1978, at about 4:00 P.M., Wolfson had called

22

and talked to him several minutes on the telephone.

23

to Palma about the fact that Rifkin was arrested in his apartment

24

and that he was being charged with the theft of money from a bank

25

and subsequently changing that money into diamonds.

26

that several news people had spoken to him about a story but he

27

had turned down one or more offers for a story and he was seeking

28

Palma's advice as to how to deal with the reporters and possibly'

F.-.m 080.-183
124-76 DOi

-2-56-
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the television network news people.
7.

Palma related that at approximately 11:00 P.M., on Monday,

3

November 6, 1978, Wolfson again contacted him by telephone and

4

spoke to him in the context of several "what if" situations.

5

situations were what if evidence or other information relating

6

to the theft of the money were in Stan's bags in Wolfson's apartment.

7

What if Palma would physically remove these items of information

8

from Wolfson's apartment;then Wolfson would not be directly involved.

9

What if the information had to do with the case of Stan Rifkin.

10

Palma stated that he got the impression from Wolfson that "more

11

information" which Wolfson was referring to consisted of paperwork

12

which could be evidence in the case.

13

the word evidence to him but used the words "more information."

14

Palma also said Wolfson spoke "round about" in this conversation.

15

Wolfson also inquired of Palma about the confidentiality between

16

a newsman and a newsman's source.

17

8.

These

Palma said Wolfson never used

During this 11:00 P.M., conversation on Monday, November 6,

18

1978, Palma could tell that there was someone else in the room

19

with Wolfson while he was talking with Wolfson.

20

who this person may have been.

21

was when Wolfson placed that call to him.

22

Wolfson made it very clear to Palma that the "more information"

23

that he was talking about had to do with the Rifkin matter.

24

did not give Wolfson a definite answer and it was understood that

25

Wolfson was to get back to Palma on Tuesday, November 7, 1978, and

26

reach a decision.

27

converstion with Wolfson on November 6, 1978, Wolfson made it clear

28

to Palma that he had not removed the "more information" from Rifkin's

FG- eB0O-183

He does not know

He also does not know where Wolfson
During this conversation

Palma

Palma indicated that during the 11:00 P.M.,

-3-

126-76 Doj
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bags.
9.

Palma stated that during the two conversations over the

3

telephone which he had with Wolfson on Monday, November 6, 1978,

4

Wolfson indicated to him that Rifkin had come to Wolfson's apartment

5

and that Wolfson had talked Rifkin into giving himself up.

6

indicated that he and Rifkin talked at length about the matter.

7

10.

Wolfson

Palma was asked during the interview on Tuesday, November 7,

8

1978, if he had any ideas who may have been with Wolfson when he

9

was talking with Wolfson at 11:00 P.M., the night before, Monday,
Palma speculated that it might have been his

10

November 6, 1978.

11

business partner, Ryan Miller who is in business with Wolfson in the

12

hobby photography of "Do It In The Dark."

13

11.

On Tuesday, November 7, 1978, I discussed the facts of

14

the Palma interview with Assistant United States Attorney Michael

15

Lippman, of the United States Attorney's Office, San Diego, Cali-

16

fornia, who was preparing an affidavit for a search warrant for

17

Rifkin's apartment at 2535 Jefferson Street, Apartment 13, Carlsbad,

18

California.

19

affidavit for the search warrant using the facts of the interview

20

with Palma.

21

from other agents that he was going to incorporate into the affidavit

22

12.

AUSA Lippman indicated that he would prepare the

AUSA Lippman indicated that he had other information

Later that afternoon, Special Agent David G. McLean

23

of the San Diego Office of the FBI read to me, over the telephone,

24

the affidavit supporting the search warrant for Wolfson's apartment

25

at 2535 Jefferson Street, Apartment 13, Carlsbad, California.

26

Special Agent McLean read this affidavit to me I noted that the

27

call letters of the radio station were listed as KNEX in Los Angeles

28

and I brought this to SA McLean's attention that that should be

080-183
F01-m

-4-

12476 DoJ

-58-
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1

changed to KNX.

2

affidavit indicated there had been a newspaper article in San

3

Diego regarding computer fraud rather than the television show

4

"Sixty Minutes" as Palma had mentioned. I also noted that the

5

affidavit indicated that Steve Palma was a radio reporter for KNX

6

radio in Los Angeles, California rather than being on leave of

7

absence from that radio station at that time.

a
9

13.

I also noted to myself at that time that the

As soon as I heard the affidavit read to me I asked

SA McLean to let me check with AUSA Lippman before he filed the
I immediately telephoned AUSA Lippman and noted those

10

affidavit.

11

discrepancies to him, that is, the call letters of the radio station,

12

the fact that it was a television program "Sixty Minutes" as opposed

13

to a newspaper article on computer fraud in the San Diego papers

14

and the fact that Palma was not then a radio reporter for KNX radio

15

but was on leave of absence at the time of the interview.

16

Lippman indicated that there was not time to change the affidavit

17

and he did not feel that the corrections pointed out by me were

18

of that importance to the affidavit to warrant being re-typed.

19

14.

AUSA

I telephonically re-contacted SA McLean who told me that

20

the secretary had been able to change the call letters of the radio

21

station from KNEX to KNX.

22

instructed that he should take the affidavit with the search

23

warrant to the U.S. Magistrate's Office as the U.S. Magistrate

24

was waiting for the affidavit and search warrant.

25

15.

I then told McLean that AUSA Lippman had

On November 13, 1978, I received a message at my office

26

in Vista, California, that Steve Palma had called me while I was

27

out and left a message that he wanted me to contact him.

28

date November 13, 1978, I contacted Steve Palma by telephone.

rp. 050.183
124.76 voo

On that
Palma
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1

told me that Dan Wolfson had been in telephone contact with him and

2

had talked about the Rifkin matter with him.

3

got the impression that Wolfson feared that the FBI was out after

4

him to find some money or diamonds on him and to arrest him.

5

also said that he got the impression that Wolfson wanted him to

6

recant what he had previously told the FBI.

7

he told me during the interview at Vista, California, on November 7,

8

1978, was the truth and that he would have to stand by what he had

9

told me.

10

16.

Palma

Palma said that what

During this converstion with Palma on November 13, 1978,

11

Palma indicated that Wolfson told him that he thought there were

12

discrepancies in the affidavit in which Palma was quoted.

13

mentioned that the affidavit spoke of a newspaper article rather

14

than a TV program.

15

that one particular item was a mistake in the affidavit and that

16

I had brought it to the attention of the AUSA who had prepared

17

the affidavit however, the AUSA felt that that was not a serious

18

error.

19

reporter who told him someone had made a comment to the effect

20

that Palma may know more about the matter of Wolfson and Rifkin

21

than what he (Palma) was saying.

22

allegation and he said he wanted to assure me that he had told

23

everything to the FBI that he knew.

24
25
26

28
08D.1 83

124-76 iol

Palma

I commented to Palma that that was correct; that

Palma also commented that he had been contacted by a national

Palma said he resented that

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is
true and correct.
Executed on

1978.

"

/

27

Fo0,

Palma said that he

.
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ANDREA SHERIDAN ORDIN
United States Attorney
ROBERT L. BROSIO

Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division
KATHRYNE ANN STOLTZ
Assistant United States Attorney
Assistant Chief, Criminal Division
1200 United States Courthouse
312 North Spring Street
Los Angeles, California 90012
Telephone:
(213) 688-2481
Attorneys for Plaintiff
United States of America
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

NO. CR 78-1050(A)-WMB

Plaintiff,

DECLARATION OF ROBIN BROWN RE

EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
STANLEY MARK RIFKIN,

Defendant.

The government hereby submits the attached Declaration of Robin
Brown setting forth additional facts indicating exigent circumstances
justifying entrance into Wolfson's apartment to execute the arrest
warrant for the defendant, Stanley Mark Rifkin.

This is to supplement

the previously filed Government's Opposition to Motion to Suppress
Evidence.
Respectfully submitted,
ANDREA SHERIDAN ORDIN
United States Attorney

ROBERT L. BROSIO
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division

KATHRYNE ANN STOLTZ

KAS:ya
Form, C'e.183

L,\

Assistant United States Attorney
Attorneys for -Plain if

571

RIFKIN

1980]

DECLARATION OF ROBIN BROWN

1

1. I am a Special Agent employed by the Federal Bureau of

2
3

Investigation and assigned to be the case agent on United States v.

4

Rifkin.

5

2.

During the evening of November 1, 1978, I met with Stan

6

Rifkin's mother at her residence on Tobias Street in Sepulveda.

7

Among other things discussed was Rifkin's mental attitudes.

8

mother said that when he was seventeen years old, he tried to cormnit

9

suicide by swallowing a bottle of pills.

I asked her what she thought

10

his mental condition was at his present age and disposition.

11

said that I should definitely consider him suicidal.

12

3.

His

She

Agents of the Santa Ana resident agency of the FBI told

13

me that they interviewed Ron Murray of Anaheim California on November

14

3, 1978.

15

and close.

16

and definitely suicidal.

17

4.

Murray told them that his association with Rifkin was long
He told the agents that he considered Rifkin paranoid

During the morning of November 4, 1978, I interviewed

18

Mary Bruskotter of Granada Hills, Rifkin's girl friend regarding his

19

whereabouts, state of mind, etc.

20

as a professor, an employer, and as a close friend.

21

I should consider Rifkin very high strung and suicidal.

22

a letter that I could read to him in the event he took a hostage or

23

threatened suicide to avoid capture.

24

5.

She said that she has known Rifkin
She told me that
She provided

Late November 5, 1978, other agents of the FBI and myself

25

were at 2535 Jefferson, Apartment 13, Carlsbad, California, where we

26

believed Rifkin was hiding.

27

to his apartment refusing entry.

28

know whether or not Rifkin was in the apartment reinforced our belief

0_00.183

Daniel Wolfson detained us at the door
Wolfson's statement that he did not

'
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1

that Rifkin was hiding in the apartment.

2

we were obviously exerting on Rifkin by making our demands at the

3

door, I felt, might drive him to suicide or to the possible destructio

4'

of someone else, or to a dangerous hostage situation.

5

6.

I felt that

The emotional pressure that

the concern over Rifkin's safety and a potential

6

hostage situation described above, along with our concern that Rifkin

7

may escape or try to destroy evidence, justified our immediate entry

8

Iinto Wolfson's apartment to execute the arrest warrant.
1 declaie under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true

9
10

and correct.

11

Executed on January 9, 1979.

12
13

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25
26
27
28

'~_

_

_

_

_

_

iOZ:Zs,>eial Agent

_

_

Federal Bureau of Investigation

RIFKIN
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ROCERT M1. TALCOTT
MICHAEL J. LIGHTFOOT
CARLA M. HOEHRLE
Suite 770
10850 Wilshire Blvd.
Los Angeles, CA
90024
474-5549 or 879-1334

1
2
3
4

Attorneys for Defendant
6
7.
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

/
9

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

0iI "

UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA

NO.

Plaintiff,
13

V.

14

STANLEY MARK RIFKIN,

Is

CR 78-1O50(A)-WMB

DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO GOVERNMENT'S
RESPONSE;
AFFIDAVITS OF
STANLEY- M. RIFKIN AND ROBERT 14.
TALCOTT; EXHIBITS A AND B.

Defendant.

16
The defendant hereby replies

17
18

of Points and Authorities

19

the Government's response to

20

The remainder of the Government's

21

orally at

in the attached Memorandum

to several

of the arguments made

the defendant's motior.s to suppress.
arguments will

the time of the hearing on

be addressed

the motions.

22
23

Respectfully

submitted,

24
25
ROBERT M. TALCOTT
MICHAEL J. LIGHTFOOT
CARLA 1I. WOEHRLE

26
27
28

Dated:

in

January 3, 1979

DOCUMENT 3
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MEMORANDUM OF
A.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT'S

3

The defendant

II-C.

contends

that the Government

4

his attorney-client relationship with

5

by

6

eventually led to Rifkin's arrest.

7

states

8

by

9

privilege.

10

We

tape recording conversations

at p. 10,

lines

22-23

Paul

into

O'Brien, an attorney,

between Rifkin and O'Brien which
In

, that no

response, the Government
facts have

been alleged

the defendant to establish a claim of attorney-client

have already pointed

to evidence supplied to

I!

defense by the prosecution clearly showing

12

client relationship existed when the Government's

13

took place.

14

O'Brien, monitored by

15

reflect such a relationship as well as

16

that the conversations

17

FBI

is

that

19

Rifkin came to

20

intruded

The

tapes of

two conversations

the FBI

in

the

intention of Rifkin
Additionally, the

1978, and their

discloses that O'Brien

his capacity as

While we contend that

tape recording

between Rifkin and

confidence.

interviewed O'Brien on November 4,

rim in

that such an attorney-

and attached as Exhibit A, clearly

be kept

interview (Exhibit B)

the

report of

believed that

a lawyer.

sufficient evidence has

been

21

submitted

22

declarations of the defendant and his attorney, Robert M. Talcott

23

to corroborate the defendant's claim of an attorney-client

24

privilege.

23
26

B.

to warrant a hearing on this matter, we attach the

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT'S
The recent

III,

decision of

27

v. Prescott, 581

28

principles which are directly

F.2d

1343

V-A and

V-B.

the Ninth Circuit in

United States

(9th Cir.1978) establishes important
applicable to

the facts

of the

1RIFKIN
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I

instant case.

2

exigent circumstances, police who have probable cause to arrest

3

a felony suspect must obtain a warrant before entering a dwelling

4

to carry out the arrest' Id. at 1350.

5

an arrest inside a home must ordinarily be authorized by a

6

warrant, the Ninth Circuit followed the previous rulings of

7

other courts which have addressed the same issue.

8

States v. Reed,

9

United States, 435 F.2d 385, 390-391 (D.C. Cir.1970); People v.

0

Ramey, 16 Cal.3d 263, 275, 127 Cal.Rptr 629, 636 (1976).

1

!2
13

In Prescott, the Court squarely held that "absent

572 F.2d 412, 424

In adopting

the rule that

See United

(2d Cir.1978); Dorman v.

See

1 Also, Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914,
920 (3d Cir.1974).
In the present case, it is the defendant's contention

14

that the warrant which was obtained to authorize his arrest was

15

invalid because it was not supported by an affidavit establish-

16

ing probable cause.

17

Government relies on the rule that an arrest based on probable

18

cause may be lawful despite the fact that the arrest was made

19

pursuant to an invalid warrant (Government Memo. p. 11).

20

rule is based on the general principle that an arrest warrant

21

is not required to effect a lawful

22

long as the arrest is supported by probable cause.

23

States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38,

96 S. Ct.

24

States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,

96 S. Ct. 820 (1976).

25

of the decision in Prescott, however, it is clear that the rule

26

cited by the Government has no application in this case where

27

the defendant was arrested inside a dwelling.

28

submitted that the defendant's arrest was unlawful,

In opposition to this argument the

This

arrest in a public place as
United

2406 (1976); United
In light

Therefore, it is
regardless
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I

of

2

authorized by a valid warrant.

the presence of probable cause, because

3

Furthermore, the decision

the arrest was

in United States

4

strongly

5

his arrest was unlawful

because it was

6

unauthorized entry

the apartment where he was

7

that time.

8

case, involved an entry into

9

supports

into

in Prescott,

The facts

II

facie an unlawful

12

particularly describing the place to

the

in

instant

one unless

it

the

is authorized

the person

is prima

by a warrant

searched -

be

to be

entry

seized -

the third-

the suspect.

14

581

15

warrant for

16

be valid,

17

the apartment where the defendant was

18

his arrest because the warrant

did

19

whatsoever to

See Government of Virgin

20

v. Gereau, supra,

21

for

22

third persons,

23

circumstances where the police officers also

24

to believe

25

F.2d at

staying at

suspected of a crime.

in such circumstances,

residence - and

by means of an

the residence of a third person

for the purpose of arresting a person
held that,

effected

like those

The court

1 party

v. Prescott

the defendant's alternative contention that

10

13

not

1350.

Under this

standard, it

the defendant's arrest, even

could not support the

that residence.
502

entry

F.2d at 928

the arrest of suspects,
to search

was effected

27

the defendant

28

apartment where he was

has not

into and the
staying

at

found to
search of

the time of

Islands

("Although police have warrants

for those suspects

by an unlawful

it were

not contain any reference

only in exigent
have

entry,

contention that his arrest
the Government argues

asserted an expectation of
arrested

-4-

probable cause

be within.")

the defendant's

26

if

they may enter premises, at least of

that the suspects may

In opposition to

is clear that the

sufficient to

that

privacy in

permit him to

the
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the lawfulness of the

(Government memo.

entry.

p. 19).

I

contest

2

In support of this argument the Government

3

Court's

4

(December 5, 1978),

5

decision of Jones v. United States,

6

ever,

the Government's assertion that the defendant somehow

7

lacks

"standing"

8

his arrest

9

Rakas and in Jones,

10

raise this

I1

rights.

12

Illinois, 47

recent decision in Rakas v.
and

to

attempts

relies on

challenge the unlawful

257

earlier

(1960).

conduct

How-

involved in

principles discussed in

Under the

is meritless.

Supreme

U.S.L.W. 4025

to distinguish the
362 U.S.

the

it is clear that

the defendant may properly

issue of the violation of his Fourth Amendment

In Rakas, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the

basic holding of

13

Jones that

14

a place other

15

protects

him from unreasonable

16

place".

47

17

defendant clearly demonstrates

18

Jones, Mr.

19

interest in the premises

20

legitimate expectation of privacy and

21

governmental

22

attempt to demonstrate the defendant's lack of a subjective

23

expectation of privacy by reference to his

24

might be arrested there

25

ness

26

he is temporarily residing

27

thoroughly legitimate expectation

28

place will

"a person

can

have a legally

than his own

home

U.S.L.W. at 4029.

Rifkin

so

sufficient interest

that the Fourth Amendment
intrusion into that

governmental

The attached decldration of the
that, like

the defendant in

had a sufficiently extensive possessory
where he was

arrested to

The Government's

knowledge that he

is not convincing.

that he may be subject to
does

a lawful

A person's aware-

arrest

not destroy his

in a place where
basic and

that his privacy

subject to unwarranted and

-5-

support a

of freedom from unlawful

invasion of those premises.

not be

in

in

unlawful

that
intrusion.
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Moreover, even apart from the substantial

2

interest which the defendant had

3

that he must

4

entry and search made to effect

5

was,

6

search.

7

"standing"

8

which

9

no legitimate expectation

lawfulness of the

in fact, the "object" which was seized

even a casual

of privacy

could contest

ii

were

12

appears beyond reasonable question,

13

defendant may properly contest the

14

to effect his arrest

15

upon his personal

16

See Rakas, 47 U.S.L.W. at 4029.

the legality of

in the

the search

if

because that

argument

his own property
fn 11.

ized

20

announced in United

21

applying only

22

residence during

23

used against the third-party

24

effect,

25

contention that the

26

permitted to contest the legality of the

27

of

28

into a private residence would be unlawful

that the substantive rule

States v. Prescott

a search for

the defendant's

because of the unauthor-

unlawful

19

in cases where

infringed

the Fourth Amendment.

in opposition to

submits

the entry made

entry directly
by

It

that the

legality of

contention that his arrest was
the Government

premises searched

therefore,

interests protected

Rakas in

visitor with

47 U.S.L.W. at 4029,

18

entry

by means of that

by the decision in

the Court recognized that

In an additional

person

principle of Fourth Amendment

law was reaffirmed

seized as a result.

it is clear

his arrest because his

10

17

premises,

in the

be permitted to contest the

Again, this basic

possessory

should be construed as

evidence is

seized at a third-party

a.suspect and

is subseqL

(Government Memo p. 18).

ntly
In

this argument is merely a variation on the meritless
defendant

the Government's position

in

is

this case should
entry.

not be
The logic

that an unauthorized entry
as

to the owner,
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I

who could successfully suppress any evidence seized which was

2

sought

3

would be

4

who was the

5

Amendment interests, as discussed above,

6

by

7

Prescott

to be

lawful

as

against him;

to a temporary

target of

the police

but that

the same

resident of the same

the entry and whose personal

conduct.

entry
premises

Fourth

were equally infringed

Such a construction of the decision

the earlier cases upon which

it relies.

The entry

into the apartment where the defendant was arrested was

10

authorized
I

12
I

the premises
- -unlawful

not

by a warrant based on probable cause to believe

the defendant would be

found there and

to be searched;

under United

States v. Prescott.

presumptively

Furthermore,

the well-established

15

States and Rakas

16

own Fourth Amendment privacy and property interests were

17

infringed

18

fully submitted that the Government's arguments

19

grounds are

20

C.

under

principles discussed in Jones v. United

v. Illinois, it

by that unlawful

RESPONSE

that

particularly describing

it was therefore

14

21

in

is completely unwarranted by the reasoning of that

case or by
9

introduced

is clear that the defendant's

conduct.

not well-taken and should

It is

therefore respecton these

be rejected by this Court.

TO GOVERNMENT'S VIII

In opposition

to

the defendant's motion for a hearing

22

to traverse

the search

warrant the Government argues that.

23

contrary to

the defendant's contention, no material

24

ments were made

25

(Government Memo

26

the Government has

27

McLean

28

frankly disclose that the search warrant affidavit

in the affidavit in support of
p.31).

misstate-

the warrant

In connection with this argument,

submitted the declarations of Agents David

and Charles McLaran.

-7-

These declarations, however,
signed by
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I

Agent McLean

2

television program on

computer

3

a conversation between

Daniel

4

regarding Palma's status as a radio

5

[Vol. II

contained deliberate false statements
fraud which was

6

on the validity of a search warrant

7

numerous occasions

8

decisions on

9

misstatement of

by various

reporter.

Federal Courts

II

of the statement.

12

(9th

13

(8th Cir.),

cert.

14

Carmichael,

489 F.2d 893,

15

United States

16

cert. denied 423 U.S.

17

Belculfine, 508

18

decision regarding the

19

the veracity of an underlying

20

__

21

not squarely reach a holding on this

22

at 682,

23

that under

24

entitled to a hearing regarding

25

in the search warrant affidavit;

26

the evidence at the hearing reveals

27

/

28

/

fn 8.

States

States

v. Marihart, 492

denied 419 U.S.

844
58,

988-898

(7th Cir.1973)

banc);

(en

See Also,

affidavit,

United States

warrant

Franks

(1978), the
issue.

v.

In its recent
to test

v. Delaware,

Supreme Court did
See 57

L.Ed.2d

the defendant's contention, therefore,

the principles of

v.

668-672 (5th Cir.),

(Ist Cir.1974).

2d 667

56

F.2d 897,898
States

(1973).
63

50,

827 (1974); United

traversal of a search

57 L. Ed.

is

that a deliberate

v. Damitz, 495 F.2d

v. Thomas, 489 F.2d 664,

It

The

regardless of the non-materiality

See United

Cir.1974); United

,

of Appeal.

contained in a supporting affidavit will

invalidate a search warrant

F.2d

falsehood

has been considered on

10

U.S.

intentional

issue have repeatedly held

fact

the subject of

Wolfson and Steven Palma and

The question of the effect of an

this

regarding a

the above-cited cases
the misstatements
and, furthermore,
intentional

he is
contained
that if

falsity on

RIFKIN
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the part of the affiants, the warrant authorizing the search
must be invalidated on that ground.
Respectfully submitted,

Dated: January 3, 1979
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DECLARATIONJ

OF STANLEY MARK

2

1, STANLEY MARK RIFKIN,

3

1.

5

by Daniel

6

2535 Jefferson Street,

7

at the same apartment

8

morning hours of November

9

apartment the previous night.

I drove with fir. Wolfson

Wolfson.

5-6,

12

closest

13

occasions over the years as

14

on the week-end of November 4-5,

15

unrestricted access

16

to come and

17

apartment on a few occasions during

Is

3.

he has visited me.

During my visit
I had

parts of his apartment and was free

pleasure.

During the week-end of

Mr. Wolfson left me alone in the
that week-end.
1978,

November 4-5,

20

the same apartment

21

arriving at Mr. Wolfson's,

22

them in the bathroom

I unpacked

I cleaned my clothes at

in Mr. Wolfson's own washing machine.

After

I unpacked my toiletries and left

through the week-end.

On November 1.

2 and 3. 1978

1 met with Paul

an attorney, in Rochester, New York.

25

that we met,

26

in his capacity as an attorney.

27

had was

28

me on several occasions during the three days

no one else was present.

by me to be kept

I had contacted

Each of
;n

O'Brien,

On each of the occasions

24

intended

be my

1978, as on other visits,

my clothes at Mr. Wolfson's apartment.

4.

six years old.

Wolfson on countless

I have visited Mr.

19

23

I was

the

I consider Mr. Wolfson to

Aside from my own brother,

go at my

I was arrested

having slept in

1978,

II

to all

apartment at

to his

the late evening-early

in

Agents

by FBI

I

at Lindbergh Airport

Carlsbad, California.

1 have known Mr. Wolfson since

friend.

met

California and was

Diego,

arrived

2.

at approximately 12:15 P.M.,

On Novemeber 4, 1978,
in San

RIFKIN

declare as follows:

hereby

4

10
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Mr.

O'Brie

the conversations we

confidence.

Mr. O'Brien

told

that our conversa-

1
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tions were protected by
On November

the attorney-client privilege.

5, 1978 1 spoke

to

Mr. O'Brien twice by tele-

2

5.

3

phone.

4

relationship and

5

permission to let

6

conversations or to disclose our conversations to anyone.

7

November 3, 1978

8

fees for legal

9

and to

Those conversations

took place in an attorney-client

were confidential.

I did

not give him

anyone monitor or otherwise listen to our

I paid Paul

work

be performed

O'Brien $6,000 as an advance

performed during

the previous

in the future.

II
Dated: January 3,

1978

_

_

_

_

_

STANLEY MARK RIFKIN
13
14
Is
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

for

three days

10

12

On

[Vol. II
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DECLARATION

ROBERT

declare as

I, ROBERT M. TALCOTT.

I am an attorney licensed

1.

for Stanley Mark

with hr. Paul

that he

O'Brien in

November
ISunday,

Ist,

2nd,

services on his

6.

Mr.

O'Brien

Mr.

7.

Rifkin on

Mr. Rifkin

by telephone on

he at

all

times

an attorney

not a business

forth above.

to perform

behalf.

Mr. Rifkin as
indicated

legal

a retainer for
that his

solely and exclusively as an

During this

considered

further stated that he had received

a declaration

services.

attorney-client
Rifkin.

Mr. O'Brien

incorporating

When the declaration is

the

relationship with

associate or partner of Mr.

telephone conversation,

that he would forward

it with

informed

stated that during his wleetings

and 3rd,

O'Brien again

Rifkin was

ano was

spoken with

contacted him as

sun] of $6,000.00 from

set

Mr. O'Brien

client Stanley I-ark

O'Brien further

Mr. Rifkin had

5.

Mr.

1978 I spoke telephonically

November 5, 1970.

on November

legal

I am the attorney

1st; Thursday, November 2nd; Friday,

3rd; and had

Mr.

4.

the State of

Rochester, New York.

had met with my

Wecnesday, November

that

December 28,

During our telephone conversation,

3.

in

to practice

Rifkin.

On Thursday,

2.

follows:

Honorable Court, and

this

California and before

me

M. TALCOTT

indicated

the information

received,

I shall

the Court.

Gated: January 3, 1978
ROBERT N1. TALCOTT

-12-
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Transcription of Recorded Telephone Calls
received at 716-381-7794 during the period 7:00 AM,
November 4, 1978 to 7:30 PH, November 5, 1978.

Transcribed and Reviewed by:
SA LENNIS R. CARNEY
FBI
Rochester, New York

Identity of Individuals
HIGGINS - HUGH H. HIGGINS, JR., FBI, Rochester, New York
DIANE

-

Mrs. DIANE O'BRIEN, wife of PAUL

PAUL

-

PAUL W. O'BRIEN

STAN

-

STANLEY M. RIFKIN

THOMAS - HAROLD D. THOMAS, FBI, Rochester, New York

[Vol. II
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Saturday, November 4, 1978
HIGGINS

Hello, is uh DENNIS CARNEY there
please?

DIANE

Yes. Just a minute please.

PAUL

Hello
Piano playing.

DIANE

well because we've had a little, t
I don't know how to explain it
really, but but JOHN'll explain
it. Anyways I'm waiting for a
call from a bank robber and I
gotta get off the phone.

Neighbor

Oh my God. I'm gonna get my
clothes on . . .

DIANE

Ok..

Neighbor

. . . I'll be back

DIANE

I just wanted someone to
sit with me 'cause I can't
call out and I gotta sit here

Neighbor

All right. Okay. Bye

DIANE

Bye

.

19801
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Approximately 10:00 AM
DIANE

Hello

STAN

Hi. May I please speak to PAUL?

DIANE

Uh He isn't here right now.

STAN

Do you know where he is or
when you expect him...

DIANE

STAN

.
. he's just out
running. He should be back in
15, 20 minutes.
Un, okay, maybe you can take
tiat complicated message for me.

Yeah. He's .

DIANE

Okay

STAN

Okay

DIANE

Yes

STAN

Tell him it's ED O'REILLY

DIANE

Uh huh

STAN

And that, um, everything is off.

DIANE

Uh huh

STAN

um, that he should go back to
work on Monday

DIANE

Oh okay

STAN

• . . and that I'll try to call
him later on in the day.

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL
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DIANE

All right. Fine.

STAN

Okay ?

DIANE

Uh huh

STAN

Thanks very much

DIANE

Okay

STAN

Bye bye

DIANE

Hello

PAUL

Hi,

DIANE

Hello

Nursing Office

Hi. Is DIANE O'BRIEN home?

DIANE

Yes.

Nursing Office

This is the Nursing Office
calling.

DIANE

Hello

THO AS

Ub Mrs. O'BRIEN?

DIANE

Yes

THOMAS

HAL THOMAS down at the FBI again.

DIANE

Yes

THOMAS

I just wanted to let . .

DIANE,

this is

PAUL.

This is DIANE.

.

1980]
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Sunday, November 5, 1978
Approximately 4:30 PH
STAN

PAUL

PAUL

Hello

STAN

Hi. How you doing

PAUL

Pretty good

STAN

Good. Um, does anybody know
about my last phone call?

PAUL

Huh! Just the folks who were
here in the house . . . my kids

STAN

Oh okay um. I think it (unintelligable) a little conference
about this thing and I think
I would absolutely like you to
send the cash . . . in In a
a Jiffy pack . . . you know that
thing

PAUL

urn urn

STAN

with no return address

PAUL

Okay

STAN

Okay?

PAUL

Okay. Now, you're sure, STAN.
That's uh

STAN

I am.

PAUL

Okay. No place that I can meet
you or anything?

STAN

. . . I'd love that (chuckle)
but I don't think so. And,
anyway, just gives you gets you i
ton of trouble.

Absolutely dead positive

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL
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PAUL

Well

STAN

Okay?

PAUL

.

-

-

you know. Not . . .

. . not if

my intention was

to go out and, you know, if
you're, if you're serious
about uh . . .
STAN

Oh absolutely dead serious
about it . . .

PAUL

.

STAN

. . . that's (chuckle) no, I
mean you know one against the
FBI is real bad odds.

PAUL

Well, yeah, exactly I mean
'cause your obviously your best
shot is uh . . .

STA.N

No doubt about it.

PAUL

.

. . walking in, then uh

.

.

is to just walk in and

say hey uh
STAN

Yuh. I don't know what's going
on and let's talk about it. Sure.

PAUL

.

.

. you know let's get this

thing straightened out . . .
let's get it straightened out
and uh . . .

ST-;

That's right

PAUL

.

. . but I, you know really
it it's certainly not an
inconvenience to uh take it
someplace and that sort of thing

19801
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STAN

I understand. I think the best
thing would be to mail it.

PAUL

Okay

STAN

Okay. What do you think is
the chances that your phone is
tapped?

PAUL

I surely wouldn't uh you know
I'd I'd I'd say they're uh fifty
fifty-ish, wouldn't you think?

STAN

Yeah. I don't know. I mean I
thought they're not allowed to
tap attorneys phones because of

PAUL

Well, I don't know.

STAN

Yeah

PAUL

. . . but you know I'm not in
private practice or anything.
They're not thinking that.I
wouldn't think . . .

STAN

.

.

it

. .

. because of what do you call
though un . . . anyway . . .

okay.
PAUL

Uh well. You're dead sure that
that it's not easier for me uh

STAN

Dead sure.

PAUL

.

STAN

Dead sure. I'd I would that
would certainly be my first
choice.

PAUL

Well and you .

.

.

jump some placeeitwhatever.

.

I, I guess

I'm not clear on why it wouldn't
why it uh wouldn't work or
whatever know as well as anyone
else. I'm not I'm obviously not
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PAUL

the guy to uh stand up
eloquently and defend you but
we could find somebody to do
that . . . but uh

STAN

Oh uh I think you might be
called.

I mean don't .

.

.

I

wouldn't kiss that off yet.
PAUL

Well seriously I mean, I mean,
number one it s a, it s a heck
of a lot more secure way to uh.

STAN

Yuh - proceed.

PAUL

;n.;.

to get the money and um

and also if that's the intent
it's just as easy.
STAN

Well what I'd like you to do is
just send the money in that in
the plain brown wrapper . . .

PAUL
STAN

Okay now of course that's going
to take a while uh . . .
Well it should just take one day,
if you send it tomorrow.

PAUL

Yuh

STAN

Okay

PAUL

Well I really I wish you'd think
that over anyway 'cause uh . . .

STAN

Oh I did . . .

'PAUL

;

..

you know, I could get on

a plane

1980]
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STAN

*

.

.

that's why I tried to call

.

I can get on a plane tonight

back
PAUL

. .

or in the morning or whatever and
be some place if you wanted.
STAN

Yeah I understand but . . . even
if yourphone isn't tapped you're
certainly being followed so . . .

PAUL

Yeah

STAN

. . . actually it doesn't have

so much to do with me, okay,
you can just do that . . .
PAUL
STAN

if

Okay
*

..

boy that'll

just be super

and I'll, I'll stay in touch and
let you know every inch of the
way.
PAUL

Okay. Good.

STAN

Okay?

rAULL

All right, STAN

STAN

Super.

PAUL

Right, right. Bye bye

STAN

:'eby,:.

Exhibit A - 10

Thanks.
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PAUL

Hello

DIANE

Hi

PAUL

Hi

Approximately 4:30 PM (last part of conversation)
.

.

don't I make it out to

PAUL

him?

STAN

Um . . . well you could.

PAUL

(Laughter)

*

I
think it's the best, to just put
cash in the envelope. You don't
care.
it

gets .

Well, you do.
.

.

If

for heaven sakes

it's gonna be a • ..
STAN

(unintelligible) my risk .
I would say that's the way to do

it.

Aw, come on.

PAUL

Huh?

STAN

Sure

PAUL

Huh?

STAN

Sure. Well you also don't want
to get anybody else involved too much. Okay?

PAUL

Yeah, but if . . . is this guy
an attorney?

STAN

Yeah

1980]
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PAUL

he's
Well, he, he's not. .
ot a perfect right to it then,
f that s what it is

STAN

Yeah, but he may not take the

case I mean we don't even know
what's going on yet
PAUL

Oh...

Telephore Operator

Three minutes.
through.

PAUL

That's a . . .

STAN

Uh, you said those guys with
badges, they found you?

PAUL

Huh? No, STAN, I called them.
Heavens, when I heard what it
was . . .

STAN

Oh, okay. Fine.

PAUL

. . . you know.

STAN

. . . you called them. Okay.

PAUL

.

STAN

Yeah well I tried you know

Signal when

. . yeah I thought but I
thought you'd be calling and
that we could uh because I got
some people . . .

I tried Saturday . . .
PAUL

. . . 'cause I got a folk some
folks here that if uh, in fact,
if that's, you know I ve got a
an acquaintance at least here
who's a Assistant U. S. Attorney
that we could have gone to and
get the thing at least under way
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STAN

Fine. Well, okay I mean I did
what I thought was right too.
I called I called my attorney
and he's got he's got an
appointment tomorrow morning.
Okay ?

PAUL

Okay.

STAN

So if you do that .. .
I
recommend you send the cash.

PAUL

Well, ok -, well, all right,

Um...

That would be my order, okay?
let me think about it.
STAN

(unintelligible)

PAUL

. .* let me thing about it
i'll get it out there anyway
but uh I think that's not a
you know if it's coming from
me there's no way they can uh

anybody's gonna know. I'll just
send the money out.
STAN

Okay.

PAUL

Well .

STAN

Take care and after this blows
over we'll try again.

PAUL

Yeah.

STAIZ

Okay?

PALL

Let me, uh yeah, let me know
for heaven sakes what's going
on because, because frankly,
STAN, if, yeah if you need
some more help, why uh . . .

STAN

.

. uh...

Let (laughter) . . .

Oh you'll be the first
(Unintelligible)

1980]
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you know, we can get
something uh ...
.

.

PAUL

.

STAN

Great

PAUL

.

STAN

Okay

PAUL

All right

STAN

Take care

PAUL

Good.

STAN

Bye bye.

PAUL

Right.

.

. organized anyway.

Thanks for calling.

Bye, bye.
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PAUL W. O'BRIEN, 17 Warder Drive, Pittsford, New
York furnished the following information:
O'BRIEN stated he has known an individual named
STANLEY RIFKIN since approximately 1975 when RIFKIN worked
for a firm known as Payment Systems, Inc. (PSI), a wholly
PSI was doing
owned subsidiary of American Express Company.
work for Rochester Telephone Company and this is how O'BRIEN
1976.
the
Sunmer,
met RIFKIN. He had last seen him during
On Wednesday, November 1, 1978, O'BRIEN was involved
in the hearings regarding the proposed rate hike of Rochester
Telephone Company, which were bein held at the Chamber of
Commnerce building in Rochester. 0 BRIEN noticed RIFKIN in the
hearing room, and at the conclusion of the hearing on Wednesday
afternoon, at about 3:30 PM to 4:00 PM, RIFKIN told him he had
a business offer to discuss. RIFKIN and O'BRIEN then walked
back to O'BRIEN's offices in the Midtown Plaza Office Building.
RIFKIN signed the security log maintained for the telephone
company by Midtown Plaza security officers on this occasion,
but O'BRIEN did not notice what name RIFKIN used.
RIFKIN advised he was involved in a West Germany
land deal wherein he received payments in the form of cash
and diamonds. Because he had to convert these diamonds to
cash, he wanted O'BRIEN to handle the legal work to set up a
New York City based diamond brokerage. RIFKIN advised
O'BRIEN that he currently had between $300,000.00 to $400,000.00
in diamonds, which he wished to convert into cash.
O'BRIEN asked RIFKIN how he could contact him and
RIFKIN stated he could not be contacted since "STANLEY RIFKIN
RIFKIN explained that he had done
was not in Rochester."
something several months ago that he haa always wanted to
do - he had disappeared.
After their conversation, RIFKIN and O'BRIEN parted
company on Wednesday at O'BRIEN's office building, after agreeing

to meet for lunch on Thursday at noon at the Top of the Plaza
restaurant.
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On Thursday, November 2, 1978, O'BRILN and RIFKIN
met as planned at the Top of the Plaza. RIFKIN paid the bill
at this restaurant, using a $50.00 bill. O'BRIEN had made the
reservation in his name for this luncheon. More discussion
took place at this time concerning RIFKIN's job offer. They
left each other at 1:30 PM, and agreed to meet for breakfast on
Friday, November 3, 1978, at the Coffee Shop of the Americana
Flagship on State Street, in Rochester, New York.
They met as planned on Friday morning, with O'BRIEN
RIFKIN
arriving at the Americana Flagship at about 9:05 AM.
had a cheese omelet, rye toast, and hot chocolate with no
whipped cream. O'BRIEN had a cheese omelet, white toast, and
coffee. When the bill arrived for this breakfast, O'BRIEN
observed RIFKIN write something on the back of the check.
This led O'BRIEN to assume that RIFKIN was staying at the
Americana Flagship and was charging the breakfast to his room.
RIFKIN left 0 BRIEN briefly on this occasion and O'BRIEN
believed RIFKIN was going to his room in the hotel.
Upon leaving the hotel, O'BRIEN and RIFKIN walked
to the Chamber of Commerce building, and then RIFKIN left,
walking back in the direction of the Americana. They made
arrangements to meet at 12:30 PM on Friday, November 3, 1978
at the elevators at the Midtown Plaza.
At 12:30 PM, on Friday, November 3, 1978, they met
as planned and drove in O'BRIEN s car to O'BRIEN's residence.
RIFKIN wished to meet Mrs. O'BRIEN and take her to lunch with
them. They arrived at the O'BRIEN residence at about 1:00 PM
and found that Mrs. O'BRIEN was not at home. RIFKIN asked
O'BRIEN if he could leave an excessTpiece of luggage at the
O'BRIEN home, and O'BRIEN agreed. This piece was a canvassback-pack which was empty.

27

Exhibit B -
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They then departed and went to the Depot restaurant
in Pittsford, arriving at 1:30 PM for lunch. 0 BRIEN did not
see RIFKIN pay for this meal, but saw him go to the cashier
and assumed he paid cash for their meal. It was in the parking
lot of the Depot that RIFKIN gave O'BRIEN a plain white envelope
containing $6,000.00 in $100 and $50 bills. This money was
earnest money for the business offer RIFKIN was making to O'BRIEN.
As a result of receiving this earnest money, O'BRIEN
agreed to approach his superiors at the Telephone Company, to
arrange a leave of absence to handle RIFKIN's business dealings.
He was to discuss this Friday afternoon, and RIFKIN was to call
O'BRIEN's residence on Saturday morning. In addition, RIFKIN
asked O'BRIEN to have his secretary make reservations for RIFKIN
at a New York City hotel for P week's period beginning Saturday
afternoon. RIFKIN furnished O'BRIEN with a list of preferred
hotels including, in order of preference, the Mayfair Hotel,
the Tuscany, the Park-Lane, and as a last resort, the WaldorfAstoria. 0 BRIEN advised his secretary was unable to obtain
reservations at any of these hotels and he planned to so inform
RIFKIN when he talked with him on Saturday morning.
O'BRIEN stated he did speak with the President of
the Telephone Company on Friday afternoon and received permission to make arrangements for this leave of absence.
O'BRIEN stated that in one discussion with RIFKIN,
RIFKIN told him he was a partner in a California business named
Stan Rifkin, Inc. The other partner in this business was a
Mr. TREVOR WONG, and that RIFKIN desired to buy out I.NG's
interest in this business, but wished to remain anonymous in
this transaction because it was his intention to thereafter
dissolve the business. RIFKIN asked O'BRIEN to call WONG's
attorney (GARY GOODGAME at Mann Theatres, telephone 213-2733336); to represent himself as ED O'REILLY, a New York
attorney representing an interested purchaser; and to offer to
Usin$ the name ED O'REILLY,
WONG's interest for $100,000.00.
O'BRIEN called GOODGAME on Friday morning, November 3, 1978,
with RIFKIN's offer, but received a non-comittal response.
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O'BRIEN advised that RIFKIN offered him $30,000.00
for establishing the New York City diamond brokerage firm and
negotiating a purchase of WONG's interest in Stan Rifkin, Inc.
Thereafter, RIFKIN said he would pay O'BRIEN $100,000.00 to
$200,000.00 per year to oversee the diamond brokerage firm.
O'BRIEN advised that Friday evening, November 3, 1978,
he was watching the Rochester local i o'clock news on Channel
10 (WHEC-TV) which carried a news item concerning a multimillion dollar bank scheme in Los Angeles. He stated the story
identified the subject as STANLEY M. RIFKIN, displayed a
picture of RIFKIN and identified the bank as Security Pacific
National Bank (SPNB). He stated he immediately attempted to
reach the appropriate parties in Los Angeles and, unable to
do so, then called the Buffalo, New York Office of the FBI.
Because he anticipated further telephonic contact
from RIFKIN, O'BRIEN consented to the installation of a
recording device on his home telephone, by signing an FD-472.
O'BRIEN provided the interviewing Agents with the
following items:
I. One piece of Americana Hotels note paper, given
to him by O'BRIEN, containing the following writing: "GARY
GOODGANE (213) 273-3336 Mann Theatres Undisclosed principal
for acquisition of Stan Rifkin Inc. $100,000. - Ed O'Reilly
of New York Mr. TrevorUWong, Pres. (213) 892-0749 (Bus.)
(213) 456-7836 (Res.)."
2. Business card from RIFKIN's canvas back pack
containing the following inscription: "STAN RIFKIN INC 15015
Parthenia St. Sepulveda, CA 91343 USA (213) 892-0749.
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly

3

provides that the court may allow a party to take depositions of its

4

own witnesses and that the depositions may be used at trial if the

5

witness is unavailable.

Section (e) of Rule 15 provides in part:

6

"At the trial or upon any hearing a part or all of

7

a deposition, so far as otherwise admissible under

8

the rules of evidence, may be used as substantive

9

evidence if the witness is unavailable, as unavail-

10

ability is defined in Rule 804(a) of the Federal

11

Rules of Evidence . . .'

12
13

"Unavailable" as a witness under the Federal Rules of Evidence
includes a witness who:
and the proponent

14

" . . . is absent from the hearing

15

of his statement has been unable to procure his

16

attendance . . . by process or other reasonable

17

means" [Rule 804(a) (5)].

18

Under the previous version of Rule 15 which permitted depositions

19

only at the request of the defendant, the Court in United States v.

20

Bronston, 321 F.Supp. 1269, 1272 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) indicated that:

21

*While the mere fact that a necessary witness is

22

a foreign national domiciled abroad and beyond

23

the subpoena power of the court does not mandate

24

an order pursuant to Rule 15 (footnote omitted],

25

it is an impelling consideration (footnote omitted]."

26

In United States v. Kearney, 560 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir.), cert.

27

denied, 434 U.S. 971 (1977), the trial court admitted into evidence

28

depositions which had been taken in Japan at the request of the

rwl 081o.83
121.76 Doi

government.
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1

The only conceivable objection to the admissibility of the pro-

2
3

posed depositions is that the questions must be submitted by both
parties to a Swiss magistrate who in turn asks the questions. It is

4

anticipated that the defendant will claim that this procedure violates

5

his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.

6
7

might be lost by this procedure would be defense counsel's opportunity
to bully or intimidate a witness. This is no great loss. A trial is

8

a search for the truth, not a game of theatrics.

9

frontation is only the right to have appropriate questions propounded

The only thing which

The right of con-

to the witness.

10
11

In United States v. Hay, 376 F.Supp. 264 (D.C.Colo. 1974), aff'd,
1975),

cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935,

(1976), the

12

527 F.2d 990 (10th Cir.

13

Court admitted into evidence depositions from Switzerland over defense

14

counsel's objections.

15

parties in taking depositions, since the depositions were taken before

16

the treaty with Switzerland regarding assistance in criminal matters

17

went into effect in 1977.

is

in that case objected that the questions had to be asked through a

19

third party.

20

1

Many difficulties had been encountered by the

[27 U.S. Treaties 20191.

The defense couns 1

The Court found that this procedure was permissible:

"Defendant says that he was prejudiced because

21

questions had to be asked through Consul Rand.

22

In fact, this situation didn't last long, and

23

most of Mr. Alman's questions were responded to

24

by Mr. Egger without having them repeated by

25

Consul Rand.

26

an interpreter is used, the questions are given

27

to the interpreter to ask of the witness.

28

inconvenience doesn't invalidate the deposition"
(376 F.Supp.

But, even if this were not so, when

at

279].
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1

Furthermore, it would be premature for the Court to find this

2

procedure constitutionally invalid before even seeing how it works

3

in practice.

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-4r~ Btm 1883
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Telephone:
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
NO. CR 78-1050(A)-WMB

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
V.

DECLARATION OF ROBIN BROWN RE

DEPOSITIONS TO BE TAKEN IN SWITZER-

STANLEY MARK I RIFKIN,

LAND

Defendant.

The government hereby files the attached declaration of Robin
Brown in connection with the motion for depositions to be taken in
Switzerland.
Respectfully submitted,
ANDREA SHERIDAN ORDIN
United States Attorney
ROBERT L. BROSIO
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division

KATHRYNE/ANN STOLTZ
Assistant United States Attorney
Assistant Chief, Criminal Division
KAS :ya

Attorneys for Plaintiff
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DECLARATION OF ROBIN BROWN
The Swiss government has been requested to arrange depositions

3

of the following individuals for January 15, 1979.

4

through nine are essential to the government's case.

5

and eleven are individuals whose names have come up in the course of

6

the investigation and who may have relevant information to provide in

7

connection with this case:

8
9

1.

Witnesses one
Witnesses ten

An unnamed bank official at the Wozchod Handelsbank,

Zurich, that has set aside the appropriate documents re receipt of

10

$10.2 million,

11

2.

Werner Oppliger of Mat Securitas Express S.A., Geneva,

12

sealed the suitcase containing the diamonds prior to transport to

13

airport;

14

3.

15

Claude Pochat of Mat Securitas Express S.A., Geneva,

transported the diamond shipment to the Geneva airport;

16

4.

Jean-Claude Medico (same as #3);

17

5.

Alain Cochard (same as #3);

is

6.

Martin Jaquet, of Swiss Air received the shipment from

19

#2 - #5, and held the shipment until Rifkin picked it up in Geneva;

20

7.

Hans Schneeberger (same as #6);

21

8.

Jacuqes Spalter, a Swiss citizen and former associate of

23
24

Rifkin, met Rifkin in Geneva October 28, 1978;
9. Alex Malinin, a Soviet citizen, employee of Russalmaz,

25

a Soviet sales agency, sold the diamonds to Stein;
10. Rene Brun, a diamond broker that lives in Geneva that dealt

26

with Rifkin on more than one occasion;

27
28

11.

Robin Page, a former associate of Rifkin while Rifkin was

employed in Geneva.
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I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true
and correct.
Executed on January 9, 1979.

4

6

AOB N ir', Special Agent
Fede alureau of Investigation

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
r
" 2R

OD 183
6Tc,

-2-

1
2
3
4
5
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ANDREA SHERIDAN ORDIN
United States Attorney
ROBERT L. BROSIO
Assistant U. S. Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division
KATHRYNE ANN STOLTZ
Assistant U. S. Attorney
1300 U. S. Courthouse
312 North Spring Street
Los Angeles, California 90012

6
(213) 688-2481

Telephone:
7
8

Attorneys for Plaintiff
United States of America

9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

10

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

12

Plaintiff,

13
14

NO. CR 78-1050(A)-WMB
DECLARATION RE PROCEDURES
TO BE FOLLOWED IN SWISS

v.

DEPOSITIONS

STANLEY MARK RIFKIN,
Defendant.

15
16
17

The government hereby submits the attached Declaration of Robin

18

Brown regarding procedures to be followed in the taking of depositions

19

in Switzerland.

20

will be provided tomorrow.

21

reporters from the United States

22

has agreed to waive any requirement of the witness's signature on a

23

verbatim transcript.

Names

of the witnesses and their expected testimony
The government will take one or two court
to record testimony.

24

Respectfully submitted,

25

ANDREA SHERIDAN ORDIN
United States Attorney

26
27
28
, ,6 .-76 00-18
Do) 3

DOCUMENT

6

Defense counsel
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ROBERT L. BROSIO

Assistant U. S. Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division

KATHRYNE ANN STOLTZ

Assistant U. S. Attorney
Attorneys for Plaintiff
United States of America
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1.

I, ROBIN C. BROWN, a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau

of Investigation assigned to the Los Angeles, California Division
4
5

do declare the following:
2.

On a number of occasions within the last week, I spoke

6

with Special Agent Leonard Ralston, Legal Attache to the American

7

Embassy in Bern, Switzerland.

6

the United States and local law enforcement agencies on all matters.

9

The following information was provided to him by representatives

He acts as an immediatary between

10

of the Swiss Federal Police and the Swiss judicial system and then

11

subsequently provided to myself:

12

3.

Prior to a witness testfying in a Swiss court he is, in
This is the

13

detail, reminded of the perjury laws in Switzerland.

14

normal procedure for any testimony received in the Swiss court.

15

If the United States government requests, an oath similar to

16

an oath presented in a deposition taken in an American court can

17

be administered.

18

4.

A deposition taken within a Swiss court is taken as
The questions are provided orally to a Swiss Magistrate

19

follows:

20

in English who would then pose that question in French or German to

21

the witness.

22

question and then discuss the answer.

23

is then summarized and dictated to the court reporter by the Magis-

24

trate in English.

25

may be given by both the defense and prosecution.

26

the Magistrates speak English and in those rare instances where

27

they do not, the questions would then be translated into the working

28

language of the Magistrate by a court interpreter and the same

=w7
080-183
,24.76
Doi

The Magistrate and the witness then discuss the
The answer to the question

During the course of the deposition questions
Virtually all
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There is no

1

would apply to the answer provided by the Magistrate.

2

restriction as to how a particular question might be phrased or how
the answer would be phrased except that the final answer given by the

4

Magistrate be in summary form.

Occasionally, magistrates will relax

the procedures and allow counsel to ask questions directly of the
6

witness although they are not required to do so.
5.

8

Answers to questions provided in depositions are summarized

by the Magistrate and dictated to a court reporter.

At the termina-

tion of the witnesses testimony that testimony is reread to the
10

witness where upon the witness would sign that summary transcript.
The Swiss government has indicated that a verbatim transcript pro-

12

vided by a translator providing an English translation immediately

13

to a court reporter would present no problem to the Magistrate or

14

to Swiss law. In Geneva a tape recording of the court proceedings
is allowed by the court. In Zurich, the witness reserves the right

15
16
17

to refuse to be taped. The only interview to be conducted in Zurich
is one bank official who has not indicated a desire not to be tape
recorded.
6.

All of the summary transcriptions provided by the court

20
20

are either in French or German.

21

been advised that the court in this matter, does not require summary

22

transcriptions.

23

7.

The Swiss judicial system has

Interpreters in both German and French are available in

24

Geneva and in Zurich and will be provided by the court and/or the

25

Swiss Federal Police.

26

that are similar in job description, duty, and allegiance to the court,

27

to interpreters in American courts.

28
Fo,.. 080-183
128-76 DO)

8.

These interpreters are court interpreters

With regards to the rules for an attorney objecting to
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1

testimony or questions, the Swiss court system has indicated that

2

law provides that testimony regarding third-party bank accounts

3

under the Swiss Bank Secrecy Law would prohibittheir required

4

testimony.

5

on the record.

6

9.

All other remarks regarding these depositions will go

The Swiss government said that there would be no problem

7

with court reporters or other officers from the American judicial

8

system being present in the court or assisting in the deposition.

9

10.

At the present time SA Ralston, in concert with the Swiss

10

Federal Police and the Swiss judicial system has so far scheduled

11

depositions in Zurich for Monday the 15th and depositions in Geneva

12

for Tuesday the 16th and Thursday the 18th.

13

11.

The Swiss government has further indicated there would be

14

no problem in Stanley Rifkin accompanying his counsel to Switzerland.

is

They have indicated that there is presently no arrest warrant out-

16

standing in Switzerland for Rifkin and that the Swiss government

17

will takes steps to assure that prosecution of him will not be sought

18

while Rifkin is within their jurisdiction.

19

advised of a restricted passport with the life of approximately

20

three weeks being issued to Rifkin and indicate that that would

21

be compatible with their law and requirements.

22

12.

They have further been

I have made airplane reservati6ns for all parties involved

23

so as to arrive in Zurich, Switzerland on Sunday, January 14 at

24

1:40 P.M.

25
26
27
28
-rm08D.183
21.76 D03

1 declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and
correct.
EXECUTED:

This

/

day of Januar

,

1979.
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7
8
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United States of America

9

UNITED STATES D ISTRICT COURT

10

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11

Plaintiff,

12
13
14
15

NO.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

)
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V.

)

GOVERNMENT'S DECLARATION OF
ROBIN BROWN RE EXPECTED TESTIMON'Y OF WITNESSES

STANLEY MARK RIFKIN,
Defendant.

CR 78-1050(A)-WMB

)

IN SWITZERLAND

AND SAFE CONDUCT FOR DEFENDANT

16
17

The government hereby files the attached Declaration of Agent

18

Robin Brown regarding the expected testimony of witnesses in

19

Switzerland and the assurances of safe conduct for the defendant

20

in Switzerland.

21

Respectfully submitted,

22

ANDREA SHERIDAN ORDIN
United States Attorney

23
24

ROBERT L. BROSIO
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division

25
26
27
28

KATHRYNE ANN STOLTZ
Assistant United States Attorney
Assistant Chief, Criminal Division
Attorneys for Plaintiff
United States of America
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DE C LA RA T I ON

2

I, ROBIN BROWN, hereby declare and say as follows:

3
4

1.
4gation.

I am a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investi-

5
2.

6
7

The following witnesses listed in subparagraphs a through

h are essential and important witnesses to the prosecution
of the
I
case of United States v. Stanley Mark Rifkin, CR 78-1050 CA .
8have been informed by F.B.I. Special Agent Leonard Ralston, Legal

9
Attache to the United States Embassy, Bern, Switzerland that the
10

:Swiss Federal police informed him that these people have all been

11
contacted and asked if they would be willing to come to the United
States to testify with all expenses paid.
All of the people listed

12
13

tin subparagraphs a through h have indicated that they are not willing
14

:or are not permitted by their employers to come to the United States

15

to testify at trial.

The Government expects that the witnesses will

16 1be
able to provide the following information:
17
(a)
18

i

Bank official at the Wozchod Handels Bank, Zurich:
It is anticipated that the bank official will

lay a business

19
1 record foundation for certain bank documents which will

20

show that

0 10.2 million dollars was received by the bank pursuant
to a wire

21
transfer on October 27,
22

1978, for credit to account number 390302002

at their bank from the Irving Trust Company, a bank in New York.

23
24

25
26
27
28
Form 08D.183
12.8-76 DOJ

This is the bank account of Russalmaz.
On Monday, October 30, 1978, $2.055 million
dollars was
transferred out of that account.
vided the

The Swiss Federal Police have pro-

information that the bank has already

turned these bank
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1

documents over to them, although we do not yet have copies.

2

of these documents will be turned over at the taking of the deposi-

3

tions.

4

information outlined

5

the F.B.I. that he was at Russalmaz when they received a phone call

6

from the baAk that the money had arrived and who asked Russalmaz to

7

have the remaining money after the purchase of the diamonds trans-

a

ferred out of their account.

9

on their stationery furnished to us by Lon Stein.

Copies

The expectation that the bank documents will contain the
above comes from Lon Stein, who has informed

The name of Russalmaz' bank is printed
Documents from

10

the Irving Trust Company also show that the money was wire trans-

11

ferred from their bank with instructions to be credited to the

12

Russalmaz account at

13

informed me that Stein's interviews, the stationary referred to, and

14

all documents and information from the Irving Trust Company have

15

been turned over to defense counsel.

16

(b)

17

the Wozchod Handels Bank.

Ms. Stoltz has

Werner Oppliger:
Werner Oppliger works for the Mat Securitas Express S. A.,

18

Geneva as a courier.

19

from Russalmaz on October

20

from Russalmaz to Swiss Air

21

the Swiss Federal Police from their interview of him.

22

cipated that he will sa.

23

suitcase and its contents were in the

24

delivered as when picked up, as this would probably be the normal

25

business practice.

26

/

27

/

He sealed the suitcase of diamonds obtained
27,

1978, and traveled with the shipment

for pickup.

It is anti-

that the seal was intact and that the

28
Fom OBD-183
12.8-76 Doi

This information came from

3

same condition when it was
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(c)

Claude Pochat;

(d)

Jean Claude Medico; and,

(e)

Alain Cochard:
These witnesses also work for Mat Securitas Express S. A.,

Geneva as couriers.

The Swiss Federal Police have provided the

information that these individuals do not remember this particular
shipment very well, however, they helped transport it.

It is assumed

that normal business procedures were followed which would establish
chain of custody, although this information has not yet been received
from the witnesses.
(f)

Martin Jaguet; and,

(g)

Hans Schneeberger:
It

Both of these witnesses work for Swiss Air in Geneva.
is anticipated that they will testify that a suitcase of diamonds
arrived via Mat Securitas Express S. A.,
October 27, 1978.

Geneva from Russalmaz on

These diamonds were picked up on October 28,

1978, by an individual

identifying himself as Stanley Rifkin.

The

person picking up the shipment must show his passport and give the
passport number.

It is anticipated that Swiss Air has notes or

documents indicating the arrangements which were made regarding who
was authorized to pick up the shipment and possibly a signed receipt
by the person picking up the shipment.

It is anticipated that the

above two witnesses will be able to testify to the above information
because of the following facts:

Rifkin confessed to F.B.I. agents

that he picked up the diamonds after they were purchased.

He said

that he had intended to use a code number to pick up the diamonds,
but found out that he would have to show his passport which in fact

Fo.
080.183
124-76 DOJ
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I

he did.

2

Rifkin has been turned over the defense counsel.

3

was given to the Swiss Federal Police, who in turn told the F.B.I.

4

agent in Bern that the people who could provide the information

5

regarding te pickup of the diamonds were the above two named indivi-

6

duals from Swiss Air.

7

two individuals.

Ms. Stoltz has informed me that the interview report of
This information

We have no information directly from these

8

Lon Stein, the diamond broker, also provided
information to the F.B.I. that Russalmaz told him that arrangements

9

would have to be made regarding the name and passport number of the

10

person picking up the diamonds.
(h) Alex Malinin:

12

Alex Malinin is an employee of Russalmaz, a Soviet diamond

13

business in Geneva.

14

Lon Stein came to Russalmaz on October 26, 1978, to select diamonds

15

for a ten

(10) million dollar purchase.

16

that day.

The following day he selected 8.145 million dollars worth

17

of diamonds which he wished to purchase.' This purchase was completed

18

on that day using funds which had been wired transferred into Russalm
account at the Wozchod Handels Bank in Zurich, Switzerland. Stein

19
20

It is anticipated that he will testify that

Stein was shown diamonds on

21

was on occasion accompanied by another gem broker, Ron Romenella.
The above information was obtained from Lon Stein and Ron Romenella.

22

A copy of the bill of sale obtained from Lon Stein will be shown to

23

Mr. Malinin.

24

the bill of sale reports have been turned over the defense
counsel.
Photographs of the diamonds and their wrappings
will be

25
26
27
28
For,
BOD-183
124-76 DOj

Ms. Stoltz has informed me that these interview and

shown to Malinin.

I have been informed by Ms. Stoltz that defense

counsel have their own set of photographs.

Two of the original
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I

paper wrappings will also be shown to Malinin.

2

that Malinin wrote on some of the wrappings.

Mr. Stern told us

It is also anticipated that Malinin will be able to

3
4

testify that Russalmaz received a wire purportedly

5

at Security Pacific Bank establishing some of the arrangements for

6

the above purchase.

7

Van Nuys and Los Angeles who turned over their work order requesting

8

that this cablegram be sent.

9

fingerprint.

from a Mr. Nelson

This information came from Western Union in

The cablegram contains Rifkin's

Western Union does not have a copy of the cablegram

10

itself, but indicates that the receiving party, Russalmaz, should

11

have a copy of it.

12

of this work order from Western Union has been turned over to

13

defense counsel.

I have been informed by Ms. Stoltz

that a copy

It is anticipated that Russalmaz also has a cablegram

14
15

regarding the arrangements for the pickup of the diamonds which was

16

sent from somewhere in Geneva.

17

for Security Pacific Bank.

18

of that cablegram.

20

and Alex Malinin of Russalmaz will be shown a photospread.

21

following individuals are in the photospread:

22

Stan Rifkin, Lon Stein, Gary Goodgame, Robin Page and Dan Wolfson.

3.

23

4.

This information came from attorneys
a copy

The Government does not yet have

Martin Jaquet of Swiss Air, Hans Schneeberger of Swiss Air
The

Ron Romenella,

There is also a telephone toll record for calls which the
I have been informed by

24

government has evidence that Rifkin made.

25

Ms. Stoltz that this evidence has been turned over to defense.

26

is anticipated that the witness from Russalmaz will testify that one

27

of these phone numbers is theirs as it is the same as their phone

28
1,. OBD.183
.8-76 DoJ
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number on their stationery.
5.

2

Jacques Spalter is a witness who is willing to come to the

3

United States.

4

F.B.I. agent in Bern, Switzerland that he says that he was with

5
6

Rifkin when Rifkin picked up the diamonds from Swiss Air and flew
with Rifkin to Frankfort, ermany. This information was not included

7

in Rifkin's confession.

8

information that Rifkin said "I am a very wealthy man now," and that

9
10

The Swiss Federal Police have represented to the

The Swiss Federal Police have provided

Rifkin had a suitcase with him. I have been informed that Spalter
can be made available for a deposition if so requested.
6.

12

Rene Brun and Robin Paae are two individuals whose names
have come up in the course of the investigation as possibly having

13

some connection to Rifkin.

14

these potential witnesses are essential to the case.

I cannot represent at this time that
I have been

informed that they can be made available for depositions if requested,
7.

16

Special Agent Ralston informed me that he talked to

17

Rudolph V. Wyss of the Swiss Federal Police of the Federal Depart-

18

ment of Justice who is the person who is designated as a liaison
with the United States government in the Swiss Federal Police and

19

who is authorized to speak for the Swiss government on matters such
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

as this.

Mr. Wyss represented to Agent Ralston that there were no
arrest warrants out for Rifkin and that he can personally assure us
that Rifkin will not be arrested in Switzerland for any past crimes.
If Rifkin should be arrested in Switzerland for any past crimes,
Mr. Wyss will exercise his authority to insure that he be immediately

/
/
/
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released.
8.

I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing

is true and correct.
EXECUTED ON January 12, 1979,

in Los Angeles, California.

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Fo,,, 080.183
12.4-76 Do

'-

arant.

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

U'I -ED

S7:?.:""S DIS-'RCT COURT

Ci7',T-2-',L DISnICT O

HONORABLE 1-4.

[Vol. H

MATTHEW BYRNE,

C.A:LI'O:RNIA

JR.,

JUDGE PRESIDING

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CR 78-1050-1Th1B

STANLEY MARK RIFKIN,
Defendant.

REPORTER'S

TRINSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Los Angeles, California
Tuesday, February 6, 1979

ROBERT E. KILLION
Official Reporter
419 U.S. Courthouse

312 North S-rin'
Lo

Street

Angeles, California

DOCUMENT 8

90012

623

RIFKIN

1980]

2
1

AF I'E.1'AN'CES:

2
3
4

5
6

On behalf of

the Plaintiff:

ANDREA SHERIDAN ORDIN
United States Attorney
KATIiYRYNE ANN STOLTZ
BRAD D. BRIAN

Assistant U.S. Attorneys

7

1263 U.S. Courthouse
312 North Spring Street

8

Los Angeles, California

9

90012

On behalf of the Defendant:

10
11
12
13

ROBERT 11. TALCOTT, Esq.
CARLA H.
70EIIRLE, Esq.
10850 Wilshire Boulevard
Suite 770
90024
Los Angeles, California
-and-

14

1IICIIAEL J. LIGHTFOOT, Esq.

15

1440 West Ninth Street
Los Angeles, California

90015

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24
25

MOSICIT 9. KILLION. OIC,*¢A. .P0-V3-9.

.S.R.

624

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 11
3

1
LOS ANGELES,

CALIFOaNIA;

TUESDAY,

FEB3RUARY 6,

1979;

1:45 P.tM.

2
3

THE COURT:

Good afternoon.

4

TIHE CLERK:

Item No. 3 on the calendar, crininal

5

No.

6

Rif kin.

78-1050-I1IB,

7
8

United States of America vs.

MS. STOLTZ:

Stanley Mark

Kathryne Stoltz and Brad Brian for

the government, your Honor.

9

lMR.
TALCOTT:

Good afternoon, your Honor.

Robert

10

Talcott, Carla Woehrle, Stan Rifkin available and ready to

11

proceed.

12
13

THE COURT:
speedy trial date.

All right.

I have the order on the

I will sign that.

14

Mr. Rifkin, you have read this order, have you?

15

THE DEFENDANT:

16

THIE COURT:

17

THE DEFENDANT:

18

THE COURT:

19

You have discussed it with your counsel?
Yes.

Do you have any questions about it

whatsoever?

20

THE DEFENDANT:

21

THE COURT:

22

Yes, I have, your lhonor.

Not at all.

HIave you explained it to him thoroughly,

Mr. Talcott?

23

MR. TALCOTT:

24

Til: COURT:

25

TILE DEFENDANJT:

I have.
You have signed the order?
I have.

POSCIPIT
C. KILLION. 01IL

0Kpo1r.

C.S.Ik
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1

Thll!

2

With reference to the notions to suppress,

3

COURT:

All right.

Thani: you.

It

will be filed.
is

there

anything additional anyone wants to add?

4

MS. STOLTZ:

5

MR. TALCOTT:

6

TilL COURT:

No, your H1onor.
Nothing.
These decisions are, as I mentioned to

7

you the other day,

to a large extent turning on questions of

8

cases that were not presented really by either side.

9

of the cases you mentioned the othar day,

In some

as I go through this,

10

a particular case that the government relies upon -- I don't

11

know if you have read, for instance, in the Fifth Circuit,

12

Cravero --

13

was held on rehearing, and on that proposition the court

14

changed its opinion.

15
16
17

the proposition you cited that case for, the case

Have you read that portion of the case?

MS. STOLTZ:

Your Honor, we Shepardized it but did

not discover rehearing had been granted.
TIIL COURT:

Right in

the same opinion,

18

of the sar.e opinion the rehearing is

19

says that it

20

on and found there was a valid warrant in the case.

21

granted,

the last page

and the court

made an error on the proposition that you relied

All right.

At any rate, let's start off with the

22

arrest and the search that was made pursuant to the arrest and

23

the statement made by Hr.

24
25

Rifkin at the time of that arrest.

An arrest warrant was obtained from a magistrate
in Los Angeles based upon the affidavit of Robbin C.

*089AT 9. K;LLOCN. Of,¢-e-

.. nan..

C 9..

Brown,
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That

has been the subject of

131

1

Special Agcnt of the FBI.

2

both oral argument and briefing

3

of the affidavit.

4

any source information whatsoever, as we have discussed before,

5

and

6

affidavit for some reason when it was prepared and for some

7

reason when the magistrate issued the warrant based upon it,

8

no questions were apparently asked;

9

information whatsoever.

It is

vith

respect to the

sufficiency

an affidavit that is totally void of

I think the government has partially

conceded.

The

there is no source of any

If you go through it paragraph by

10

paragraph, it is impossible to tell where Mr. Brown obtained

11

the information that is set forth in subparagraphs (a) through

12

(f),

13

name of the diamond broker, not stating the name of the

14

individual who met with 11r.

15

Rifkin allegedly exhibited the diamonds to, not stating where

16

the information was obtained from the bank, not stating whether

17

the recording had ever been listened to, not stating any

18

information whatsoever about where

19

in Switzerland, not stating how they knew the diamonds were

20

picked up -- just totally void of any information.

21

including such obvious shortcomings as not stating the

Rifkin in Los Angeles who Mr.

they heard what occurred

I have reviewed a substantial number of cases on
arrest warrants, I

22

search warrants and arrest warrants --

23

should say.

24

favor the investigating officers seeking a warrant from the

25

court and attempting

It is clear that the courts favor and should

to set forth the probable cause so the

ROBERT 9. KILL|ON. OFfICI.L .IPOT...
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1

magistrate can independently determine whether there is

2

probable cause for the arrest, and the courts do tend to

3

sustain those affidavits, but I can't find any case, nor has

4

any side, particularly the government, referred me to any case

5

where there is a total absence of the source information where

6

the warrant has been sustained.

7
8

The warrant is found to be invalid and cannot be
the basis of a legal arrest.

9

This is probably doubly so in the Ninth Circuit if
Prescott would certainly indicate that,

10

Prescott is good law.

11

in addition to the probable cause that the defendant committed

12

the crime, the warrant is going to have to show that the

13

defendant is inside a premise and probable cause or, as the

14

Fifth Circuit, I guess, tal:s about, reasonable belief that

15

the defendant is in those premises.

16

Prescott several times, not exactly sure what Prescott is

17

requiring, but we really never arrived at the Prescott question

18

because under the Supreme Court decision of Giordenello and

19

Aguilar v. Texas, there is no way to sustain the warrant.
With the warrant being invalid, the next question

20
21

comes:

22

warrant?

23
241

I am, having reread

Is there a valid arrest and valid entry without the

There is no case authority whatsoever for the
proposition that mere probable cause to arrest will allow

251 an arrest in a non-private place without a warrant.

WeOINT I. KILLION.

.cPOs,. CetA'.
S.M.
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7

1

Th

2

argument,

3

distinguished between arrest and search.

4
5
6

govern!-ent urgjed at

one titne,

not

that Cravero was authority

in

:riting

for that,

but in
that

oral

they

In the rehearing the court clearly said -- and I
will quote:
"When an officer holds a valid arrest

7

warrant and reasonably believes that the

8

subject is within the premises belonging to

9

a third party, he need not obtain a search

10

warrant to enter for the purpose of arresting

11

the suspect."

12

And they found in that case that there was a valid

13

arrest warrant and that they did have reason to believe that

14

the suspect was in the third party's premises and they had a

15

right to enter the premises based upon the valid arrest warrant.

16
17

Then the court says:
"We need not consider here the broader

18

issue which was left open by the majority

19

opinion in Watson whether or when the

20

police can lawfully make a warrantless

21

arrest in a private place."

22

So they specifically cut out and exclude the issue

23

that is controlling in this case, whether they can make a

24

warrantless arrest in a private place.

25

There is no authority for the proposition whatsoever

ROCRS

It. K-LLION. Ovrte,,u

S,,Ofl,* C

.
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1

1

that proLable cause to arrest alone allows the entry into a

2

private place or particularly into the dwelling of a third

3

party to make the arrest.

4

government first argued their case in a written brief.

5

has to be probable cause plus, and it has to be probable

6

cause plus e:cigent circumstances.

9

It

So the next question is whether there was probable

7
8

I believe this is the way the

cause, and, secondly, whether there was exigent circumstances.
I find that there was probable cause.

I also find that

10

if the affidavit for that warrant -- there was sufficient

11

probable cause -- there appears to be, anyway, from the

12

testimony and from the filings in here -- there appears that

13

there was a sufficient probable cause for that search warrant

14

if the government and the magistrate had required that the

15

agent do what is a condition precedent to the issuance of that

16

warrant, namely, giving the source.
I find that there is probable cause to arrest if the

17

The question then is:

18

arrest were made in a public place.

19

Were there sufficient exigent circumstances?
The government alleges really four types of

20

one, that Rifkin had an alleged suicidal

21

circunstarces:

22

tendency; secondly, the possibility that Rifkin might hold

23

Wolfson as a hostage;

24

fourth, the fear that Rifkin might flush the diamonds down the

25

toilet.

third, the fear that Rifkin might escape;

MONERT2. KILLION.

fC;t.

Tm

C.s..
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There is no case authority for the proposition

2

at least I don't believe there is from my analysis of the

3

cases --

4

search as an exigent circumstance to arrest?

5

the suicidal propensity, the 11olfson hostage question, and

6

the attempt really all go to the arrest.

7

diamonds goes to search.

In other words,

Flushing the

Even assuming that you can, I find no case that

8
9

Can you use an ex:igent circumstance involving a

would hold that these are exigent circumstances.

The strongest

10

case in this circuit,

11

country for the government, is the one that they rely upon,

12

Flicksinger.

13

Wallace urote the case in 1973.

14

stating three times in the opinion, that there is a very close

15

question as to exigent -- he found that the review on appeal is

16

that of whether the finding of the district court was clearly

17

erroneous.

18

two hours before the arrest of the defendants in question.

19

The court found that, while it

20

weight to the district court's finding, that there was an

21

exigent circumstance because of the fact that, the defendants'

22

being arrested, there was a high probability that they would

23

be warned of their arrest because of the previous arrest of

24

the two codefendants.

251

the strongest case probably in the

In that case there were codefedants.

Judge

He found in that case,

In that case there had been an arrest of codefendanls

was close, that they would give

That circumstance is not present here.

RO IRIT Z. KILLION. Ol,..

at- olra.

.1 A.

The cases are;
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1

clear that the agents thensclves cannot create the circum-

2

stances.

3

Here the only exigent circumstance is created when

4

the agents go to the door and ask if Rifkin is there.

5

is no indication that Rifkin believed that he was going to be

6

arrested, other than the fact that they had -- there is some

7

testimony that they had practiced what to do if they were

8

arrested sometime in the future.

9

Wolfson was going to be a hostage.

There

There was no indication that
The fear of Rifkin's escape

10

froia the premises that he was in would certainly be minimal.

11

There is no evidence that there was a weapon which could be

12

used to either harm the agents or Rifkin or any hostage.

13

I can find no authority that would hold that, under

14

the circumstances, there were exigent circumstances that

15

existed prior to the time the agents attempted to enter the

16

premises; therefore, I would find that the arrest of the

17

Rifkin was not valid.

18

being basad upon either a valid arrest warrant or warrant of

19

any kind, and not being an arrest based upon probable cause

20

coupled with exigent circumstances.

21

It was invalid, an illegal arrest, not

The next issue, then, is whether under the analysis

22

of Browm v. Illinois, as set forth by the United States

23

Supreme Court, the illegality, the taint created by the illegal

24

arrest ana illegal entry has been sufficiently attenuated

25

and has been removed to the extent that either the search or

MOlINT M.KIL*ION.

O,,¢.*.

.PO-T... C.1.-
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1

the staterient by Mr.

2

of the illegal entry or illegal arrest.

3

Rifkin can be said not to be the product

We discussed the other day the analysis in Brown.

4

We start here the same as they start in Brown with an illegal

5

arrest.

6

surrounding the arrest, are many, many tines more aggravated

7

than the facts here.

8

bad purpose, on the part of the agents.

9

effort to get a search warrant, though the search warrant is

10

The facts in Brown, as far as the circumstances

They had made the

now found to be invalid.

11

MS. STOLTZ:

12

THE COURT:

13

I do not find any substantial misconduct,

I believe you mean an arrest warrant.
Arrest warrant.

Thank you very much.

Though tLe arrest warrant is found to be invalid.
They did not use force tactics in entering the

14

I don't recall the testimony with reference to

15

apartment.

16

whether weapons were used when they entered or not, whether

17

their guns were drawn or not.

18

first as:ed ?Jr. Wolfson if they could enter and whether the

19

defendant was there and they got a response that they didn't

20

know whether he was there and thereafter made the inquiry.

21

The entry occurred after they

But the question is whether the four standards or
The issues

22

the three standards of Brown have been met.

23

discussed in Brown are the temporal proximity of the arrest

24

and the confession or search, the presence of any intervening

25

circumstances between the illegal act of the entry or the

NlODCA[TJr.KILLION. W11.1-AUl

C-IIID.€IL
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1

arrest and the search and the statcnent, and particularly

2

the purpose and flagrancy of the officials' misconduct.

3

The strongest case, I would say, for the government

4

is United States v. O'Loonev.

5

been cited.

6

again wrote the case.

7

I don't believe it has ever

It is a Ninth Circuit case in 1976.

Judge Wallace

Judge flufstedler dissented.

In that case there was an investigatory stop.

8

The court found that the arrest was legal, and after finding

9

the arrest was legal, it went on to say:

10

"Even if there was an illegal detention,

11

the post-arrest statements need not be

12

suppressed."

13

After the arrest, O'Looney was taken to the police

14

station and was given the Miranda warnings,

15

that the statements, though he gave them after the Miranda

16

warning, were the product of his illegal arrest and detention.

17

As I say, first, the court said there was not an illegal arrest

1s

and really didn't have to go any further, but they said that

19

even if there was -- they said there was a legal arrest, but

20

even if there was an illegal arrest, we will now analyze it

21

under the Brown guidelines.

22

lie then contended

Brown clearly says that the mere fact that you have

23

a Miranda warning alone is not sufficient to remove the taint.

24

The mere fact that the search or statement is voluntary is not

25

sufficient to remove the taint.
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"more" has to be in these three

2

before.

3

[Vol. II

guidclines that I mentioned

The Ninth Circuit found in O'Looney that the Fourth

4

Amendment violation was far less flagrant than it was in

5

Brown, which is true, and that several hours had passed between

6

the time of the illegal act and the time of the statement,

7

and then after they discussed several hours passed, they drop

8

a footnote, and the footnote says:

9

"Indeed, the temporal interlude in

10

O'Looney's case is of sufficient different

iI

nature as to warrant characterizing it as

12

an intervening circumstance of significance.

13

O'Looney waited in an interrogation room for

14

over an hour after the initial questioning by

15

the local detective before the ATF agents

16

arrived.

17

this time, and he was free to reflect on the

18

situation or to call his attorney."

19

The case found that there was sufficient change in

20

circumstances intervening, intervening circumstances, and it

21

found that there was sufficient temporal lapse between the

22

illegal act and the confession.

23

He was not questioned at all during

In a case decided, again not cited, in 1977 after

24

O'Looney -- this time Judge Hufstedler was writing the

25

majority rather than the dissent, as she had dissented in

RODEtNT E. KILLION. OFFICIA.
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and she finds that you have an illegal arrest, arnd

1

O'Looney,

2

then the defendant is

3

arrested and taken to the Police Department and then given his

4

warning, that even that is not sufficient.

taken from the premises where he is

She states:

"The fact that Sanudo was given the

5
6

Miranda warning before he made his

7

incriminating statements at the

8

headquarters does not renove the taint.'

9

Then she cites from Brown, saying:
"The Miranda warnings by themselves are

10
21

not sufficient."

12

Then she states:
"We conclude -- "

13

The "we" does not include Chief Judge Chambers, who

14
15

dissented.

She says:

16

"We conclude that the government did not

17

meet the heavy burden placed upon it to prove

18

that Sanudo's statements were not the products

19

of the illegal arrest at his home on the

20

evening of November 20th.

21

consider the evidence ir. the light most favor-

22

able to the government, the record will,

Although we

nevertheless, not support the ruling of the
district court."
24
25

I might also state that the same rule applies to

I
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1

searches as applies to statements.

2

United States v. Bazinet, an Eighth Circuit case, that states

3

that the government has a heavy burden of proof in establishing

4

that the consent, the consent to a search, was the voluntary

5

act of the arrestee and was not the fruit of the illegal arrest

That has bccn held in

6

It is also cited in 1cCalleb v. United States.

7

In the Duncan case, which is the other case relied

a

upon by the government, which was the case involving the

9

fingerprints of the minor and the illegal act was subpoenaing

10

the minor in to have the fingerprints taken -- the court found

11

that two days lapsed, Judge Hufstedler writing it again --

12

Per Curiam, with Judge Hufstedler and Browning on the court --

13

that two lays lapsed from the time of the illegal act until

14

the time of the obtaining of the information from the defendant

15

and they found that the temporal -- well, they also found that

16

the acts of the government were not flagrant.

17

tlie temporal lapse was sufficient to remove the taint.

18

They found that

There is no case that has ever held that any search,

19

be it consented to or not, or any statement, be it voluntary

20

or not, even after a Miranda warning that is given immediately

21

-- given or taken immediately after the illegal act, the

22

arrest or the entry, is admissible.

23

search or the statement immediately followed or followed within

24

a matter of minutes the illegal act, the courts have rejected

25

the utilization of those statements or the fruits of the search I

1i
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1

I find, therefore, that the statement made by

2

Rifkin in the apartment following his illegal arrest --

3

that the motion to suppress is granted, and that statement

4

will be suppressed from evidence.

5

I find

As to the search that occurred subsequent to that

6

arrest in the Wolfson apartment, I find that that search cannot

7

meet the requirements of Brown, and the products of that

8

search are suppressed.

9

The next question is the search that occurred --

10

I might also state that on the money, the search for the money,

11

the same ruling is true.

12

with the search for the money, because under the heavy burden

13

of the gcvernment under Brown, that is not as clear a consented

14

to search as is the search for the diamonds.

15
16

As to the search the following day --

Was it the

following day?

17

MR. TALCOTT:

18

THE COURT:

19

search warrant --

20

complete record.

21

I would find that even more so

Yes.
-- the following day as a result of the

Let me go back one step so you can have a

I do not find that there was a violation of any

22

attorney-client privilege or intrusion into the Sixth

23

Amendment rights of the defendant by the FBI or by the

24

government.

25

for the invalidation of the warrant or the searches or the

I do not find that that is a basis or grounds

ROIERT 9. KILLION. Of*¢,AL .(.O.,(.
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1

statement made.

2

As to the search warrant, now, that was executed in

3

San Diego, I would find that the search warrant is based upon

4

the fruits of the illegal search from the evening before.

5

I believe the government conceded the other day, if I am

6

right, Ms. Stoltz, that if the warrant was invalid, the search

7

was invalid at the time of the arrest, then the search warrant

8

was invalid.

9

MS. STOLTZ:

10

THE COURT:

That's correct, your Honor.
All right.

The search warrant being

11

invalid, the search that took place the day following the

12

arrest, the fruits of that search and the matters obtained in

13

that search that the government intended to use in evidence

14

are suppressed.

15

As to the statement of Mr. Rifkin that he gave to

16

the FBI following his release on bond and at the FBI building

17

when he was copying down the addresses from his address book,

18

while the record could be clearer as to what fir. Rifkin's

19

statements may have been with his attorney and whether his

20

attorney had knowledge of the fact that Rifkin was going

21

to the F3I building, it is clear that Rifkin initiated the

22

contact with the FBI.

23

agents did the appropriate thing by contacting the Assistant

24

United States Attorney for obtaining advice as to what to do.

25

Rifkin was allowed to come to the FBI office.

It is not a Massiah problem.

ROBERT 1. KILLION. IN,-
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--

Brown.

Agent Brown.

-- Agent Brown said that he brought the

4

other agent into the room for the dual purpose of watching the

5

exhibits and also being a witness to anything that might be

6

said.

7

very willing listeners, but I do not find that they violated

8

the Sixth Amendment rights or the Fifth Amendment rights of

9

Mr. Rifkin.

I would find that, at the very least, the agents were

14r. Rifkin volunteered those statements; he was

10

the one who arranged for the meeting; he was the one who

11

entered into the conversations.

12

was probing or questioning by the Bureau agents who were

13

present.

14

Rifkin, as I say, volunteered the statements that

15

he did make.

16

denied on those statements.

17

It does not appear that there

I do not suppress.

The motion to suppress is

I would like to make it clear that even if those

18

statements are subject to a stipulation, I reserve the right

19

to rule on the materiality or relevancy or probative value

20

of those statements.

21

constitutional violation in

22

or in the hearing of those statements by the FBI.

2I
24
25

I am just holding that there was not a
the taking of those statements

think that covers them all.

W~here do we stand now

on the stipulations?
MS. STOLTZ:

Your Honor, we will still be in the

60|CRT C. KILLON. Of-1.1
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I would say that far more than

1

process of preparing them.

2

half of them have been conpleted.
Is the time schedtle still satisfactory

THE COURT:
4

with the government?

5

MS. STOLTZ:

6

MR. TALCOTT:

For the time being, yes, your Honor.
We may request a day or two more,

7

your Honor, after we receive them to review them and make the

8

appropriate objections.
THE COURT:

9
10

I think we moved it one day, didn't

we, or did we move it two?
MS. STOLTZ:

11
12

It is now set for next Wednesday.

Let me see the book, please.

I believe they are due on Monday at

noon, and the trial was set for Wednesday.
Wednesday?

13

THE COURT:

14

MS. STOLTZ:

15

THE COURT:

16

size of the reading material?

17

I can get enough time to read them.
MS. STOLTZ:

18

Wednesday at 9:30.
How long do you anticipate now, in the
I can give you another day if

Well, there will be 21 stipulations.

19

A lot of them will incorporate portions of the exhibits which

20

will make it necessary to go through the exhibits in great

21

detail.

22

I would estimate, your Honor, a hundred pages.
M1R. TALCOTT:

Your Honor, we are going to need time

23

once we receive these hundred pages to go over them and

24

especially in light of the court's rulings today.

251

that some of the material contained in those stipulations --
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material contained in those
1' I am not sure of some of the
2
3
4

stipulations.
TilE COURT:

What were your time estimates again on

the trial, a half day?

5

MS. STOLTZ:

6

MR. TALCOTT:

7

THE COURT:

8

Thursday, the 15th.

9

your stipulations.

A half day, your Honor.
Yes, your Honor.
I will move it one day.

You can do it

That will give you until Tuesday to file

10

MR. TALCOTT:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. TALCOTT:

That is at 9:30, your Honor?
That would be at 9:30.
Your Honor, there is one other matter.

13

When the court said, "Is there anything further," we had made

14

a request and submitted to the court through the clerk a case

15 which stood for the proposition that we were entitled to the
the
16 regulation upon which the government relied in placing
again
17 phone monitoring in Mr. Paul O'Brien's home, and we would
18 request that we be made available those regulations.
19

THE COURT:

20

MS. STOLTZ:

Is that being used in the case?
Your Honor, I think that is a question that

21 is still open, in light of the court's ruling today, meaning
22 that we had not planned to use it if we had the confession.
23
24

ut I think that decision has to be reevaluated.
THE COURT:

All right.

If it is going to be used,

25, an you arid ltr. Talcott advise Mr. Janisch, and we will hav,!
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it for sometime later this week for a hearing on that,

1

to set

2

because the government hasn't had the opportunity to respond

3

at all.

4

than somebody handing up a xerox copy of a case.

As a matter of fact, there hasn't been a motion other

That's correct, your Honor.

5

MR. TALCOTT:

6

MS. STOLTZ:

7

that decision in the next day.

8

THE COURT:

9
10
11

I believe we can make

Yes, your Honor.

All right.

On the stipulated facts, are

there any stipulated facts that, though agreed they are facts,
raise questions of admissibility?
MS. STOLTZ:

Your Honor, although the stipulation --

12

this is one stipulation that is not written yet and has besn

13

brought to my attention, that there is another attorney in the

14

case by the name of Garry Goodgame, who was the attorney for

15

Mr. Rifkin's corporation, that the defense is going to raise

16

the attorney-client privilege as to portions of his testimony.
MR. TALCOTT:

17

That would be correct with respect

18

to Mr. Goodgame, who is an attorney in Los Angeles, and,

19

of course, with respect to Mr. O'Brien, if they intend to

20

use any communications, we would interpose an attorney-client

21

privilege.

22
23

Has Goodgame -- Goodgane, I assume,

TiE COURT:

has given sone information?

24

MR. TALCOTT:

25

THE COURT:

Yes, he has.
Already?
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1
2
3

IR. TALCOTT:

Yes, he has.

le was very instrumental

in the course of the investigation, your Honor.
THE COURT:

I think we had better set this for anothe

4

status conference sometime this week when you get the stipula-

5

tions completed, because if we are going to have a hearing,

6

for instance, on the admissibility and the attorney-client

7

privilege, we are going to need more time and you are going to

8

have to have witnesses here.

9

MR. TALCOTT:

Can we have that next Tuesday?

If the

10

government is not going to complete the stipulations until

11

next Tuesday --

12
13

It sounds pretty late.

THE COURT:
available Friday?

14

MS. STOLTZ:

15

MR. TALCOTT:

16

Are you both

Yes, your Honor.
Yes, your Honor.

The question is

whether those stipulations will be available at that time.
What do you think?

17

THE COURT:

18

MS. STOLTZ:

Your Honor, we can have them finished.

19

How much time the defense counsel will have to review them

20

may be part that may cause a problem.

21

a3
my mind that they can be completed; it's just a question

22

to how much time Mr. Talcott will have had to analyze them.

23
24
25

There is no question in

We can set it for Monday afternoon.

THE COURT:

That at least gives you the weekend.
11R.TALCOTT

That would be better, your Honor.
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1

TJE COURT:

2

MR. TALCOTT:

3

THE COURT:

4

That might not be enough time.

All right.

Let's make it --

Could we make it at 3:30, your Honor?
There is a judges' meeting at 4:00.

5

MR. TALCOTT:

6

THE COURT:

Let's make it at 3:00.

3:00 is fine.
If there is any possibility

All right.

7

that the case is not going to go forward, if the government

8

is going to be asking for a continuance in any way, unless you

9

have made that decision --

10

MS. STOLTZ:

11

THE COURT:

12
13
14
15

Have you made your decision yet?

That decision has not been made.
Let us know as soon as possible.

Do you

know when your decision will be made on that?
MS. STOLTZ:

Your Honor, it should be made, I would

say, in two or three days at the outside.
Then if there is going to be a request

THE COURT:

16

on behalf of the government, let the defendants know and we

17

will set a hearing sometime later this week to see what we will

18

do with that.

19

MS. STOLTZ:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. TALCOTT:

22

THE COURT:

23

MS. STOLTZ:

24

MR. TALCOTT:

Yes, your Honor.
Anything additional?

All right.

Nothing additional.
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
Thank you, your Honor.

25
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1
1

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA; THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1979; 9:40 A.MJ.

2
3

THE CLERK:

Item No. 2 on the calendar, Criminal

4

Action No. 78-1050-WMB, United States of America v.

5

Mark Rifkin.

6
7
8
9
10

MS. STOLTZ:

Good morning, your Honor.

Stanley

Kathryne

Stoltz for the government.
MR. TALCOTT:

Good morning, your Honor.

Michael

Lightfoot, Carla Woehrle, Robert Talcott, and the defendant
Stanley Mark Rifkin present in court and ready to proceed.

11

THE COURT:

Counsel.

12

MR. TALCOTT:

Your Honor, this is the time set for

13

trial of this matter, and, with the Court's permission, th-!

14

defendant would respectfully request to withdraw his earlier

15

plea of not guilty to Counts Two and Three of the indictment

16

and enter a plea of guilty to those charges.

17

Mr. Rifkin, will you come forward, please.

18

THE COURT::

19

THE DEFENDANT:

20

THE COURT:

21

MS. STOLTZ:

Is that your desire, Mr. Rifkin?
Yes, your Honor.

The government's intentions are what?
Your Honor, it is the government's

22

intentions to move to dismiss the remaining counts at the time

23

of sentencing, and an agreement has also been reached whereby

24

the government will not prosecute Mr. Rifkin on the subsequent

25

case on which he was arrested, although we may present evidence
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of that at the time of sentencing.
THE COURT:

I will get to the agreement in a moment,

but there will be a dismissal of the other counts?
MS. STOLTZ:
THE COURT:

Yes.
The motion to withdraw the previously

entered not-guilty plea to Counts Two and Three is granted.
Is Stanley Mark Rifkin your true and correct name?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Mr. Rifkin, how do you now plead to

Count Two of the indictment, guilty or not guilty?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Guilty, your Honor.

How do you now plead to Count Three of

the indictment, guilty or not guilty?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Guilty, your Honor.

Mr. Rifkin, I am going to ask you some

questions to determine whether you actually are guilty of the
offenses you are pleading guilty to and also to determine
whether your pleas of guilty are freely and voluntarily being
entered.

Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

I want to advise you again of your right

to a speedy and public trial by jury, the right to see and
hear the evidence presented against you and to cross-examine
any witnesses that the government may call.
You have the right to request this Court to compel

mI,.T
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1

the attendance of any witnesses that you may desire in your

2

own behalf, and you have the right to have counsel at all

3

stages of the proceedings.

4

THE DEFENDANT:

5

THE COURT:

Do you understand that?
Yes, your Honor.

Under the Fifth Amendment of the United

6

States Constitution you cannot be compelled to incriminate

7

yourself.

Do you understand that?

8

THE DEFENDANT:

9

THE COURT:

Yes.

In other words, you don't have to answer

I0

any questions that anybody asks you about any of the facts or

11

circumstances surrounding these charges.

12

that?

13

THE DEFENDANT:

14

THE COURT:

15

silent.

Do you understand

Yes.

You have an absolute right to remain

Do you understand that?

16

THE DEFENDANT:

17

THE COURT:

Yes.

When you plead guilty, though, in orier

18

for me to determine whether there is a basis in fact for your

19

plea of guilty, in other words, whether you actually are guilty

20

of the offense, I am going to be asking you some questions,

21

and when you answer those questions you will be incriminating

22

yourself.

Do you understand that?

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24

THE COURT:

25

Yes, your Honor.

And the government could at some

subsequent time use those statements against you.
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1

understand that?

2

THE DEFENDANT:

3

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

So in order to plead guilty you will

4

be waiving your right against self-incrimination.

5

understand that?

6

THE DEFENDANT:

7

THE COURT:

8

THE

9

THE COURT:

Do you

Yes, your Honor.

Is that what you want to do?

DEFENDANT:

Yes, your Honor.

If this case goes to trial you don't

I0

have to prove that you are innocent; it is the obligation of

11

the government to prove that you are guilty and to prove that

12

beyond a reasonable doubt.

13

THE DEFENDANT:

14

THE COURT:

Do you understand?
Yes, your Honor.

Now, if I accept your pleas of guil':y

15

to these counts, all those rights I told you about, you waive

16

and give up.

17

aren't going to be any witnesses called; the government doesn't

18

have to prove anything.

19

both of those counts, and the only thing left in the case is

20

of
for me to sentence you, and that sentence could consist

21

time in the penitentiary.

You are admitting you are guilty to

THE DEFENDANT:

22
23

There is not going to be any trial; there

Do you understand that?
Yes, youL Honor.

I waive those

rights.
Do you still want to plead guilty?

24

THE COURT:

25

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, your Honor.
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2

THE COURT:

Have you discussed this case fully and

completely with your attorneys?

3

THE DEFENDANT:

4

THE COURT:

5

Indeed.

Have you kept anything back from them at

all?

6

THE DEFENDANT:

7

THE COURT:

Not at all.

Have you discussed with your attorneys

8

the nature of the charges against you in Counts Two and

9

Three of the indictment?

10

THE DEFENDANT:

11

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Have you discussed with your attorneys

12

any possible defenses that you might have to the charges in

13

Counts Two and Three of the indictment?

14

THE DEFENDANT:

15

THE COURT:

Yes.

Do you understand that when you plead

16

guilty, youa waive and give up forever the opportunity of

17

raising any defenses whatsoever?

18

ment, incompetency, insanity, use of drugs, use of narcotics

19

any imaginable defense that you might have when you plead

20

guilty, you waive and give that up forever.

21

that?

22

THE DEFENDANT:

23

THE COURT:

24

THE DEFENDAN]T:

25

THE COURT:

Now, that includes entrap-

Do you understand

Yes, your Honor.

Is that what you want to do?
Yes, your Honor.

During the course of the pretrial

RODCRT
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1

proceedings here you raised certain issues with reference to

2

the admissibility of evidence and moved to suppress certain

3

matters, and also certain motions to dismiss were filed and

4

then withdrawn, and certain issues were reserved to be

5

resolved at the time of trial.

6

THE DEFENDANT:

7

THE COURT:

Do you recall those?

Yes, your Honor.

In some instances rulings were given

8

in your favor; in some instances rulings were given against

9

you, and in some instances the matter was kept in abeyance

10

until trial.

Do you understand?

11

THE DEFENDANT:

12

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Now, when you plead guilty, you never

13

again get a chance to raise those issues.

14

that?

15

THE DEFENDANT:

16

THE COURT:

Do you understand

Yes, your Honor.

And when you plead guilty you give up

17

your right to appeal any of the rulings that I made adverse

18

to you.

Do you understand?

19

THE DEFENDANT:

20

THE COURT:

21

THE DEFENDANT:

22

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Is that what you want to do?
Yes, your Honor.

Did you discuss with your attorneys any

23

of your
searches that were made of you or of your person or

24

that wculd
property or any searches that resulted in evidence

25

be used against you?

RODIERTK. KILLION,
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1

THE DEFENDANT:

2

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Did you tell them all the facts and

3

circumstances that you were aware of with reference to those

4

searches?

5

THE DEFENDANT:

6

THE COURT:

Definitely.

Did you discuss with your attorneys any

7

statements that you may have made to any law enforcement

8

officials during their investigation of this case or after

9

your arrest?

10

THE DEFENDANT:

21

THE COURT:

12

Yes, I did, your Honor.

Did you tell them all the facts and

circumstances surrounding those statements?

13

THE DEFENDANT:

14

THE COURT:

Completely.

Have you discussed with your attornes

15

the effect and consequences of your plea of guilty, in other

16

words, what happens

17

you waive and give up when you plead guilty?

18

to you when you plead guilty and what

THE DEFENDANT:

My understanding is that I waive the

19

rights which you have mentioned and that I could face a

20

sentence on each count of five years in prison and a thousand-

21

dollar fine and that you could run those consecutively so I

22

would face ten years in prison and a $2,000 fine.

23
24

THE COURT:

At this time I am attempting to focus

on the rights that you give up.

Did you discuss those with

251 your attorneys?

MOSipT
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Yes, I did.

1

THE DEFENDANT:

2

THE COURT: Did they tell you substantially the same

3

as I have, as to what the effect of your plea of guilty is

4

with reference to any rights you might have?

5

THE DEFENDANT:

6

THE COURT:

7

Do you know the maximum penalty provided

by law to the offense in Count Two?

8

THE DEFENDANT:

9

THE COURT:

Yes, I do, your Honor.

It is what?

THE DEFENDANT:

10
,,

Precisely the same, your Honor.

Five years in prison and a thousand-

dollar fine.

12

THE COURT:

Mrs. Stoltz?

13

MS. STOLTZ:

Yes, your Honor.

That is as to ea:h

14

count, and, as the defendant mentioned, it may be run conse-

15

cutively.
The sentence for Count Three is identical.

16

THE COURT:

17

THE DEFENDANT:

18

THE COURT:

19

That is correct.

It is your understanding that the maximum

penalty is ten years in prison and a $2,000 fine or both?
That is correct.

20

THE DEFENDANT:

21

THE COURT:

22

THE DEFENDANT:

23

THE COURT:

24

you in any other jurisdiction?

25

How old are you, sir?
Thirty-three years old.

Do you have any charges pending against

THE DEFENDANT:

No, I don't.

ROME[T 9. KILLION. O
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2

You have some charge pending against you

THE COURT:

1

in this jurisdiction; is that correct?

3

THE DEFENDANT:

4

THE COURT:

5

In this federal court for the Central

District of California?

6

THE DEFENDANT:

7

THE COURT:

8

I believe that is correct.

That resulted from your arrest in the

last two weeks?
THE DEFENDANT:

9

That is correct.

Are there any other charges that you are

THE COURT:

10
11

1 believe that is correct.

aware of that are pending against you?

12

THE DEFENDANT:

13

MR. TALCOTT:

None at all.
Your Honor, if the Court is referring

14

to charges, there is an arrest complaint that has not gone

15

any further.
THE COURT:

16

I am using it in the broadest possible

Do you understand that of the two five-year

17

sense.

18

sentences available here, those can run consecutive -Yes.

19

THE DEFENDANT:

20

THE COURT:

21

THE DEFENDANT:

22

THE COURT: -- years.

23

I don't know what will happen with the other case.

-- to make the maximum penalty ten -Yes.

24

The governnent made some statement about it, but do you under-

25

stand that any sentence you get here can run consecutive to

POSRT 9. KILLAOONoN.t
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1

and in addition to any sentence that you get in any other case?

2

THE DEFENDANT:

3

THE COURT:

4

THE DEFENDANT:

5

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Do you understand that?
Yes.

Now, if you are committed to the custody

6

of the Attorney

General, there is a Board of Parole or

7

a Parole Commission that will decide if and when you are to be

8

released.

Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:

9

THE COURT:

10

Yes, your Honor.

The Board of Parole operates under

11

certain guidelines and salient factors that they consider

12

when someone should be released.

13

THE DEFENDANT:

14

THE COURT:

15

Do you understand that?

Yes.

Have you discussed those with your

attorneys?

16

THE DEFENDANT:

17

THE COURT:

Yes.

I want you to understand that the Board

18

of Parole can change those at their will, absolutely any time

19

they want.

20

will be the same today as they will be when and if you are

21

in the penitentiary.

You have no rights that attach that the guidelines

Do you understand that?

22

THE DEFENDANT:

23

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

So if you are pleading guilty because you

24

think that the guidelines that are in effect now or the

25

consider
factors that the Parole Commission or Parole Board may
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1

now will be the same in the future, don't plead guilty for

2

that reason.

Do you understand that?

3

THE DEFENDANT:

4

THE COURT:

Your Honor, the plea of guilty --

Go ahead, Mr. Rifkin.

You may say what

You are the one who is pleading guilty.

If

5

you want.

6

anybody is going to the penitentiary, it will be you and not

7

anybody else.

8
9

THE DEFENDANT:

Those factors didn't motivate me to

plead guilty, your Honor.
All right.

10

THE COURT:

11

that those factors can change?

12

THE DEFENDANT:

13

THE COURT:

14

You do understand, though,

Of course.

Has anyone made any threats against

you or any member of your family to get you to plead guilty?

15

THE DEFENDANT:

16

THE COURT:

Not at all.

Has anyone made any promises of leniency

17

or a partizular type of sentence or some other concession on

18

the part of the government in order to get you to plead guilty?

19

THE DEFENDANT:

20

THE COURT:

21
22
23

No, your Honor, not at all.

What is the arrangement between the

government and the defense?
MS. STOLTZ:

Your Honor, it is that the government

indictment
ill move to dismiss the remaining counts in this

was a superseding
and also the underlying indictment, since this
251 2 indictment, and that the government will not proceed against
24
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1

Mr. Rifkin in the new case for which he was arrested approxi-

2

mately a week ago, but that we will ask the Court to consider

3

that evidence at the time of sentencing, but he will not be

4

prosecuted on that case, and there are no other agreements or

5

promises in connection with his plea of guilty.
Mr. Talcott?

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. TALCOTT:

That is my understanding, your Honor.

No further promises or agreements were

8

Nothing further.

9

entered into between the government and the defense counsel.

11

Is there anything else that the defendant

THE COURT:

10
has to do?

No, your Honor.

12

MS.

13

MR. TALCOTT:

14

THE COURT:

15

Mr. Rifkin, you have heard what Miss Stoltz said

16

STOLTZ:

No, your Honor.
All right.

as far as agreements between your attorney and the government.

17

THE DEFENDANT:

18

THE COURT:

19

Do you think there is any other agreement

whatsoever?

20

THE DEFENDANT:

21

THE COURT:

22

No.

Has anyone told you there is some private

agreement that you are not going to tell me about?

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24

THE COURT:

251

Yes, I have.

No.

Do you have any idea that there is some

agreement other than or different in any way from that which
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1

Mr. Talcott and Mliss Stoltz just set forth?

2

THE DEFENDANT:

3

TilE COURT:

4

Not at all.

Do you understand that I am not a party

to any agreement whatsoever?

5

THE DEFENDANT:

6

THE COURT:

I understand that.

If the government wants to dismiss some

7

of the counts that they brought, they can dismiss it.

8

they don't want to indict you, they can do that.

9

stand that?

10

THE DEFENDANT:

ii

THE COURT:

If

Do you under-

Yes.

The mere fact that you are pleading

12

guilty to two counts rather than all the counts isn't in any

13

way going to affect --

14

by not having the maximum number of years available, but it

15

doesn't in my mind mean that you were or were not involved in

16

the other counts.

Well, I guess it would affect it

Do you understand that?

17

THE DEFENDANT:

18

THE COURT:

Yes, I do, your Honor.

Incidentally, do you understand that

19

if you are confined and when the Parole Board goes to consider

20

whether you will be released, that they may consider counts

21

which were dropped by the government?

22

THE DEFENDANT:

23

THE COURT:

Do you understand that?

Yes, your Honor.

In other words, there are counts in the

24

indictment charging different offenses that the government will

25

dismiss, but the Board of Parole may consider those to determinj

I

OSERT 9. KfLLION.

c,.

m.o
---

Cm

..

[Vol. II

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

660

16
1

whether you should be released or not.

2

that?

3

THE DEFENDANT:

4

THE COURT:

Do you understand

Yes, your Honor.

They also may consider charges that were

5

not formalized against you; in other words, you have a

6

complaint against you now.

7

the Board of Parole can consider that as a fact as to when

8

you should be released.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT:

9

Yes, your Honor.

Has anyone told you what actual sentence

THE COURT:

10

If the government doesn't indict,

ii

you would get, in other words, what sentence I am going to

12

give you?
THE DEFENDANT:

13
14

Is your plea of guilty freely and volun-

THE COURT:
tarily being entered?

17

THE DEFENDANT:

18

THE COURT:

19

Yes, it is.

Do you have the indictment in front of

you?

20

THE DEFENDANT:

21

THE COURT:

22

I understood that was

entirely in your discretion, your decision, your Honor.

15
16

Not at all.

Yes, I do, your Honor.

Let's turn to Count Two.

It reads:

"Beginning on or about the month of June,

23

1978, and continuing to on or about October

24

28, 1978, within the Central District of

251

California and elsewhere, defendant Stanley
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1

Mark Rifkin devised and intended to devise a

2

scheme and artifice to defraud Security

3

Pacific National Bank and to obtain money

4

and property by means of false and fraudulent

5

pretenses and representations knowing at the

6

time that such pretenses and representations

7

were made that they were false and fraudulent.

8

"It was part of said scheme and

9

artifice to defraud that defendant Rifkin

10

would and did contact a diamond broker in

11

Los Angeles, California, to negotiate a

12

large purchase of diamonds for the defendant

13

in Geneva, Switzerland.

14

"It was a further part of said

15

scheme and artifice to defraud that you would

16

and did make various false and fraudulent

17

representations to the diamond broker to

18

induce him to act on your behalf, knowing

19

that said representations were false and

20

fraudulent when made, including, but not

21

limited to, the representation that you were

22

acting on behalf of a major American corpora-

23

tion who wanted to purchase a large quantity

24

of diamonds.

25

-Fourth, it was a further part of said

nOSCinT I. KILLIONd.W,-

..

L

662

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. H

18
1

scheme and artifice to defraud that you would

2

and did gain access to the wire transfer room

3

of the Security Pacific National Bank at

4

333 South Hope Street, Los Angeles, California,

5

by false pretenses.

6

room, you obtained secret codes used to authorize

7

the wire transfer of funds from the bank.

Once in the wire transfer

8

"Fifth, it was a further part of said

9

scheme and artifice to defraud that you would

10

and did make various false representations in

11

telephone calls to employees of Security

12

Pacific National Bank knowing said representa-

13

tions to be false and fraudulent when made,

14

including, but not limited to, the following:

15

"that you were Mike Hanson from the

16

International Department of Security Pacific

17

National Bank;

18

"that you were authorized to request

19

a wire transfer of 10.2 million dollars from

20

Security Pacific National Bank to an account

21

in Zurich, Switzerland, via a bank in New

22

York, the Irving Trust Company."

23

The sixth paragraph charges:

24
25

"it was a further part of said scheme
and artifice to defraud that you would and
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1

did cause Security Pacific National Bank to

2

wire transfer 10.2 million dollars in inter-

3

state and foreign comrerce from Los Angeles,

4

California, to the Irving Trust Company in

5

New York for credit to an account in Zurich,

6

Switzerland.

7

"It was a further part of said scheme

8

and artifice to defraud that you would and

9

did cause the diamond broker to travel to

10

Geneva, Switzerland, and to purchase approxi-

11

mately 8,639.84 carats of polished diamonds

12

from Russalmaz, an entity which handles

13

the export of diamonds from the Soviet Union.

14

"Eight, it was a further part of said

15

scheme and artifice to defraud that you would

16

and did cause $8,145,000 of the money which

17

had been wire transferred from the Security

is

Pacific National Bank to be used to pay

19

Russalmaz for the approximately 8,639.84 carats

20

of diamonds."

21

The last charge reads:

22

"On or about October 14, 1978, within

23

the Central District of California, for the

24

purpose of executing the above scheme and

25

artifice to defraud and to obtain money by

RODCAT C. KILLION.
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1

false and fraudulent pretenses, you did

2

knowingly and willfully cause to be transmitted

3

in interstate and foreign commerce by means

4

of wire and radio communication certain signs,

5

signals, pictures, and sounds, that is, that

6

you caused Western Union to send a cablegram

7

from Van Nuys, California, to Ruzzalmaz in

8

Geneva, Switzerland, purportedly from Security

9

Pacific Bank indicating that their representa-

10

tive had access to 10 million dollars to

11

purchase diamonds of a specified size and

12

quality."

13

Are you guilty of that offense?

14

THE DEFENDANT:

15

THE COURT:

16

THE DEFENDANT:

17

THE COURT:

18
19

Yes.

Did you commit those acts?
Yes.

Tell me what you did and start back when

you put the scheme together.
THE DEFENDANT:

Well, I developed a plan to have

20

money transferred from a bank in Los Angeles to a bank in

21

New York to purchase precious stones.

22

1HE COURT:

This indictment charges that the scheme

23

was devised between June and October of 1978.

24

first put the scheme together in your mind?

25

THE DEFENDANT:

R0o090

When did you

In all truth, I don't think I could
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1

say.
Was it during that period?

2

THE COURT:

3

THE DEFENDANT:

4

THE COURT:

5

THE DEFENDANT:

6

How did it come about?
I'm sorry; I don't understand the

question.
How did the scheme come about?

THE COURT:

7
8

I would say that, yes.

How

did you devise the scheme?
THE DEFENDANT:

9

The firm with whom I was employed put

10

into

implemented a system for Security National Bank

ii

which

12

their wire room in the event there was a failure in the

13

primary system.

14

system, and in the course of my work I interviewed a number

---

Security Pacific National Bank which would automate

My -- there was no specification of that

of individuals in the room to fird out how the system worked
16

so we could supply a system in case the primary system didn't

17

work.

18
19

THE COURT:
did that work?

All right.

What did you do after ycu

Was it then that you devised this scheme?

20

THE DEFENDANT:

21

THE COURT:

22

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.

What was the scheme that you devised?
It was to have money transferred

23

from a Los Angeles bank to the New York bank to buy precious

24

stones, and I contacted the diamond broker -- well, a gem

251

broker to arrange the purchase, and then I called the bank and
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1
2

led them to believe I had the authority to make such a transfer
THE COURT:

Before we get to what you did, what

3

exactly was the scheme, though, from beginning to end?

4

did you intend to profit in the end from the scheme?

5
6
7
8
9

THE DEFENDANT:

How

I could describe the scheme, but

I'm not sure I knew how I was going to profit.
THE COURT:

Let's describe the scheme and then we

will see where --

THE DEFENDANT:

The idea was to transfer the money

10

from one bank to another for the credit of a seller of

11

diamonds and then simply to collect the diamonds so that one

12

would have, in principal, the asset. in the form of diamonds.

13
14

THE COURT:

At the conclusion of the scheme you

would have the diamonds; is that correct?

15

THE DEFENDANT:

16

THE COURT:

17

THE DEFENDANT:

18

THE COURT:

19
20
21

Yes.

To do what you wanted with them?
That is correct.

After you devised this scheme, what

steps did you take to carry it out?
THE DEFENDANT:

Well, I did approximately three thing

First, I contacted the diamond broker --

22

THE COURT: Who was the diamond broker?

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24

THE COURT:

25

THE DEFENDANT:

His name?

Lon Stein.

Where was he?
In Los Angeles.

--.
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Was your contact in person or by phone?

1

THE COURT:

2

THE DEFENDANT:

3

THE COURT:

4

Let me ask you this.

5

in cerson?

What was said in the first conversation?
Was the first conversation by phone or

6

THE DEFENDANT:

7

THE COURT:

8

THE DEFENDANT:

9

THE COURT:

11

THE COURT:

12

THE DEFENDANT:

13

THE COURT:

14

THE DEFENDANT:

Do you recall the name?

THE COURT:

was impossible.

diamonds?

19

THE COURT:

Yes.

Did you tell him what you wanted the

diamonds for?

21

THE DEFENDANT:

22

THE COURT:

25ji

We discussed purchase in the amount

Purchasing ten million dollars of

THE DEFENDANT:

24

Yes, Laserre, L-a-s-e-r-r-e.

All right.

18

23

In Encino -- Sherman Oiks.

of ten million dollars, and he said it

16

20

We had lunch at a restaurant.

Where was that?

THE DEFENDANT:

17

In person.

Where did you meet with him?

10

15

Both.

No.

Did you tell him who you were represent-

ing?
THE DEFENDANT:

No.

I don't think -- I believe --

I may have said I was representing a large American corporation.

0O0E1T
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THE COURT:

1

You sat down with this fellow you had

2

never met before and said you wanted ten million dollars' worthl

3

of diamonds?

4

THE DEFENDANT:

5

THE COURT:

6

THE DEFENDANT:

7

THE COURT:

8

Yes.

What did you tell him your name was?
Stan Rifkin.

Did he inquire of you at all as to where

you were going to get the money to buy these diamonds?
I would say not very much.

THE DEFENDANT:

9

What did he say?

10

THE COURT:

11

THE DEFENDANT:

How would you -- were he to arrange

12

such a purchase, he didn't want his credibility damaged.

13

He would have to know the money existed.
THE COURT:

14
15

make the purchase?
Oh, no, absolutely not.

THE DEFENDANT:

16

THE COURT:

17
18

Did you tell him where you wanted to

Just that you wanted to buy ten million

dollars worth of diamonds?

19

THE DEFENDANT:

20

THE COURT:

21

Yes.

You wanted him to get the diamonds for

you?
I wanted him -- he is a broker.

22

THE DEFENDANT:

23

wanted him to negotiate the deal.
How did the conversation conclude?

24

THE COURT:

25

THE DEFENDANT:

NOil

It was impossible.
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THE COURT:

J
2

Was that the end of the conversation that

first time?

3

THE DEFENDANT:

4

THE COURT:

5

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.

When did you next talk to him?
I would say perhaps a week later.

6

I tried to find out the facts of why it was impossible, and

7

it seemed that our conversations were basically my trying

8

to find out why it was impossible and his not being able to

9

find out why it was impossible, and it seemed that as he

10

tried to explain he opened up new avenues, additional avenues

11

he had not hitherto considered.
THE COURT:

12

Between the time that you talked to him

,3

in the first conversation and the second conversation, did

14

you do anything else in furtherance of your scheme?

15

THE DEFENDANT:

16

THE COURT:

17

Oh, no.

In your second conversation with him did

he tell you why he thought it was impossible?

18

THE DEFENDANT:

19

THE COURT:

20

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.

What did he tell you?
Just the quantity was too large;

21

it couldn't be done in either a single transaction or even a

22

small number of large transactions.
THE COURT:

23
24

25

Did you suggest to him possible ways of

doing it?

THE DEFENDANT:

No, not at all.

. LpORTlN. CS .
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2

At the conclusion of your second conver-

TIHE COURT:

1
sation,

what was the status of your negotiation?

3

THE DEFENDANT:

4

THE COURT:

5

THE DEFENDANT:

Couldn't be done.

When did you next talk to him?
I would say that I -- in the period

I probably spoke with him every week or

6

in the indictment.

7

two from June to October.
How did the discussions progress?

8

THE COURT:

9

THE DEFENDANT:

They were nearly always the same.

10

I would ask detailed questions about why it was impossible;

11

that would generate new prospects; he would run down those

12

prospects and talk again.

13

to not being possible.

Nearli always those prospects led

What type of suggestions were you making?

14

THE COURT:

15

THE DEFENDANT:

16

THE COURT:

17

THE DEFENDANT:

18

THE COURT:

19

THE DEFENDANT:

I'm sorry; was I making suggestions?

Were you making suggestions?
No.

He was making -Yes.

I was asking questions about

20

how he thought it was impossible, and he would make --

21

questions about why it wasn't possible would stimulate him to

22

think of new possibilities.

my

Then he would run those down?

23

THE COURT:

24

THE DEFENDANT:

25

THE COURT:

Yes.

What were some of the possibilities?

RO
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1

THE DEFENDANT:

One was

to buy uncut diamonds, not

2

polished; one was to go directly to a -- I guess the world

3

source or one of the primary sources for cut and uncut

4

diamonds; another one was to try to arrange this at the

5

New York Diamond Club, I think it is called, where large

6

transactions -- although not this large -- are done on the

7

floor in an open market.

8
9

Up to this point had he talked to you

THE COURT:

at all about the source of funds?

10

THE DEFENDANT:

11

THE COURT:

12

THE DEFENDANT:

13

THE COURT:

14
15
16

Not very much.

No.

No.

Or who you represented?
No, not after the first conversation.

Did he discuss with you any way the

style of payment would be made?
THE DEFENDANT:

Each time he had a suggestion.

He suggested a style.
How would it be made?

17

THE COURT:

18

THE DEFENDANT:

It depended on the -- since he was

19

more or
not familiar with transactions of this size, he was,

20

less, asking questions about it.

21

example, that just putting --

22

He would suggest, for
Well, let me back up.

The biggest problem was what I stated before.

It

was how would he not -- be sure to not damage his own credibili
That was about which

24

So he needed to know the money existed.

25

as putting funds in
there was a great deal of discussion, such

*asPT
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1

an escrow, putting money up front, schemes like that.
Do you recall all this?

2

THE COURT:

3

THE DEFENDANT:

4

I would say I don't recall every

detail.
Do you recall what you did?

5

THE COURT:

6

THE DEFENDANT:

7

THE COURT: Vividly?

8

THE DEFENDANT: Vividly?

9

THE COURT:

Oh, yes.

Your attorney the other day made some

10

mention about a mental condition, and that's why I am going

11

through some of this in detail with you.

12

all, right?

13

THE DEFENDANT:

14

THE COURT:

15

THE DEFENDANT:

16

I believe you asked me if I recalled

it vividly, and I said, querulously, "Vividly?"
Yes.

THE COURT:

18

THE DEFENDANT:

I would say that I don't remember

vividly.
You know what you did.

20

THE COURT:

21

THE DEFENDANT:

22

THE COURT:

2THE

I don't recall it all.

No.

You said ycu recalled it vividly.

17

19

You recall it

Yes.

You recall what you did.

DEFENDANT:

Yes.

You recall the scheme.

24

THE COURT:

25

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.

KOMT
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THE COURT:

You recall what you were attempting to

do.

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.

Were you attempting to defraud the bank?

THE COURT:

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.

You were attempting to get some diamonds

THE COURT:

in return from the bank?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

No.

Is there any question that you recall
I don't mean word-for-word conversatio

exactly what you did?
THE DEFENDANT:

There is no question that in the

broad terms presented in the indictment, I remember that.
THE COURT:

All right.

Let's go ahead with your

conversations, then, with the diamond broker.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
methods.

I'm not sure where we left.

You left where he was trying various

None of them worked out.

You talked about dif-

ferent methods of payments and you talked to him about once
a week from June until October of 1978r

Did you finally

formalize an arrangement?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

No.

Did you finally work out some agreement

with him?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

No.

When did you terminate your conversations
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with him?
THE DEFENDANT:

2

My understanding was that he was

3

to travel to Geneva to see if an arrangement could be made with

4

the prospective seller there.

5

THE COURT:

6

THE DEFENDANT:

7

THE COURT:

8

THE DEFENDANT:

9

Who would that be?

When wag that discussion?

Was that by phone or in person?

THE COURT:

11

THE DEFENDANT:

12

THE COURT:

13

THE DEFENDANT:

14

THE COURT:

15

THE DEFENDANT:

The price of a one-way ticket from

Los Angeles to Geneva.
How much was that?

18

THE DEFENDANT:

21

Only on one -- only once.

How much die you advance him?

THE COURT:

20

Telephone.

Were you advancing costs to him?

17

19

I would guess the beginning of

October.

10

16

Russalmaz.

I think it is about

I don't know.

$700.
THE COURT:

Had you done any research yourself or

reading yourself on the diamond market or anything?

22

THE DEFENDANT:

23

THE COURT:

24

THE DEFENDANT:

25

THE COURT:

Not at all.

Nothing at all?
Nothing at all.

What happened after he went to Switzerlan
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1
2

THE DEFENDANT:

He phoned and said it couldn't be

done.

3

THE COURT:

4

THE DEFENDANT:

Did he say.why?

Yes, that apparently Russalmaz had

5

an inventory in the amount required but it would take too long

6

to sift through all of the -- he couldn't select -- he couldn't

7

-- he couldn't do his clients service in the time required

8

to select an inventory he felt was worth the amount.

9

THE COURT:

Let me ask you this, Mr. Rifkin.

From

10

June until October you massaged this scheme in your -- bad

11

word -- you contemplated this scheme in your mind; is that

12

correct?

13

THE DEFENDANT:

14

THE COURT:

15

THE DEFENEANT:

I would say that I felt that a

preponderance of the time.
THE COURT:

18
19

During that time did you ever think,

"Maybe I won't go through with the scheme"?

16
17

Yes.

Each time you thought it, you put it

aside and. continued forward with the scheme; is that right?
THE DEFENDANT:

20

No; just the other way around.

21

1 would put the scheme aside and continue with daily life, and

22

1 probably spent five minutes a week thinking about the

23

scheme.

24
25

THE COURT:

And every time you thought about it,

you went further with it?
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1

THE DEFENDANT:

2

THE COURT:

3

And you continued to think about it

from June until it finally was put into existence?

4

THE DEFENDANT:

5

THE COURT:

6

THE DEFENDANT:

7

THE COURT:

8

THE DEFENDANT:

9

THE COURT:

Yes.

You had ample time to withdraw it?
I would say that.

But you didn't take that opportunity?
I would say I withdrew it many times.

Came right back to it?

10

THE DEFENDANT:

11

THE COURT:

12

That is correct.

Came back.

All right.

After he called you from

Switzerland, what happened then?
THE DEFENDANT:

13

I worked a counterproposal where he

15

exact value, but
didn't have to worry about assessing the
that would be enough;
he could make an approximate evaluation;

16

he would go to work
he was satisfied with that, and he said

17

on it.

14

What happened then?

18

THE COURT:

19

THE DEFENDANT:

20

Then I went to Switzerland, and we

conversed a number of times over the telephone.
In Switzerland?

21

THE COURT:

22

THE DEFENDANT:

23

THE COURT:

24

THE DEFENDANT:

In Switzerland.

When did you go to Switzerland?
If I could stay away from dates for

2511 the moment, as I don't remember the dates.

AOil[T
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THE COURT:

Just your best estimate.

THE DEFENDANT:

I could name the day in the sense

that he called me on a Thursday and I must have left Thursday
morning and we talked all day Friday.
THE COURT:

This was before any transactions at

the bank?
THE DEFENDANT:

The transaction at the bank was

Wednesday afternoon.
THE COURT:

Before you left for Switzerland?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

That is correct.

What prompted you to undertake the

transaction at the bank at that particular time on Wednesday
afternoon?
What is the government's proof on the date?
MR. TALCOTT:
THE COURT:
MS. STOLTZ:
THE COURT:

October 25, your Honor.
October 25?
Your Honor, that is correct.
All right.

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

My conviction that he would succeed.

Your conversations with him led you to

believe that the diamonds would be available if the money was
there, right?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

That is correct.

What had you done in preparation for your

transaction at the bank?

You have told us now what you had
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1

done in preparation for getting the diamonds.

2

done in preparation for your transaction at the bank?
THE DEFENDANT:

3

Well,

What had you

I hadn't done very much

In the study that I had made in

4

specifically, your Honor.

5

the spring of that year, I felt that I knew the wire room

6

operation, and so I knew that it was basically a matter of

7

making a telephone call.
THE COURT:

8
9
10

The indictment charges that by false

pretenses you gained access to the wire room.
that?

11

THE DEFENDANT:

12

THE COURT:

13

THE DEFENDANT:

14

THE COURT:

15

Wednesday -- the Wednesday.

How did you gain access to the wire room?
I walked in.

What were the false pretenses that you

used?

16

THE DEFENDANT:

17

THE COURT:

18

THE DEFENDANT:

19

THE COURT:

20

THE DEFENDANT:

21

THE COURT:

22

When was

That I was doing a study.

What name did you use?
"Stan Rifkin."

How did you get into the room?
I opened the door, walked in.

Who did you tell you were doing a study

to?

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24

THE COURT:

25

THE DEFENDANT:

Her name is Rosemary Hanses, H-a-n-s-

What was her position?
I don't know her official position.
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1

She was the head of a project to automate the wire room.

2

was a client contact in the -- the first job.

3

THE COURT:

4

did you do that day?

5

She

When you went into the wire room, what

THE DEFENDANT:

I observed -- I timed the operators

6

and took counts of transactions to see if 'the primary system

7

had a better behavior, was behaving better than it had before.

8

One of the reasons for going at all ever to the wire room

9

before was to give an unsolicited proposal to the vendor there

10
11
12
13

where we could go in and improve the system substantially.
THE COURT:

When you went on the 25th, you went

to get the code, right?
THE DEFENDANT:

Well, since I hadn't made the

14

decision to do it, I had not -- I had not made a decision to

15

go ahead dith the plan.

16
17
18
19
20

THE COURT:

What do you mean when you say you hadn't

made a de:ision?
THE DEFENDANT:

I was still very much rolling it

around in my mind.
THE COURT:

Your purpose for going to the bank

21

on the 25th was to get data that would make the plan opera-

22

tional; is that correct, whether you used it or not?
Yes.

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24

THE COURT: So that's why you went to the wire room?

25

THE DEFENDANT:

ROBERT 9.
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1I
2

THE COURT:

them, that you were doing a study, wasn't correct?

3
4

THE DEFENDANT:
correct.

5
6

That was

But you were studying it from a little

different viewpoint than you led thea to believe.
THE DEFENDANT:

I was also studying it from a dif-

ferent point.

9

I0

I was doing a study.

That was the reason I was there that day.
THE COURT:

7
8

And the false pretenses that you told

Namely, you were going to attempt to

THE COURT:

take the mcney from them.

11

THE DEFENDANT:

12

THE COURT:

Yes.

Now, after you got into the wire room,

13

what did you do about obtaining what the indictment calls

14

secret ccdes?
THE DEFENDANT:

15

I assume that the code to which

16

they are referring is a means of identification used by

17

bank employees, authorized bank employees, to effect transfers,

is

and the code is in plain view in the wire room.
And you obtained that code that day?

19

THE COURT:

20

THE DEFENDANT:

21

THE COURT:

22

THE DEFENDANT:

23

THE COURT:

24
25

Yes.

Did you write it down?
Yes.

Does the government have that piece of

paper?
MS. STOLTZ:

No, your Honor.
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1

THE COURT:

2

piece of paper then?

All right.

3

THE DEFENDANT:

4

THE COURT:

5

THE DEFENDANT:

6

THE COURT:

What did you do with that

I carried it.

You took it out with you?
Yes.

If I could go back one second, looking

did you ever at any time tell

this diamond

7

at the indictment,

8

broker you were acting on behalf of an American corporation

9

who wanted to purchase large quantities of diamonds?

10
11

THE DEFENDANT:

13

THE DEFENDANT:

14

THE COURT:

17

what did you then do?
THE DEFENDANT:

Who did you tell them you were?

19

THE DEFENDANT:

20

THE COURT:

21

THE DEFENDANT:

24
25

I went to a telephone and phoned

the wire room, said I wanted to make a transfer.
THE COURT:

23

That was at the first meeting.

After you left the wire room that day,

18

22

That was

I'm sorry?

THE COURT:

16

I believe I did.

at the first meeting.

12

15

Yes.

Mike Hansono

Where was the telephone?
It is a pay station located near

the headquarters building.
THE COURT:

At this time you decided you were going

to put the scheme into operation, correct?
THE DEFENDaNT:

I was going to take the next step.
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The next step of getting the money sent?

1

THE COURT:

2

THE DEFENDANT:

3

THE COURT:

4

THE DEFENDANT:

5

THE COURT:

6

THE DEFENDANT:

7

I wanted them to effect.
THE COURT:

8
9

I told them details of the transactioi

Did you tell them what your position

was, what Mike Hanson's position was?

11

THE COURT:

12

THE DEFENDANT:

13

THE COURT:

14

THE DEFENDANT:

15

THE COURT:

No.

Pardon me?
No.

Do you know a Mike Hanson?
No.

Did you tell them you were from the

International Department of Security Pacific National Bank?

17

THE DEFENDANT:

18

THE COURT:

Yes.

Did you authorize them to request a wire

transfer?

20

THE DEFENDANT:

21

THE COURT:

22

THE DEFENDANT:

23

THE COURT:

24

THE DEFENDANT:

25

I don't know.

What did you tell them?

THE DEFENDANT:

19

Yes.

Who did you talk to?

10

16
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Yes.

And of how nuch money?
$10,200,000.

How did you happen to pick that amount?
Ten million was in principal, the

amount of the indictment, and the two hundred was the broker's
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commission.

What instructions did you give them as

2

THE COURT:

3

far as the transfer?
THE DEFENDANT:

4

Well, I gave them information which
I gave them the name of the

5

they convert to instructions.

6

payee, the payor, to whose account to credit.
Did you mention the Irving Trust Company

7

THE COURT:

8

THE DEFENDANT:

9

THE COURT:

10
11

Yes.

Then you gave them some code; is that

correct?
THE DEFENDANT:

Your Honor, when the conversation

12

commences and the operator on the other end asks who you are

13

in order to assure that you are authorized, you are asked to

14

give this code of the day.
That is what you did?

15

THE COURT:

16

THE DEFENDANT:

17

THE COURT:

18

THE DEFENDANT:

19

Yes.

The code changes every day?
That is my understanding, although I

have no personal knowledge.

20

THE COURT: Anything else in that phone conversation?

21

THE DEFENDANT:

22

THE COURT:

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24

THE COURT: What did you do after you got home?

25

THE DEFENDANT:

No.

Then what did you do?
Went home.

Thought a lot about taking the next
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1

step.
The next step in your scheme was what?

2

THE COURT:

3

THE DEFENDANT:

4

THE COURT:

5

THE DEFENDANT:

6

THE COURT:

7

THE DEFENDANT:

8

THE COURT:

9

THE DEFENDANT:

Go to Geneva.

When did you go?
The following morning.

Had you obtained a passport?
I had a passport.

Before this time?
Yes.

When did you purchase an airline ticket?

10

THE COURT:

11

THE DEFENDANT:

12

THE COURT:

13

THE DEFENDANT:

14

THE COURT:

At the airport.

Had you made a reservation?
I don't recall.

Does the government have proof on

reservations?
16

MS. STOLTZ:

Not for Mr. Rifkin, your Honor.

17

purchased the ticket for Mr. Stein.

18

and that payment, but

19

THE COURT:

not
All

20

you flew to Switzerland?

21

THE DEFENDANT:

22

THE COURT:

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24

THE COURT:

25

He

We have those reservetions

for himself.
right.

What name did you use when

Stan Rifkin, I believe.

That is the name your passport was :.n?
Yes.

What did you do when you got to

Switzerland?
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THE DEFENDANJT:

1
2

things were going.
THE COURT:

3
4

Up to this point had you ever checked

to see if the money was credited to you in the Zurich bank?
THE DEFENDANT:

5
6

8

THE DEFENDANT:

9

THE COURT:

12
13

THE DEFENDANT:

No.

Yes.

I tried but couldn't find the

information.
THE COURT:

Had you tried that before you went to

Switzerland?
THE DEFENDANT:

15

THE COURT:

17

No.

Irving Trust?

14

16

In the Zurich bank?

Yes.

THE COURT:

11

Oh, I tried --

No.

7

10

I contacted Russalmaz and asked how

Yes.

Go ahead, if you will.

Continue what

you did in Switzerland.
THE DEFENDANT:

The contact with Russalmaz was

18

basically that the money had not been credited to their account

19

They were unaware of the money being credited, so I contacted

20

their bank and alerted them the money should be coming, and

21

some hours later it arrived -- it didn't arrive; a telegraphic

22

confirmation that the money was in the account of the New York

23

bank of the Zurich bank, and the Zurich bank called its clients

24

in Geneva and informed them it was there.

25

THE COURT:

When you gave the bank authority to
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transfer, was it to transfer to Russalmaz?
Yes.

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Then what happened?

THE DEFENDANT:

I went to Russalmaz to pick up the

baggage ticket for a piece of luggage in which was supposed
to be the diamonds.
Who gave you those instructions?

THE COURT:

THE DEFENDANT:

Either Mr. Stein or the managing

director of Russalmaz.
THE COURT:

Would that be by phone or in person?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

By phone.

Did you ever have any discussion as to

why you would go pick up the luggage rather than just getting
the diamonds?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

What was that discussion, and who was it

with?
THE DEFENDANT:

If I could say that is a very lcng

story, basically.
THE COURT:

Do you recall it?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

You have all these thoughts in mind now?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

I think so.

All right.

THE DEFENDANT:

Go ahead.

The diamonds had to be exported.

ROSERTi. KILLION.

..

C.
[Ig.C. .

I

687

RIFKIN

1980]

43

Therefore, they coul6 not be picked up

1

don't know why.

2

at the office; they had to be picked up in the duty-free port

3

of Geneva, which is at the airport.

4

couldn't be done.

That's the reason it

So someone had to pick up a baggage ticket, the

5
6

baggage claim ticket for a piece of luggage in the duty-free

7

port.

8
9

Did you intend to bring these diamonds

THE COURT:

as part of your scheme back to the United States undeclared?

10

THE DEFENDANT:

11

THE COURT:

12

THE DEFENDANT:

13

THE COURT:

No.

Did you intend to declare them?
No.

I didn't --

My question might have been unclear.

14

As part of your scheme, did you intend to declare these

15

diamonds with Customs?

16

THE DEFENDANT:

17

THE COURT:

,a
19

No.

You intended to bring them illegally

into the United States?
THE DEFENDANT:

No.

I didn't intend --

I never thought I would get them, so

20

a difficult point.

21

I didn't -- there was no plan or scheme.

22

This is

THE COURT:

Well, if ycu didn't think you would

23

get them, and you now had ten million dollars over in the

24

bank in Zurich --

25

Is that right?

THE DEFENDANT:

I just never thought it could go all
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the way through.
TIHE COURT:

2

If it went all the way through, your

3

intention was to get the diamonds back into the United States;

4

correct?

5

THE DEFENDANT:

6

THE COURT:

7

THE DEFENDANT:

8

THE COURT:

9

What were you going to do with them?

At some point did you decide what you

THE DEFENDANT:

I would say at some point I thought

I should go back to the United States.
without the diamonds?

12

THE COURT:

13

THE DEFENDANT:

14

I didn't know.

were going to do with them?

10
11

No.

I didn't know what to do with the

diamonds.
THE COURT:

15

Let's go ahead with what happened.

16

guess you haven't got the diamonds yet.

17

ticket.

18

THE DEFENDANT:

19

THE COURT:

20

THE DEFENDANT:

21

THE COURT:

22

THE DEFENDANT:

23

THE COURT:

24

THE DEFENDANT:

25

THE COURT:

Yes.

I

You got the baggage

The next morning --

Who did you get that from?
The managing director of Russaln.az.

Where did you meet him?
In his office.

What did he tell you?
Nothing.

Just gave you the ticket?

MOiMllIT 9[. KILLION. O01'11-1. m[MeCP.
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THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.

He wanted to check my passport

Then there was a number we had used to identify the individual
coming to pick up the baggage claim ticket.
THE COURT:

You say "we used."

THE DEFENDANT:

Who would use it?

He and I agreed that the individual

coming to pick up the baggage claim ticket would have a
passport in my name with my passport number and would give
him a number in addition to that.
THE COURT: Then what happened?
THE DEFENDANT:

The next morning I presented the

baggage claim ticket to Swissair,

who assured me it would

be on a flight, and I flew to Luxembourg.
THE COURT:

Why did you fly to Luxembourg?

THE DEFENDANT:

I believe a colleague of Mr. Stein's

told me that the diamonds -- precious gems could be imported
duty free there.
THE COURT:

What flight did Swissair assure you

they would be on?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

A flight to where?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

To Luxembourg,via Frankfurt.

The same fl.ght you would be taking?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

I don't know the number.

Yes.

So you flew to Luxembourg.

diamonds go with you?

111011[14T
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1

THE DEFENDANT:

2

THE COURT:

3

When you got to Luxembourg, did you get

some luggage?

4

THE DEFENDANT:

5

THE COURT:

6

THE DEFENDANT:

7

THE COURT:

8

Yes.

Did you get that luggage with the diamond!?
Yes.

Up to this point had you seen the

diamonds?
THE DEFENDANT:

9

THE COURT:

10
11

Apparently.

Not at all.

What happened when you got to

Luxembourg?
THE DEFENDANT:

12

I retrieved the bag with the

13

baggage claim ticket, went to a hotel and discovered that the

14

diamonds were in the bag.
How did you make that discovery?

15

THE COURT:

16

THE DEFENDANT:

17

THE COURT:

18

Was Stein with you at that time?

19

THE DEFENDANT:

Opened the bag, looked in.

Then what did you do?

Not at all.

I think it is

20

important to say that what you have observed -- that is the

21

first time I saw the diamonds, and it was the first indication

22

I had really that this scheme workad.

23

didn't have the slightest idea what to do.

24

long time.

I was aghast.

I

I thought for a

It just seemed to me that the only logical thing

251 for me to do was to go back to the United States, but I had

NlOWER[
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1

this cargo.
Could I interrupt one moment?

2

THE COURT:

3

On the Pago Pago case, it will be about fifteen

4

more minutes.
so you made arrangements to return to the United

5
6

States?
So I made arrangements to return

7

THE DEFENDANT:

8

to the United States, which I did.

9
10
11

Did you do anything in Luxembourg with

THE COURT:
the diamonds?

I reduced their bulk -- not the

THE DEFENDANT:

The diamonds are packed in very, very

12

bulk of the diamonds.

13

small packages, and it was very bulky.
You repacked it?

14

THE COURT:

15

THE DEFENDANT:

16

THE COURT:

17

Yes.

Did you talk to anybody about the

diamonds there?

18

THE DEFENDANT:

19

THE COURT:

20

getting rid of them?

21

I just reduced it.

Did you attempt to do anything as far as

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Not at all.

No.

How long did you stay in Luxembourg?

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24

THE COURT:

Overnight.

Then came to the United States?

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.
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1

THE COURT:

2

THE DEFENDA:;T:

3

THE COURT:

4

THE DEFENDANT:

5

EWhat did you do with the diamonds?

Where in your luggage?
I don't know how to answer; just in

the bag.
Did you conceal them in the bag?

6

THE COURT:

7

THE DEFENDANT:

8

THE COURT:

9

THE DEFENDANT:

Not really.

Did you take the lining out of the bag?
No.

No.

You just stuck them in there?

10

THE COURT:

11

THE DEFENDANT:

12

Put them in ny luggage.

I put them in a container that was

made to contain folded dress shirts, but it is transparent.
Then what happened?

All right.

13

THE COURT:

14

THE DEFENDANT:

15

THE COURT:

16

THE DEFENDANT:

17

MR. TALCOTT:

I arrived back in the United States.

Did you declare them?
No, I didn't.
Your Honor, I will interrupt at this

is

time and indicate to the Court that that completes the

19

allegations of Counts Two and Three with respect to the wire

20

fraud.
THE COURT:

21

It might complete the allegations, but

22

I am going to make sure there is a basis in fact and he was

23

you made
totally competent and, based upon the statements that

24

scheme of
the other day, I am going to go through the entire

2511 it.

MOSCIRT6. KILLION. .-
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We would object to that, your Honor,

MR. TALCOTT:

1
2
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As a matter of fact,

you may withdraw the plea if you desire.
I am just indicating to the Court that

MR. TALCOTT:

5
6

there has been a factual basis indicated to the Court on

7

Counts Two and Three.

9

Do you have any desire to withdraw the

THE COURT:

8
plea?

10

MR. TALCOTT:

11

THE COURT:

12

THE DEFENDANT:

Do you want to concentrate on the

Customs episode?
You went through Customs and didn't

THE COURT:
16

When you got back to the

All right.

United States, what did you do?

13
14

No.

declare them?
THE DEFENDANT:

17

Right.

The bags were searched.

For some reason the agent didn't find them.
Then what did you do?

19

THE COURT:

20

THE DEFENDANT:

21

attorney friend of mine.
THE COURT:

22
23

I went to a hotel, contacted an

What did you subsequently do with the

diamonds?

24

THE DEFENDANT:

25

THE COURT:

Nothing.

Kept the diamonds with you?

POSERT 5. KILLION.
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THE DEFENDANT:

2

THE COURT:

3
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Yes.

The diamonds were with you when you

were arrested in California?
Yes --

THE DEFENDANT:

4

I'm sorry; in the interim,

5

well -- well, there is a few days in the interim that I tried

6

to sell some.

I had also given some to my attorney friend.
Given some of the diamonds to him?

7

THE COURT:

8

THE DEFENDANT:

9

THE COURT:

Where did you attempt to sell them?

10

THE DEFENDANT:

11

THE COURT:

12

THE DEFENDANT:

13

THE COURT:

14

what day that was?

16

THE COURT:

October 14?

That is what the indictment charges.

Is that date right?

18

MS. STOLTZ:

19

THE COURT:

20

MS. STOLTZ:

21

THE COURT:

Is this the Western Union telegram?
Yes.
That is correct.
October 14, 1978.

Do you have that date

in mind?

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24

THE COURT:

25

Beverly Hills.

On October 14, 1978, do you remember

THE DEFENDANT:

22

Excuse me?

Where did you attempt to sell some?

15

17

Yes.

Yes.

Did you transmit in interstate and foreign

commerce a Western Union telegram?

mODCT It.

KILLION. wpw

MelgO

. C.O.M.

1980]

RIFKIN

695
5-I

1

THE DEFENDANT:

2

THE COURT:

3

THE DEFENDANT:

4

THE COURT:

5

THE DEFENDANT:

6

THE COURT:

7

THE DEFENDANT:

8

THE COURT:

9

10
11

Yes.

What did that telegram say?
Did you ask me if I transmitted it?

Yes.
No.

Did you have it transmitted?
Yes.

What did you do with reference to that

telegram?

THE DEFENDANT:

I typed it and handed it to the

clerk in a Western Union office and asked to have it sent.
And the telegram was addressed to whom?

12

THE COURT:

13

THE DEFENDANT:

14

TIIE COURT:

15

THE DEFENDANT:

16

THE COURT:

17

THE DEFENDANT:

18

THE COURT:

19

THE DEFENDANT:

20

THE COURT:

To Russalmaz.

And it was sent by whom?
Western Union.

Who was the named -Nelson.

The name that you were using?
Yes. It wasn't my name.

So when you went to the bank on Wednesday

21

October 25 --

22

did you go to the bank?

I might have the dates wrong.

23

MR. TALCOTT:

24

THE DEFENDANT:

25

MS. STOLTZ:

What date

That is correct, your Honor.
Yes.

This was two weeks -- a week before he
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1

wire transferred the funds.
TIE COURZT:

2
3

All right.

THE DEFENDANT:

5

THE COURT:

6

THE DEFENDANT:

How did you know that?

9

THE DEFENDANT:

I had some contact with him.

What was his position?

10

THE COURT:

ii

THE DEFENDANT:

He is, I believe, the head of the

wire roon.
THE COURT:

13

So ten days before you went to the wire

room you were using Nelson's name; is that correct?

15

THE DEFENDANT:

16

THE COURT:

17

Mr. Nelson works for Security Pacific

National Bank.
THE COURT:

14

Yes.

How did you come upon the name "Nelson"

8

12

Did the telegram go under

the name of Nelson?

4

7
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Yes.

Is that the first time you used his

name?

18

THE DEFENDANT:

19

THE COURT:

20

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.

What did the telegram say?
I don't remember the exact words.

21

of the
It was ta the effect that Stein was a representative

22

of diamonds.
bank and had the funds for the purchase

23
24
25

THE COURT:

When you sent that telegram, did you

know it was false?
THE DEFENDANT:

MO
R 6
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1
2

THE COURT:
telegram?

3
4

What was the purpose of sending the

THE DEFENDANT:

In order to induce Russalmaz to

complete the sale.
THE COURT:

Was one of the purposes alsso putting

into execution the scheme to defraud?
THE DEFENDANT:

Oh, yes.

All part of that same schen e?

THE COURT:

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.

When you sent the telegram, ,did you know

THE COURT:
it was false?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Did you willfully send it?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

When you sent it, did you know it would

be transuitted in interstate or foreign commerce?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

I assumed so.

That was the purpose of it; is that

correct?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Is there any other information with

reference to Count Two that has not been covered?
MS. STOLTZ:
THE COURT:

No, your Honor.
All right.

As to Count Three, do

you have that in front of you?

MIOUNT 6. KILLION. OFL.m
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THE DEFENDANT:

2

THE COURT:

Yes, I do.

Count Three realleges paragraphs 1

3

through 8, which I will not reread to you.

4

in mind?

5

THE DEFENDANT:

6

THE COURT:

7
8
9

Do you have those

Yes, I do.

It then states --

I am talking about

paragraphs 1 through 8 of Count Two.
It then states:
"On or about October 25, 1978, within

I0

the Central District of California, for the

11

purpose of executing the above scheme and

12

artifice to defraud and to obtain money by

13

false and fraudulent pretenses, you did

14

knowingly and willfully cause to be transmitted

15

in interstate commerce by means of wire

16

communications certain signs and signals,

17

that is, defendant Rifkin, yourself, caused

18

the Security Pacific Bank to wire transfer

19

10.2 million dollars from Los Angeles,

20

California, to the Irving Trust Company in

21

New York, New York, for credit to the account

22

of Russalmaz at Wozchod Handelsbank in Zurich,

23

Switzerland."

24

Did you commit those acts?

25

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.
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THE COURT:

Are you guilty of that offense?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Tell me what you did with reference to

that particular transaction.
THE DEFENDANT:

If you will excuse me, your Honor,

I believe we have explained that.
THE COURT:

Let's do it again for this count.

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Do it again for this count?
We didn't explain what you requested be

done by the bank.
THE DEFENDANT:

I requested the bank to make a

wire transfer of 10.2 million dollars from Los Angeles to
the Irving Trust Company in New York.
THE COURT:

That was the telephone call from the

pay phone?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

That is correct.

All right.

When you did that, did you

know how the transfer would be done?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

I had an idea.

What was your idea?
Do you mean that it was done by

THE DEFENDANT:
wire?
THE COURT:

Yes.

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

You are not being charged here with a

MOUT
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1

telephone call.

2

THE DEFENDANT:

3

THE COURT:

4

THE DEFENDANT:

I knew it would be done by

How did you know that?

8

THE DEFENDANT:

11

Yes.

cable.
THE COURT:

10

Oh, no.

You are being charged here with causing

7

9

No.

them to send a cable.

5
6

[Vol. II

I had done the system which enabled

them to do that.
THE COURT:

All right.

What was the purpose of your

requesting them and causing them to send that cable?

12

THE DEFENDANT:

13

THE COURT:

14

THE DEFENDANT:

15

THE COURT:

For furtherance of the plan.

The scheme to defraud?
Yes.

At the time that you requested them to

16

do that, did you do so willfully?

17

THE DEFENDANT:

18

THE COURT:

19

THE DEFENDANT:

20

THE COURT:

21

THE DEFENDANT:

22

THE COURT:

Yes.

Knowing that it would be done?
Yes.

And anticipating it would be done?
Anticipating it would be done.

When I said, "It would be done," that

23

is, there would be a wire communication from the bank to the

24

Irving Trust Company in New York?

25

THE DEFENDANT:

That is correct.

NOIENT a[. KILLION. Orr-"*
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THE COURT:

And the wire communication would be to
in Count Three?

the effect as set forth
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

That is right.

Any other information on Count Three

that the government has that hasn't been covered?
MS. STOLTZ:
THE COURT:

No, your Honor.
Do you know of any reason I shouldn't

accept your plea of guilty?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Not at all, your Honor.

Have you ever been seen by a psychiatriist

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: When was that?
THE DEFENDANT:

If you would broaden it to psycholo:gijt

as well -THE COURT:

All right.

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Before that had you ever?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Two days ago.

Yes.

When was that?

THE DEFENDANT:

In the time since I have been out

on bail I have seen psychologists or psychiatrists two to
three times a week.
THE COURT:

Have you ever seen one before this

October of 1978?
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.

PO5[RT 9. KILLION.
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1

a half.
that for a month and

2

THE COURT:

3

THE DEFENDANT:

4

Any other than that?
When I was seventeen I was

an inpatient at County General Hospital.

5

THE COURT:

6

THE DEFENDANT:

7

THE COURT:

8

THE DEFENDANT:

9

THE COURT:

io

Yes.

In the psychiatric ward?
Yes.

For how long?
Three months.

Have you discussed all of these with

your attorney?

11

THE DEFENDANT:

12

THE COURT:

Yes.

You have told them everything about

13

any psychiatrist or psychologist or mental treatment you

14

have received?

15

THE DEFENDANT:

16

THE COURT:

17

Did you discuss with your attorneys

any injuries you may have ever had to your head?

18

THE DEFENDANT:

19

THE COURT:

20

THE DEFENDANT:

21

THE COURT:

22

Yes.

You told them everything about it?
Yes.

Is there anything that you left out at

all?

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24

THE COURT:

25

Absolutely.

Not at all.

Do you understand, as I mentioned to you

a moment ago, that when you plead guilty you waive and give up

mel.9 T N. KILl. ON. -',
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1

the right to ever raise any defenses?

2

THE DEFENDANT:

3

THE COURT:

Yes.

That is, a defense of incompetency

4

or a defense of insanity or a defense of diminished capacity,

5

if there be such a thing in federal court, or any other

6

type of defense relating to your mental conditiorr.

7

understand?

8

THE DEFENDANT:

9

THE COURT:

THE DEFENDANT:

11

THE COURT:

Yes.

You have discussed that.fully with your

attorney?

13

THE DEFENDANT:

14

THE COURT:

15

Yes, I do.

Is that what you want to do?

10

12

Fully.

Have you taken any medication, drugs,

or pills regularly?

16

THE DEFENDANT:

17

THE COURT:

18

THE DEFENDANT:

19

THE COURT:

No.

Have you taken any today?
No.

Have you taken any during the time

20

between June and October of 1978?

21

THE DEFENDANT:

22

THE COURT:

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24

THE COURT:

25

Do you

Minor medication.

Such as?
Tetracycline compound.

Was there anything that you were taking

during the time from October 14 to October 28?

0OlltT
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1

THE DEFENDANT:

2

THE COURT:

3

THE DEFENDANT:

4

THE COURT:

Excpt for that, no.

Did that in any way affect your thinking?
No.

Mr. Talcott, have you discussed with

5

Mr. Rifkin the nature of the charges against him and any

6

possible defenses he might have?

7

MR. TALCOTT:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. TALCOTT:

Fully and -Have you ---

THE COURT:

10

[Vol. ]I

--

completely, your Honor.
explained to him that his plea of

11

guilty waives his right to ever raise any defenses to these

12

charges?

13

MR. TALCOTT:

14

THE COURT:

15
16

I have, your Honor.
Have you discussed with him the possi-

bility of any illegally-obtained evidence in the possession
of the government?
I have.

17

MR. TALCOTT:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. TALCOTT: Yes.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. TALCOTT:

22

THE COURT:

And you made motions in that regard --

-- to suppress?

Correct.
Is he pleading guilty because of any

23

illegally-obtained evidence in the possession of the govern-

24

ment?

25

MR. TALCOTT:

Not to my knowledge.
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I

Do you know anything about his condition

THE COURT:

2

today that would mal:e you feel in any way his judgment is

3

impaired?

4

MR. TALCOTT:

There is nothing that I have knowledge

5

of that would make me feel his judgment is impaired at this

6

time.

7

Do you have any indication at all from

THE COURT:

8

doctors' reports or anything that you have received that he is

9

not capable of knowingly waiving his right to trial and is

10

capable of entering a meaningful and knowing plea of guilty?
No and yes.

11

MR. TALCOTT:

12

No, I have no information that he is not in a positio:

13

now to knowingly --

14

THE COURT:

15

If you had asked that question, I pr~babl

would have growled at you -Objected --

16

MR. TALCOTT:

17

THE COURT:

18

Let me break it up.

-- for compounding a question.
Do you have any informatioa

19

that would lead you to believe that he is not capable of waivinc

20

his right to trial?

21

14R. TALCOTT:

22

THE COURT:

I have no such information.
Do you have any information that would

23

lead you to believe that he was not capable at the time he

24

waived a right to a jury to knowingly make such waiver?

25

MR. TALCOTT:

I have no such information.
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1

THE COURT:

Do you have any information that would

2

lead you to believe that he cannot now knowingly and intelli-

3

gently enter a plea of guilty?

4
5

MR. TALCOTT:
to me.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. TALCOTT:

8

THE COURT:

9

There is no such information available

And none that you are aware of?
None I am aware of.
Do you know of any reason I should not

accept his plea of guilty?

10

MR. TALCOTT:

No.

11

THE COURT:

Have there been any promises made to

12

him other than those put forth on the record?

13

MR.

14

THE COURT:

16

No.

TALCOTT:

Mr. Rifkin, have you had sufficient time

to discuss this case with your attorneys?

16

THE DEFENDANT:

17

THE COURT:

18

21

Are you satisfied with their representa-

tion of you in this case?
THE DEFENDANT:

19
20

Yes, I have.

It is completely competent, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

Mr. Rifkin and Mr. Talcott have advised

22

me that they have discussed the nature of the charges against

23

Mr. Rifkin and any possible defenses he might have.

24

appears to understand the nature and consequences of his plea

25

of guilty and the nature of the charges that he is pleading
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1

guilty to.

2

to Counts Two and Three he waives and gives up the right of

3

ever raising any defenses that might have been or were asserted

4

to those charges, and also he waives his right to appeal any

5

previous rulings of this Court.

6

He also understands that by his plea of guilty

I find there is a basis in fact for the plea of

7

guilty, and I incorporate in my findings the statements made

8

by Mr. Rifkin in the discussion that I had with him in that

9

regard.

10

Just generally, Mr. Rifkin in June of 1978, after

11

having worked at the Security Pacific Bank wire room, devised

12

a scheme whereby he would transfer money from the bank through

13

the wire room to an account somewhere else where the mone

14

could be used later for the purchase of diamonds.

15

In furtherance of that scheme on numerous occasions

16

between June and October of 1978 he met with the diamond

17

broker and attempted to work out different methods by which

18

diamonds in a substantial value, namely, in the area of

19

ten million dollars, could be acquired.
After numerous unsuccessful attempts on the part of

20
21

Mr. Rifkin and the broker, it was finally worked out where

22

perhaps diamonds could be obtained in Switzerland through

23

Russalmaz.

24

could be obtained, in furtherance of his scheme he went to

25

the bank, as set forth in Count Two, went to the wire room and

After Mr. Rifkin was convinced that the diamonds
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I

by false pretenses gained cntry into the wire room, telling

2

him he was doing a study of the -- further study of the system.
While in the wire room he copied down on a piece

3
4

of paper the secret code necessary to bring about the transfer

5

of funds.

6

After leaving the wire room he went to a pay tele-

7

phone, made a call to the bank using the code,and he supplied

8

them infornation by which 10.2 million dollars would be

9

transferred to the Irving Trust Company, to the account of

10
11
12
13
14

Russalmaz in Switzerland.
The 10.2 million was arrived at with $200,000 being
for commission, the ten million for the diamonds.
After that occurred he went home, gave further
contemplation to his scheme and got a ticket to Switzerland,
flew to Switzerland.

16

In dealings with Mr. Stein and Russalmaz representa-

17

tives in Switzerland, he obtained a baggage check that he

18

utilized in getting the luggage, the baggage he had been told

19

would contain the diamonds.

20

lie had previously checked to make sure the money
After that was accomplished, he went to

21

was at the bank.

22

get the --

23

that
he went to the luggage area, was assured by Swissair

24
25

to
the baggaget would be on the flight to Luxembourg, went
Luxembourg, opened the baggage, found it to be diamonds,

After checking with Russalmaz representatives,
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1

repackaged it in such a way to get it back into the United

2

States, put it in a shirt container in his luggage, did not

3

declare it, got it into the United States.

4

After the diamonds were here he attempted to sell

5

some of the diamonds, apparently did sell or give away some

6

of the diamonds, and the remaining diamonds were with him

7

at the time of his arrest.

8
9

Mr. Rifkin specifically recalls in substantial
detail the events during this time period.

He recalls on

10

October 14, 1978, in furtherance of the scheme and for the

11

purpose of carrying out the scheme, he knowingly, willfully

12

made or caused a cablegram to be sent under the name of

13

"Nelson" to Switzerland advising that Stein would be the

14

representative of the bank and that the money would be put

15

in the account of Russalmaz.

16

In Count Three he states that on October 25, the

17

purpose of his telephone conversation to the bank was so

18

that they would transmit by wire a communication to the Irving

19

Trust Company.

20

used, becauase he had set up the procedure and was familiar

21

willfully
with the practices of the bank, so he knowingly and

22

caused that transmission to take place.

He knew that that would be the procedure

23

I find the plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily

24

Rifxin
being entered; there have been no promises made to Mr.

25

other than those set forth on the record.

ROBER[T I[. KILL.ION.
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1

pleading guilty, not because of these concessions on the part

2

of the government, but rather because he is,

3

of the offenses charged.

4

I also find that there has been no coercion or
The pleas of guilty to Counts Two

5

duress exerted upon him.

6

and Three will be accepted and entered.
The matter will be referred to the Probation

7
8

Department for a pre-sentence report.
Where have you lived other than California, if

9
10

anywhere, Mr. Rifkin?

11

THE DEFENDANT:

12

THE COURT:

13

THE DEFENDANT:

14

THE COURT:

15

in fact, guilty

Brief periods abroad.

Have you ever been arrested?
No, never.

Either the 19th or the 26th.

What

is the status of the other case?
Your Honor, I expect the other case

MS. STOLTZ:

16
17

against the woman will be presented to the grand jury next

18

week.

We are scheduled to dismiss his complaint tomorrow.

19

MR. TALCOTT:

20

THE COURT:

21

MS. STOLTZ:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. TALCOTT:

24
25

May we ask for the 26th, your Honor?
Any objection?
No objection, your Honor.
All right.
Yes.

The 26th of March.

May we have it at 3:30, your

Honor?
THE COURT:

I will have to let you know then.

0S1RT if. KILLION.
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1I

me sec the book.

2

(Brief pause.)

3

MR. TALCOTT:

4

THE DEFENDANT:

5

MR. TALCOTT:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. TALCOTT:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. TALCOTT:

10

Or for

in the morning.

4:00 in the morning?
Or in the morning.

11:00 a.m.?
That is fine, your Honor.
All right.

Thank you very much.

Your Honor, there are two other

matters.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. TALCOTT:

Yes?
At this time we would respectfully

13

request that the $200,000 bond that has been previously posted

14

in this case be exonerated at this time and a new bond in an

15

amount to be determined by the Court set until the time of

16

sentencing.

17

MS. STOLTZ:

18

THE COURT:

19
20

Your Honor, we are -We have two problems.

The bond I have

set, he made.
MS. STOLTZ:

That is correct.

There is a one

21

million-dollar bond which was set by the Magistrate in the

22

new complaint.

23

for tomorrow, and pursuant to our agreement we are scheduled

24

to dismiss that case tomorrow, so at that time the only

25

remaining charge against him will be this case.

The preliminary hearing date on that is set

RO90INT 9. KIL.ION. OFFICIALREpoFltm. C.$ S
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1

In view of the fact that he has pled guilty, we

2

would ask that he be remanded on this case and no bond be

3

set and that the bond which was previously set be exonerated.

4

He has made the bond in this case, and when the charges in

5

the new case are dismissed, this will be the only case and

6

the only bond remaining.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. TALCOTT:

9

What is your request?
My request is substantially the same,

except that I would request that an amount of a bond be indi-

10

cated and that it not be a no-bail situation, and I would

11

suggest to the Court that, in practicality, any amount in

12

excess of the existing bond --

13

would not be able to be made by the defendant.

14

to the Court a half million dollars.

15

THE COURT:

16

no bail information.

17

the bail?

18

and even less than that -I suggest

Has Pretrial Services made a --

I have

Has Pretrial Services made a study on

MS. STOLTZ:

Yes, your Honor.

Pretrial Services

19

recommended, I believe it was, two hundred thousand or

20

two hundred fifty thousand on the new case and said that

21

was also taking into consideration the bond in this case and

22

indicated that if something happenad to this case, in the new

23

case they would recommend -- it was either four hundred thousand
or a half million.

25

THE COURT:

When are you goinV to dismiss that case,

1101914T 1. KILLION. O0FV--*IlPell~l
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tomorrow?
Your Honor, the preliminary hearing,

MS. STOLTZ:

2
3

I believe, is scheduled for 3:30 tomorrow, so we either have

4

to

5

dismiss the case at that time.

6

THE COURT:

him, present the case to the grand jury, or

indict

I will keep my bail in effect, rather
I will reset the bail.

7

than exonerating it now.

8

will have to be changed -Yes.

MR. TALCOTT:

9

-- as I think you are each aware.

THE COURT:

10

The bail

11

Could you contact Pretrial Services and see if they have done

12

a written report on this, which I assume they have?

13

MS. STOLTZ:

14

THE COURT:

Yes, they have.
May I have a copy of that report?

15

will set this tomorrow morning for a bail hearing at --

16

what time is convenient for you?

17

MR. TALCOTT:

18
19

I

Well, your Honor, we have no objection

to appearing for the bail hearing, but I would suggest to the
Court that the Pretrial Services recommpnded a half million
We

20

dollars, and that's what the Court is going to discover.

21

would have no objection to that amount or, if the Court wants

22

to have it higher, to have it set higher.
THE COURT:

23
24

have to.

25

the report.

If you don't want to appear, you don't

I will just give a bail order, but I want to sce

ROlIT
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MR. TALCOTT:

And if you want to appear and to be

THE COURT:
heard on it,

All right.

you may certainly do so.

I don't know what the

government's position is.
Do you have a position?

Do you have any bail

position?
MS. STOLTZ:

Well, your Honor, we would definitely

recommend there be no bail.

If any bail is set, we recommend

that it be in the amount of one million dollars, in view cf
the fact that there was -I don't think you can sustain a no-bail

THE COURT:
MS. STOLTZ:

-

Your Honor, if a bail is set we wovld

definitely recommend it be -9:30 tomorrow morning.

THE COURT:

All right.

MR. TALCOTT:

Will you fill out, if you desire to,

THE COURT:

a Bail Reform Act form.

If not, you can

You may do that.

present it orally.
MR. TALCOTT:

Thank you.
Is there anything additional?

THE COURT:

better give me a copy of that affidavit.
time.

You had

I had it at one

I am talking about the affidavit filed with the ccmplair

in this last action.
MS. STOLTZ:

Yes, your Honor.

We will provide your

Honor with a copy.

00991T X. KILLION.
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I

THE COURT: Any objection to that?

2

MR. TALCOTT:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. TALCOTT:

Yes, we have an objectcn.,
What is your objection?
It

is

not clear at this tiro

h,-!.,!r

5

the law in our opinion permits latitude for the Court to

6

draw conclusions from that arrest complaint.

7

that the basis of the submission of that arrest com.plaint

a

to the Court is solely and exclusively to increase the

9

sentence that the Court might anticipate giving.

10
11

Increase the sentence?

THE COURT:

We would submit

I am talking

about bail.

12

MR. TALCOTT:

13

THE COURT:

Oh, bail.

All right.

I would ob-ect.

I am talking about it for tomorrow':

14

hearing, because the fact that there is an allegation against

15

him, the fact that he has been arrested again is certainly

16

a factor that I am going to consider in setting bail.

17

MR. TALCOTT:

Your Honor, the Court is aware that

18

some time after 9:30 tomorrow morning that arrest complaint

19

is going to be dismissed.

20
21
22

THE COURT:

I am aware it is going to be dismissed,

and I am aware of why it is going to be dismissed.
MR. TALCOTT:
THE COURT:

Yes.
You know, you have made arrangements,

24

are
but I am also going to be aware of what the allegations

25

against him anyway.

It is certainly a factor to consider as
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1

to what the appropriate bail is.

2

MR. TALCOTT:

3

We

feel it has no bearing at all and would make our objection.
All right.

THE COURT:

4
5

Well, we would object to that.

That objection is overruled.

The government will supply me with a copy of the complaint.

6

MS. STOLTZ:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. TALCOTT:

9

THE COURT:

Yes, we will, your Honor.
All right.

Anything additional?

Yes.
Is that a convenient time?
That is fine.

10

MR. TALCOTT:

11

THE COURT:

12

Mr. Cathcart, your doctor tomorrow -- what time do

13

May I inquire for one moment?

you have him set up?

14

MR. CATHCART:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. TALCOTT:

9:30.

We shouldn't be more than a few minutes.
Your Honor, we would respectfully ask

17

the Court to allow Mr. Rifkin to place one telephone call per

18

day until the time of his sentencing, and the reason for that

19

is that Mr. Rifkin is in what is euphemistically described as

20

high power, which is an isolation area.

21

the
access, as does the general population of county jail, to
We would ask that he be allowed to make one phone

22 telephone.
23
24

25

They do not have

call a day.
To whom?

THE COURT:
MR. TALCOTT:

To a number of persons to obtain

3O&ERT
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1

information that we would like to present to the Court if he

2

has to make those contacts.
You can supply a list of people he is

THE COURT:

3
4

going to call and let the government take a look at the list

5

and I will make that order tomorrow.

6

MR. TALCOTT:

7

THE COURT:

8

MS. STOLTZ:

9

MR. TALCOTT:

10

Any objection to that?
None whatsoever, your Honor.
In that case, may I request that

Mr. Rifkin be brought over tomorrow morning?
Yes.

THE COURT:

11
12

All right.

He can be present for the bail

hearing.

13

MR. TALCOTT:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. TALCOTT:

16

THE COURT:

Thank you.
Anything additional?
Nothing additional.
Thank you very much.

17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

1

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFOrnIA

2
3
4
5

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

6

Plaintiff,

7
8
9

Criminal Action
No. 78-1050-W.MB

VS.
STANLEY MARK RIFKIN,
Defendant.

10
11
CERTIFICATE

12
13

I hereby certify that I am a duly appointed, qualifie

14

and acting official court reporter of the United States

15

District Court for the Central District of California.

16

I further certify that the foregoing 73 pages are

17

a true and correct transcript of the proceedings had in

18

the above-entitled cause on Thursday, February 22, 1979, and

19

of
that said transcript is a true and correct transcription

20

my stenographic notes.

21
22

23

Dated at Los Angeles, California, this
of March, 1979.

23

ROBERT E. KILLION
Official Reporter

24
25

I
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AFFIDAVIT
I, Robin C. Brown, a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for over 3 years hereby declare and say'as follows:
I have conducted an investigation into the transportation of stolen goods
in interstate commerce and have acquired the following information:
1.
Beginning on or about October 1, 1978 and continuing to the
present in Los Angeles County and elswhere outside the Central
District of California STANLEY MARK RIFKIN aka Mike Hanson, David
Garnett and Stan Rifkin representing himself as an agent for a
large United States business firm interested in purchasing a quantity
of diamonds overseas committed the following acts:
(a) During the first week of October STANLEY
RIFKIN obtained the services of a reputable
diamond broker in Los Angeles, California to
conduct'the necessary negotiations for and purchase of diamonds in Geneva, Switzerland.
(b) On or about October 25, 1978 STANLEY MARK
RIFKIN, represently himself to be one Mike Hanson,
an employee of the International Banking Office
of Security Pacific National Bank, Los Angeles,
California telephoned the Wire Transfer room of
the above Security Pacific Bank and by tht
use of secret codes affected the transfer of 10.2
million dollars to an account in Zurich, Switzerland.
This conversation was recorded. I have established
that the purported account from which these funds
were transferred does not in fact exist.
These
funds were later confirmed to be on deposit in
Zurich, Switzerland with "RUSSALMAZ", an arm of
the Soviet Government that handles the export
of diamonds.
(c) On or about October 27, 1978 a purchase of
$8,145,000.00 worth of diamonds was made in Geneva,
Switzerland by the same diamond broker whose services had been obtained by STANLEY MARK RIFKIN.
These diamonds were purchased from Russian auhorities following confirmation of the deposit of
funds fraudulently obtained by STANLEY MARK RIFKIN
which were deposited to the above mentioned Zurich,
Switzerland bank account. These diamonds were
assembled by the Russians and broker and delivered
to a courier pickup location in Geneva, Switzerland.
(d) These diamonds were subsequently picked up
by an individual during the period October 27-29,

1978.
(e) On or about October 31, 1978 RIFKIN met with
an individual in Los Angeles and said that he had
-61-
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acquired the above noted diamonds. RIFKIN exhibited approximately 1 million dollars worth
of the diamonds to the individual and left three
stones with that person. These stones have been
identified by the broker as similar to the diamonds
purchased in Switzerland. In discussing this
matter RIFKIN admitted that he had acquired a new
Identity and was going to "places unknown". He
further stated that Security Pacific Bank would
bear the loss of the $10.2 million dollars.
(f) The diamond broker who had acquired the diamonds in Switzerland has positively identified
the purported voice of Mike Hanson referred to
above as the man known to him as STANLEY MARK RIFKIN.

ZROWN
'ROBINZ.
SP)QIAL AGENT, FBI

SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED TO BEFORE ME
DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1978.
THIS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE
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